This time last year, the UK was shivering through the “Beast from the East”, a blast of Arctic air that brought freezing conditions and blizzards to much of Europe.

Fast-forward to February 2019 and much of the UK has seen unseasonably warm conditions, record-breaking high winter temperatures and a series of wildfires.

As with the heatwaves that hit the northern hemisphere last summer, the extreme temperatures have triggered news and comment across the media. Carbon Brief looks back at how the story has been covered over the past week.

The summary below is split into five sections:

• Record-breaking weather
• Impacts on nature
• Weather and climate
• Media comment
• Scientists react

Record-breaking weather

The UK’s spell of unusually warm weather began during the third week of February. Thursday 21 February and Friday 22 February both saw maximum temperatures top 18C, with Thursday seeing a new record high February temperature for Scotland. The measurement of 18.3C at Aboyne in Aberdeenshire broke the previous record that had stood for 122 years.

Today was a #recordbreaking day! The Scottish record maximum temperature for February, which has stood for 122 years, has finally been broken by Aboyne, with a temperature of 18.3C pic.twitter.com/m8DnuK36lv

— Met Office (@metoffice) February 22, 2019

On Friday, 21 weather stations across the north of the UK saw new high temperatures – with some beating previous records by 2.5C. That warmth continued into the weekend. On Sunday, Wales saw a new record high February temperature of 19.1C at Gogerddan – beating the previous record of 18.6C at Velindre in 1990.

On Monday, the UK, as a whole, saw its first winter day on record where temperatures exceeded 20C, as the Guardian reported. Temperatures in Trawsgoed, Wales, reached 20.3C that morning, before going on to hit 20.6C in the afternoon.

It’s officially the UK’s warmest winter day on record; three sites exceeded 20 Celsius today with 20.6 °C at Trawsgoed, Ceredigion the highest temperature pic.twitter.com/eMCYDUdwW7

— Met Office (@metoffice) February 25, 2019

This topped the previous record for the warmest February day of 19.7C in Greenwich, London in 1998, noted the Metro. “The UK was twice as hot as Athens and warmer than Ibiza,” said the Daily Mirror.

The new record did not last long. Just a day later, on Tuesday, temperatures at Porthmadog, Gwynedd, reached 20.8C, reported the Daily Telegraph, and then, later in the day, 21.2C at Kew Gardens, London, said Sky News. On the same day a year earlier, Kew Gardens was a frigid 2.4C, the Met Office noted.

The Met Office maps below show UK-wide daily maximum temperatures – relative to a 1981-2010 baseline – on the day of the previous record in 1998 (left) and then on the record-breaking day this year.

Daily maximum temperatures for 13 February 1998 (left) and 26 February 2019 (right), relative to a baseline period of 1981-2010. Credit: Dr Mark McCarthy, Met Office

Met Office meteorologist Martin Bowles told the Guardian that “the average [daily maximum] temperature for this time of year is 9C in London and 9C in north Wales, so what we’re seeing is 10C above average”.

The maps below, created for Carbon Brief by the Met Office’s Dr Mark McCarthy, show Met Office maps of daily maximum temperature, relative to 1981-2010, for the past six days. The purple shading indicates the regions that have hit more than 10C above average.

The New York Times also noted that Ireland, France, Sweden and the Netherlands have all seen record, or near-record, winter temperatures over the past week.

Impacts on nature

Media coverage also tackled the knock-on impacts of the warm winter weather. MailOnline reported that “wildfires broke out across the country [on Monday]” as the “hottest winter day ever created arid conditions and left fields parched”.

Firefighters were called to fires in Sussex, Edinburgh, North Wales and Saddleworth Moor in Greater Manchester. “More than 1.5 square kilometres of Saddleworth Moor was ablaze in the early hours of Wednesday morning after the UK’s hottest winter day on record,” reported the Independent, noting:

“Firefighters battled the flames with leaf blowers but were hampered by difficult terrain and said the moorland was ‘surprisingly dry’ for February.”

A wildfire also broke out on Saddleworth Moor during last summer’s heatwave, which “required army assistance to tackle” and “took more than three weeks to extinguish”, said Reuters.

Paul Hudson, BBC Yorkshire’s climate correspondent, noted that the region has seen a spate of warm and dry weather:

“There’s been a prolonged abnormally warm spell and we’ve also had an exceptionally dry start to 2019.”

BBC News science correspondent Victoria Gill looked at why there are UK wildfires in February, asking: “In a changing climate, is this the new normal?”. Fires on moorland, even at this time of year, are “actually fairly typical”, she said, citing Dr Thomas Smith, an environmental geography researcher from the London School of Economics (LSE).

However, the scale of the West Yorkshire moorland fire has been driven in part by the weather, the article added. “Sunny, dry conditions created a tinderbox effect that we usually see in the spring,” it noted. Prof David Demeritt, from King’s College London, told BBC News the landscape fire were “unseasonable”. He said:

“Landscape fires in Britain happen disproportionately in the Spring, because on the moors and in the forest, you have no leaf cover. Sticks and leaf litter dry out. And because this has been a relatively dry winter, there’s more of that fuel on the ground – everything has dried out early.”

Smith added that “we should expect fire activity like we’ve seen this week to happen more frequently in future” as warm spells become more likely with climate change.

News of the fires also reached the US, with the New York Times reporting that “on the same day that Britain experienced record winter temperatures, wildfires broke out at some of the nation’s most beloved nature spots”. CNN noted that “the West Sussex Fire and Rescue Service blamed the ‘unusual warm weather this week’” for the fires in Ashdown Forest in East Sussex.

A spell of such warm weather during the winter can also confuse plants and animals, noted BBC News:

“The unusually high temperatures have prompted hedgehogs to come out of hibernation, butterflies to emerge and migrating birds such as swallows and house martins to arrive more than a month early.”

The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) warned that birds, insects and other wildlife could face “a real crisis” if the weather turns colder, as it is expected to do. (The Daily Express reports that temperatures are expected to “plummet” later this week.)

“It is mammals who will suffer worst,” Ben Keywood, an entomologist at Sheffield & Rotherham Wildlife Trust told the Independent.

“If hedgehogs have started coming out over the last two weeks or so, they are going to struggle to find a lot of the food they would normally eat as a lot of it is not out yet. So then [when the temperature falls] they may not have had enough to eat when they go back into hibernation and will have used up more of their fat reserves, which can make them significantly weaker.”

The “unexpected warmth is sowing much confusion in the natural world and threatens summer harvests, especially for fruit growers”, explained John Naish in the Daily Mail:

“Many of Britain’s plants have evolved to use winter’s cold to their advantage. In the same way that our bodies need eight hours of sleep in each 24-hour cycle, plants need a period of dormancy during the colder months if they are to thrive in spring.”

If fruit trees flower early, there might not be as many bees about as usual, warned Naish, “with a good chance they would not then be pollinated and so would not fruit”.

The warm, sunny weather has affected human behaviour, too, pointed out another BBC News piece. The retailer Asda reported that sales of swimwear, sunglasses and shorts were up 19%, 27% and 150%, respectively, compared to last year. And Sainsbury’s said sales of ice cream were up 370% on this time last year.

Weather and climate

A number of articles also discussed the causes of the spell of warm weather. The Daily Mirror explained that it “comes courtesy of a high pressure front drawing up warmer air from as far south as the Canary Islands and even the tropics”.

The tweet below, from the Met Office, shows how the jet stream – a band of fast-flowing air high up in the atmosphere – has helped steer warm air towards the UK.

A powerful #jetstream and #cold air feeding out of N America into the W Atlantic is generating deep areas of low #pressure here. Meanwhile, further east this is helping to build a marked ridge of high pressure and drawing some exceptionally #mild air across the UK pic.twitter.com/tBOquSbzD7

— Met Office (@metoffice) February 21, 2019

The Independent quoted Met Office spokesperson Grahame Madge who noted that “a lot of different variables have all aligned to give us these high temperatures”:

“The fact we are getting the warm flow coming up from the south, the fact we’ve got high pressure giving us sunny days, which is adding to the temperatures, the fact it’s been dry – dry soil means the ground heats up more quickly and helps to boost daytime temperatures.”

Madge also said that the high temperatures were considered “an extreme weather event”, while another piece in the Mirror noted that the warm spell “is officially considered a heatwave because it meets the criteria of having a temperature at least 5C above the seasonal average for five straight days”.

Both the Observer and Daily Express highlighted the impact of the “foehn effect“ on temperatures in Scotland. This process “describes how air is warmed suddenly as it moves up and past mountains”, the Daily Express explained.

According to the Met Office, the effect tends to be most marked in the Scottish Highlands, which results in “a marked contrast in weather conditions across the country with the west being subjected to wet weather, whilst the lower lying east enjoys the warmth and sunshine of the foehn effect”.

“This is why Scotland enjoyed such record-breaking weather this week,” the Daily Express concluded.

It’s exceptionally #mild in some areas today. Kinlochewe in Scotland saw temperatures soar to 17.6 °C this morning before cloud came in! #Temperatures are widely 5 to 7 degrees above the late February average pic.twitter.com/4CO82zDnzy

— Met Office (@metoffice) February 23, 2019

The role that climate change might be playing in the unseasonable weather was also picked up in some of the media coverage. Quoted in another piece in the Independent, the Met Office’s Grahame Madge said that it is “too simplistic and naive to say that this particular weather event must be because of climate change”, but that it “does fit the pattern – you would expect periods of warmer weather in a world dominated by climate change”.

“The background rate of [human-caused] warming may have just nudged [temperatures] up a little bit,” he added.

BBC News tackled the climate change question head on in its coverage on Tuesday, with a section by science editor David Shukman asking: “Does climate change have a role?”. Shukman wrote:

“Previous research has shown how the odds of particular weather events – like last summer’s heatwave – have been made more likely because of the increasing levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gases heating up the atmosphere.

“And the projections for future global warming are clear that the kind of weather that feels strange now will appear normal in the decades ahead, as the underlying global average temperature rises.

“Met Office analysis of temperatures shows that British winters have become slightly milder over the past half century, a trend that’s set to continue.”

Shukman also spoke with Prof Joanna Haigh, co-director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at Imperial College London, ahead of Tuesday’s BBC News at Ten.

During an interview at Kew gardens – the site of the new winter record – Haigh explained how climate change affects the likelihood of heat extremes:

“As global temperatures rise, then we’re going to get more extreme heat events. So this is just one example that’s happening today. And as we go into the future, this sort of thing is going to get more common. So something that is perhaps a one-in-a-1,000 [year] event in the 1950s is now a one-in-15 [year] event.”

In a piece entitled, “Is hot February down to climate change?”, BBC Newsbeat spoke to experts about the role of climate change. Prof James Screen, a climate scientist at the University of Exeter, explained that while it is hard to say a spell of good weather is because of climate change, “what we do know, based on overwhelming scientific evidence, is that climate change is only pushing in one direction – and that is towards being warmer”.

Also quoted in the article is Dr Richard Millar, senior analyst at the Committee on Climate Change. He said:

“If we look at what’s causing and driving these changes, nearly in all cases it comes to the very clear conclusion that that’s the effect of humans on the atmosphere.”

But, he noted, “you can never say with absolute certainty that any individual weather event is caused by climate change”.

Media comment

As the warm weather continued into Wednesday, much of the UK’s media increasingly weighed in on the question of its links with climate change.

Scientists are “increasingly linking extremes of heat, storms and other meteorological events to global warming”, said a Guardian editorial:

“Extreme or unusual weather in the UK is becoming widely recognised as an indication that the climate is changing…As our heating planet turns from a threat into an emergency, with emissions still increasing, we must reject passivity in favour of action.”

The editorial also noted that “the science of weather attribution has made dramatic advances…meteorologists can now analyse extreme events including floods, droughts and heatwaves to determine the contribution of manmade climate change”. The editorial concluded:

“It is no longer permissible to pretend that ice-creams in February are a quirk of nature.”

Editorial in today’s Guardian:

“These balmy February days should spur us on to limit global warming”https://t.co/OlITmr4xOm pic.twitter.com/Nmk2L5YYte

— Leo Hickman (@LeoHickman) February 27, 2019

A short editorial in the Daily Mirror, meanwhile, warned “the balmy temperature may be heaven, but could be a sign of real danger if it’s down to global warming fired by pollution”.

Another article in the Guardian carried readers’ views on the unseasonably hot weather, as well as the first signs of spring. Patrick Green was among many readers to express concern, writing that:

“The scenes are very beautiful, and I’m very pleased with the pictures I took on 22 February, but I know I’m seeing [the signs of spring] too early: climate change terrifies me.”

The Sun carried the story on its front page on Wednesday under the headline: “Fabruary: UK has hottest winter day on record.” An online version of the article said “Brits” will “enjoy” one more day of the record-breaking weather ahead of expected thunderstorms on Thursday, telling readers to “make the most of it”. It also noted, however, that the “incredibly warm weather saw” wildfires break out around the country.

It added that “experts have said climate change has played a role” in the unusually warm February temperatures, quoting Met Office climate spokesman Grahame Madge:

“Climate change has made what would have already been an extremely warm event even warmer and is probably responsible for tipping it over the 20C threshold.”

The Sun also quoted Bob Ward, policy and communications director at the Grantham Institute at LSE, who said the temperatures are “consistent with the clear climate change signal that we are seeing in the UK”.

BBC News coverage included comments from Tom Burke, chairman and founding director of environmental thinktank E3G, who said extreme warm weather events were exactly what climate change experts said would happen if emissions continued.

Writing in iNews on Tuesday, Green Party MP Caroline Lucas criticised the media narrative around the warm weather. She said:

“If you read the news reports, you might have got the impression this is something to celebrate – a triumph over the tropics and an excuse to spend an afternoon in the sun.”

But things are starting to change, she said: “After years of calling out the media’s climate silence, we are starting to see incremental improvements.” Lucas pointed to the BBC News coverage, noting this only addressed the links to climate change after hundreds of people complained on Twitter. Lucas concluded:

“It’s time for politicians and the media to follow [childrens’] lead and open up the public debate we desperately need – not about whether our climate is changing, but what we’re going to do about it.”

Metro reported a tweet from Lucas in the same vein. “This isn’t some jovial Guinness World Record. This is a climate emergency. Ministers must get off their sun loungers and introduce a #GreenNewDeal.” The Daily Mirror and the Daily Telegraph also covered her comments.

Meanwhile, Green Party deputy leader Amelia Womack tweeted pictures of the wildfires in Arthur’s Seat, Saddleworth Moor and Ashdown Forest, saying: “It’s February! Our countryside shouldn’t be a tinderbox!”

Fires at Arthur’s Seat (Edinburgh), Saddleworth Moor (Manchester) and the inspiration for the 100 Acre Wood , Ashdown Forest (East Sussex).

It’s February! Our countryside shouldn’t be a tinderbox! pic.twitter.com/6tFxbQcp7M

— Amelia Womack (@Amelia_Womack) February 27, 2019

Jonn Elledge, assistant editor of the New Statesman, wrote a piece for the Guardian asking if he is “the only one who’s terrified about the warm weather”. He wrote:

“[T]he beaches and the beer gardens fill up, while the papers describe the weather as glorious and expend more words on the latest Westminster soap opera than on the looming climate crisis.”

In contrast, in his “Weather Eye” weekly column for the Times, Paul Simons argued that “the temporary heatwave owes nothing to climate change”. “[T]emperatures will tumble by the end of this week, with more normal weather returning,” wrote Simons. “And this time last year the UK was frozen in bitter Siberian winds with widespread snow.” However, he concluded that:

“Climate is the trend viewed over years and longer periods. The long-term signs point to more extreme weather globally, with milder UK winter temperatures and more severe weather, such as intense rainfalls and severe flooding.”

Science journalist Tom Chivers tackled the question of why hot days are taken as evidence that climate change exists. In a Twitter thread he wrote:

“[T]here have been lots more unseasonably hot days than there are unseasonably cold ones, both in Britain & around the world, so if we are good Bayesians we should by now have steadily updated our beliefs to ‘I am like >95% sure that the world is really warming up.’”

I’ve been thinking about the “how come cold days aren’t evidence that global warming isn’t real but hot days are evidence that it is” complaint you occasionally see on here. And I don’t think it’s important enough for a piece so I’m afraid I’m going to do it as a thread. Sorry!

— Tom Chivers (@TomChivers) February 27, 2019

James Murray, editor of BusinessGreen, was among those who criticised the Met Office for a tweet praising the warm weather. “There’s been plenty to sing about in the world of weather just recently! We’ve got one more cracking day ahead.” the Met Office tweet said.

WTAF – it’s not like the hugely significant context of these temp records has not been pointed out over the past few days. This is now an informed editorial choice to celebrate a climate crisis as it escalates. It takes a teachable moment and torches it like a winter wildfire. https://t.co/P3BQhFPDtW

— James Murray (@James_BG) February 27, 2019

The “worrying mismatch between the Met Office’s scientists, who approach climate change responsibly, and its press team, who do less so, has had a bright light thrown on it this week,” wrote India Bourke, environment writer at the New Statesman in another tweet.

Another related Guardian piece by freelance science journalist Kate Ravilious described research from scientists at George Mason University in Virginia who analysed viewers’ reactions to weather forecasters explaining local climate change. She wrote:

“More than two-thirds of viewers were interested, and even climate change deniers failed to be irritated or angered by the coverage.”

Scientists react

Much of the coverage of the high temperatures included statements from scientists.

People were right to ask themselves whether the record temperatures were being driven by climate change, Dr Friederike Otto, acting director of the Environmental Change Institute at the University of Oxford, told BBC News. She added:

“I am very confident to say that there’s an element of climate change in these warm temperatures. But climate change alone is not causing it. You have to have the right weather systems, too.”

Martin Bowles, a Met Office meteorologist cited in the Guardian, said climate change cannot be blamed “directly” as “we’re talking about weather, not the climate”. He added:

“But it is a sign of climate change. There’s been a gradual increase of temperatures over the last 30 years so the extreme weather has also been increasing.”

Several climate scientists also took to Twitter to comment on the role that climate change may be playing in the warm weather.

What is particularly remarkable about the temperature record is “how big of a margin there has been compared to the previous record” and that its “been smashed at multiple locations over multiple days!”, wrote Dr Mark McCarthy, a climate scientist at the Met Office.

Prof Peter Stott, who leads the leads the climate monitoring and attribution team at the Met Office, said he “suspect[s] that human-induced climate change has made the extreme temperatures seen in this current warm spell quite a bit more likely”.

The maximum of 19.6C seen on Tuesday at the University of Reading “smashed” the university’s previous winter record of 17.4C, set the day before, said Prof Ed Hawkins, a climate scientist at the university.

At @UniofReading we have 110 years of continuous weather records. Yesterday’s maximum of 19.6°C smashed our previous February (and winter) record of 17.4°C, which was set the day before. #heatwave

— Ed Hawkins (@ed_hawkins) February 27, 2019

Meanwhile, Prof Richard Betts, professor of climate impacts at the University of Exeter, addressed the possible links between climate change and the wildfires on Tuesday. He wrote:

“Of course, it’s not possible to give a simple yes or no answer to the question so quickly – these things are always complicated…

“So on the question ‘Are these specific fires linked to climate change?’ I’d say ‘Maybe – we need to look into it more’. On a more general question of ‘Do we expect higher risk of fires in the British Isles due to climate change?’ I’d say yes.”

The post Media reaction: The UK’s record-breaking winter heat in 2019 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Warming of the world’s oceans has caused the total amount of fish that can be caught sustainably to fall by an average of 4% globally since the 1930s, a study finds.

Damage to harvests has been particularly severe around the UK in the North and Irish seas, the data shows, where the maximum sustainable yield has dropped by up to 35%. Fish particularly affected in the North Sea include Atlantic cod, sole and haddock.

The risk posed by warming is compounded by overfishing, which presents “a one-two punch” for fish, the lead author tells Carbon Brief. “Overfishing makes fisheries more vulnerable to warming, and continued warming will hinder efforts to rebuild overfished populations.”

The findings show that the threat of climate change to the world’s fish stocks is “not something for the distant future”, another scientist tells Carbon Brief.

Battered

Climate change is causing ocean temperatures to rise at an increasingly rapid rate, research shows. This warming is having a striking impact of marine life, including by driving mass coral bleaching and increasing the chances of deadly marine heatwaves.

The new study, published in Science, looks back from 1930 to 2010 to see how ocean warming has impacted commercial fish stocks. It covers more than 235 economically important populations of fish in 38 world regions.

To do this, the researchers estimated how warming has influenced the “maximum sustainable yield” – the total amount of fish that can be taken by fishing without reducing the stock for the next year – for different populations across the world.

This involved using population models and ocean warming data to “hindcast” changes in fish population growth rate, explains lead author Dr Chris Free, a researcher from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He tells Carbon Brief:

“We used maps of ocean temperature over time to see if ocean warming has influenced the growth of 235 marine fish and invertebrate populations around the world.

“Our results suggest that the overall effect has been a 4% loss in food provisioning potential around the world through to 2010. In some regions, like the East China Sea and North Sea, losses in food provisioning potential have been much higher, up to 15-35%.”

However, it is important to note that the study was not able to investigate the impact of warming on every fish stock, he says:

“It’s important to be clear that we couldn’t assess all fisheries globally and were only able to assess a large sample. The populations we assessed generate a third of global catch.”

(Fish missing from the analysis include those that are relied on for smallholder fishing in tropical regions, he says. This is because historical data for these populations is scant.)

It is also worth noting that the study does not look at all the ways that climate change can impact fish. For example, the research does not consider the impacts of “ocean acidification”, which occurs as seawater absorbs CO2, or “ocean deoxygenation”, the loss of oxygen from parts of the sea.

Winners and losers

The study finds that, out of the 235 fish populations, 19 (8%) have been “significantly” negatively impacted by ocean warming and 9 (4%) have been positively impacted. For the rest of the populations studied, the impact of warming was “insignificant”.

The chart below indicates the influence of warming on each of the 28 fish stocks. The measure displayed on the y-axis represents how much maximum sustainable yields would change with each degree of global warming, Free explains:

“A value of +0.1 means a degree of warming would increase population growth rate and maximum sustainable yield by 10% and a value of -0.1 means a degree of warming would decrease population growth rate and maximum sustainable yield by 10%.”

The results show that fish populations close to the UK, including in the North and Irish Seas, are the most affected by ocean warming. Fish particularly impacted include Atlantic cod, sole and haddock.

This could be because ocean warming has caused a decline in the availability of “zooplankton” – microscopic marine animals which fish feed on – in the North Sea, Free says:

“We suspect that North Sea fish populations have seen declines in productivity due to the impact of ocean warming on zooplankton. Other research has shown that ocean warming has resulted in more autumn-spawning zooplankton and fewer spring-spawning zooplankton, the latter of which are critical to the growth and survival of juvenile fish.”

The North Sea is home to one of the world’s largest cod populations. This stock is particularly important to countries in Europe, including the UK, Denmark, Norway and Germany.

Global distribution of Atlantic cod. Source: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

By contrast, the population of cod in the Northern Gulf of St Lawrence, which could have benefited from ocean warming, is an important stock for Canada.

Cod in this gulf could have benefited from warming because waters here are relatively cool, meaning small temperature increases could make conditions more favourable in the short term, Free says:

“We see evidence that populations living at the cool end of their range have benefitted from warming – but this benefit is unlikely to persist if continued warming pushes these population past their temperature tolerance.”

The map below, which is taken from the paper, gives an indication of how ocean warming has impacted sustainable fish yields in different world regions.

On the map, blue indicates a positive percentage change in maximum sustainable yield between the periods 1930-39 and 2001-10, while red indicates a negative percentage change. The size of the circle gives a picture of the size of the fish stocks (in millions of tonnes), while the number inside the circle shows the number of populations in the region.

The impact of ocean warming on global fish stocks. Blue indicates a positive percentage change in maximum sustainable yield between the periods 1930-39 and 2001-10, while red indicates a negative percentage change. The size of the circle represents the size of the fish stocks (in millions of tonnes), while the number inside the circle shows the number of populations in the region. Dotted lines indicate major world fishing regions. Source: Free et al. (2019)

Packing a punch

Another finding of the results is that populations that have suffered from overfishing were more likely to be threatened by ocean warming. Overfishing occurs when fishing fleets take more fish than is sustainable. At present, around one-third of the world’s fish stocks are overfished, according to the FAO.

One reason that overfishing could make fish more vulnerable to warming is that the largest and most healthy fish tend to be taken – and they are the ones most likely to be able to withstand warming, Free says:

“Overfishing presents a one-two punch: overfishing makes fisheries more vulnerable to warming and continued warming will hinder efforts to rebuild overfished populations.”

This finding is important, but it may be too early to say there is a causal link specifically between overfishing and warming, says Dr Thomas Cameron, a fish ecologist from the University of Essex who was not involved in the study. He tells Carbon Brief:

“Populations that were found to have responded negatively to temperature were also slow growers, large and of a greater total biomass and found mainly in Europe or the China and Japanese seas. [These] traits would attract fishing pressure. So, it’s not yet clear if the association between fishing and warming is shown to be mechanistic or caused by correlation.”

Overall, the findings show how warming can impact commercial fish populations, he adds:

“This work provides compelling evidence that there are dangers to marine food production from warming seas – at least over the scale of 10-15 years. Whether fish population movement [into] new areas can overcome this remains to be seen.”

The research reinforces the message that climate change is already having a large impact on the world’s fish, says Bryony Townhill, a marine climate change scientist at the UK government’s Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas). She tells Carbon Brief:

“Studies such as this show that climate change is not something for the distant future, but that increasing temperatures are already causing changes in the oceans.”

The post Ocean warming has caused ‘sustainable’ fish stocks to drop by 4% since 1930s appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Carbon Brief analysis shows the UK’s CO2 emissions fell for the sixth consecutive year in 2018, the longest series of continuous reductions on record.

The estimated 1.5% reduction was once again driven by falling coal use, down 16% compared to a year earlier, whereas oil and gas use were largely unchanged. However, there are signs the recent run of reductions could be coming to an end, with 2018 seeing the smallest fall in the six-year series.

The UK’s CO2 emissions were an estimated 361m tonnes (MtCO2) in 2018, some 39% below 1990. Outside years with general strikes, this would be the lowest since 1888, when the first-ever Football League match was played and Tower Bridge was being built in London.

These findings are based on Carbon Brief analysis of newly released energy use figures from the UK’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). The department will publish its own CO2 estimates on 28 March.

Falling down

The UK’s CO2 emissions have now been falling for six consecutive years, the longest run of reductions in records going back to 1850 (the blue area in the chart, below).

There were particularly large falls in 2014 (8.7%) and 2016 (5.9%), with 2018 seeing a more modest 1.5% reduction, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis. This means the UK’s CO2 emissions stood 39% below 1990 levels at an estimated 361MtCO2 in 2018 (yellow line).

This is the lowest since 1888, outside three years of economic collapse during strikes by coal miners and other workers in 1893, 1921 and 1926, each of which is prominent on the chart, below.

The 1.5% reduction in the UK’s CO2 emissions in 2018 is the smallest decline over the past six years. This highlights the fact that continued cuts cannot be taken for granted.

Still, since 1990, the UK has cut its emissions faster than any other major economy in the world, even as its GDP has continued to grow. Recent Carbon Brief analysis suggests reduced energy demand and a shift to cleaner sources of electricity explain most of the CO2 reductions since 1990.

Per-capita emissions in the UK fell to 5.4tCO2 in 2018, the lowest since 1858, when the population was less than half its current level. On this measure, the UK now ranks alongside France and well below China (around 7tCO2 per capita), but roughly three times the level in India (1.8tCO2).

Coal powered

During those six years of continuous cuts in the UK’s CO2 emissions between 2013 and 2018, almost all of the reductions have been due to coal, as the chart below shows. Overall emissions fell  by a fifth (98MtCO2), with coal accounting for 97% of that total (94MtCO2).

Meanwhile, emissions from oil increased by 4% (6MtCO2), while CO2 from gas was unchanged. (The remainder is made up of changes in emissions from other fuels, such as non-renewable wastes, as well as CO2 from non-fuel sources, such as cement production.)

Notably, coal CO2 emissions now make up just 7% of the UK total. This small share will shrink even further as coal-fired power stations continue to close ahead of a 2025 phaseout deadline. Only 5% of UK electricity generation in 2018 was from coal, a record low.

This means there is limited potential to continue reducing overall UK emissions if coal is the only contributor. Emissions from oil and gas will also have to be cut if the UK is to meet its legally binding carbon targets in future.

Expanding gas

As noted above, the largest recent changes in the UK’s fossil fuel use have been in demand for coal. There was another 16% reduction in coal use last year, down to a new low in records stretching back to 1850. This was primarily due to a 24% fall in coal use in the power sector.

The CO2 emissions from the UK’s coal use have fallen by around 80% over the past six years and more than 90% since 1970, as the chart below shows (light blue line). With oil demand also having fallen until recent years (yellow), gas is now the largest source of CO2 emissions in the UK (dark blue).

Demand for gas in the first quarter of 2018 was up 8% on the previous year after exceptionally cold temperatures during the “Beast from the East” in February and March. However, annual demand for gas was flat (+0.5%), in part due to a 4% fall in electricity generation from the fuel.

Demand for oil was also largely unchanged in 2018 (-0.3%). Within that total, demand for diesel and petrol both saw annual declines of around 1%, whereas aviation fuel was up 2%.

Transport is now the single-largest sector within the UK’s CO2 emissions total. This is because transport emissions have barely changed since 1990, while most other sectors have declined.

Transport is now the largest source of UK greenhouse gaseshttps://t.co/t6bgquAD61 pic.twitter.com/nCiavSb4T5

— Simon Evans (@DrSimEvans) February 5, 2019

The government’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC) has warned of the “worrying trend” in emissions beyond the power and waste sectors. These cuts have “masked” a lack of progress in the rest of the UK economy, it says, putting legally binding carbon targets at risk.

The housing sector is a case in point, according to another recent CCC report. Home CO2 emissions increased by 1% in 2017, the most recent year with sectoral data available.

CCC advice on when the UK should reach net-zero emissions is due on 2 May this year and will add to the pressure to reduce CO2 emissions across the whole economy.

Meanwhile, the CCC recently rated progress in each of 18 policy areas, giving the government a failing grade in 15 of them. Its letter to energy and clean growth minister Claire Perry said government policies had “failed to produce expected reductions in emissions”.

BEIS projections suggest the UK’s emissions will continue to fall over the next decade.

Carbon Brief calculations

Carbon Brief’s estimates of the UK’s CO2 emissions in 2018 are based on analysis of provisional energy use figures published by BEIS on 28 February. The same approach has accurately estimated year-to-year changes in emissions in previous years (see table, below).

Estimated year-on-year change in UK CO2 emissions versus reported results

One large source of uncertainty is the provisional energy use data, which BEIS revises at the end of March each year and often again later on. The table above applies Carbon Brief’s emissions calculations to the latest energy use figures, which may differ from those published previously.

For example, last year Carbon Brief estimated a 2.6% fall in emissions in 2017, while BEIS later put the reduction at 3.2%. Using the same Carbon Brief approach today, with the updated energy use figures, the estimated reduction is revised to 2.8%.

UK emissions are estimated by multiplying the reported consumption of each fossil fuel by its emissions factor. This is the amount of CO2 released for each unit of energy consumed and it varies for different fuels.

For example diesel, petrol and jet fuel have different emissions factors and Carbon Brief’s analysis accounts for this where possible. This adjustment is based on the quantity of each fuel type used per year, drawn from separate BEIS figures covering oil, coal and gas.

Emissions from land use and forestry are assumed to remain at the same level as in 2017.

Note that the figures in this article are for CO2 emissions within the UK measured according to international guidelines. This means they exclude emissions associated with imported goods, including imported biomass, as well as the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping.

The UK’s consumption-based CO2 emissions increased between 1990 and 2007. Since then, however, they have fallen by a similar amount to the CO2 emitted within the UK. Around one quarter of the bioenergy used in the UK is imported and its climate benefits are disputed.

International aviation is considered part of the UK’s carbon budgets and faces the prospect of tighter limits on its CO2 emissions. The international shipping sector recently agreed to at least halve its emissions by 2050, relative to 2008 levels.

The post Analysis: UK’s CO2 emissions fell for record sixth consecutive year in 2018 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Dr Jan Ivar Korsbakken and Dr Robbie Andrew are senior researchers in climate economics at the CICERO Center for International Climate Research in Norway; Dr Glen Peters is research director at CICERO.

China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) released its annual ”statistical communique” for 2018 on 28 February, with a trove of initial data, including industrial output, energy use and other economic, social and environmental indicators.

This data implies that China’s CO2 emissions grew by 2.3% in 2018, as CO2 emissions per unit of GDP fell by 4.0% while GDP grew by 6.6%. This rise is slower than the 4.7% we projected in the Global Carbon Budget 2018, though it is within our uncertainty range of +2.0% to +7.4%

Combining this data with updated statistics for the US, the EU and India, we get a revised estimate for global fossil fuel CO2 emissions growth in 2018 of +2.0% (+1.2% to +3.3%). Again, this is slower than we projected in November, when we saw global emissions growing +2.7% (+1.8% to +3.7%).

In this guest post, we will discuss why Chinese emissions grew in 2018, their evolution over the past decade and continued data challenges that give reason for caution. We also update our estimate of worldwide fossil fuel CO2 emissions in 2018 and speculate on how they might change in 2019.

China’s emissions grow again

China’s CO2 emissions grew faster in 2018 than the 1.7% growth in 2017, according to both our original estimate and the newly revised figures. This also marks the second year that Chinese emissions grew, after a pause or slight decrease between 2014 and 2016.

The stronger growth in 2018 indicates that 2017 was not a blip. However, there are some concerns about the consistency of the new Chinese statistics, which we will come back to later. The figure below shows how China’s CO2 emissions are dominated by coal (brown line).

Chinese CO2 emissions by source, 1960-2018, billions of tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2). Note the upward biased uncertainty on the growth in coal-related CO2 emission. Source: Global Carbon Project.

Indeed, the biggest factor in determining China’s CO2 emissions in 2018 was coal consumption, at 59% of total energy consumption and over 70% of energy-related CO2 emissions.

Like in 2017, coal consumption grew again, after having gone down from 2014 to 2016. Also like in 2017, the biggest single contribution to coal consumption growth was increased electricity production, which grew at 7.7% in 2018 and accounts for roughly half of coal consumption in China.

From 2014 to 2016, expanded renewable and nuclear power generation was able to cover slow growth in overall electricity consumption. This allowed coal-fired power generation to fall. In 2017 and 2018, however, electricity demand grew so fast that new low-carbon sources could not keep up.

Other sectors probably contributed to the growth in coal consumption, especially heavy industry. The newly released statistics do not contain direct estimates of coal consumption in each sector, but the production of some coal-intensive industrial products – notably steel – grew faster than in 2017.

Others sectors – notably cement – declined in 2018. For more on which sectors contributed the most, see a great set of analyses at Unearthed by Lauri Myllyvirta from Greenpeace, using proprietary data with a much more detailed sectoral breakdown.

China’s oil (+6.5%) and gas consumption (+17.7%) grew rapidly in 2018, continuing recent trends. Even though they account for a much smaller share of the country’s CO2 emissions than coal, this rapid growth helped push the growth in total CO2 emissions well above the rate for coal alone.

It’s the economy, stupid

The economic stimulus that started in late 2015 is likely behind much of the growth in Chinese industrial output and resulting increases in coal consumption.

However, the effects of the stimulus started to tail off through 2018. Growth in several sectors appears to have slowed suddenly towards the end of the year, which may be a factor in the reported CO2 emissions growth being so much lower than our original projection for 2018. On the other hand, inconsistencies in the statistics appears to be an even more important factor.

Let’s first look at the reasons why emissions started growing again by 2017. With China, details are often shrouded in mystery, but the underlying cause is often simple: It’s the economy, stupid. But this adage comes with Chinese characteristics, that they tend to complicate matters.

To understand recent changes in Chinese emissions, it is worth stepping back to see how the Chinese economy has operated since the mid-2000s.

China’s economy grew in leaps and bounds in the early and mid-2000s, after several economic reforms and after joining the World Trade Organization in 2001. The growth was driven by energy-intensive heavy industry and exports, with the growing energy demand mostly met by ever more coal. China’s CO2 emissions soared accordingly.

This export-driven growth almost came to a screeching halt when global demand plummeted after the global financial crisis in 2008. However, Chinese authorities maintained economic growth by loosening credit, spurring possibly the greatest infrastructure investment boom in human history. This led to continued high growth in GDP and, ultimately, CO2 emissions.

Limits to growth

But credit-driven growth has its limits. Public and corporate debt levels soared, the country eventually became riddled with empty housing developments (“ghost towns”) and underutilised infrastructure, along with growing overcapacity in all kinds of industries. Many projects seem to be more for the sake of construction activity than meeting actual demand.

Heavy pollution over the second ring road on the east side of Beijing. Credit: David Gourhan / Alamy Stock Photo.

By 2011-2012, GDP growth was slowing despite the government’s best efforts. Overcapacity and misallocation of capital had destroyed profitability in many industries.

Recurring extreme air pollution episodes and water and soil contamination had created growing concerns among ordinary Chinese about the health cost of China’s growth model. It was clear to Communist Party leaders that a change of course was necessary.

President Xi Jinping and premier Li Keqiang started talking about a “new normal” and an “ecological civilisation”, emphasising lower but higher-quality growth. They drew up plans to shift the growth model from heavy industry and export to domestic consumption, innovation, advanced technologies and generally moving up in the value chain.

A flurry of measures ensued, including tightening credit, closing coal mines and capping coal production. They put stricter controls on coal power plant construction while incentivising a boom in wind and solar power.

Coal consumption subsequently fell in 2014 through to 2016 and CO2 emissions levelled off. Service industries grew apace, but many of the “old” industries employing millions of people felt serious pain. On top of that, the country suffered a stock market crash in mid-2015.

Chinese leaders appear to have got cold feet and opened the credit spigot again from late 2015 through to 2016. The investment wave this prompted may explain why coal consumption and CO2 emissions started to rebound in 2017.

In the last quarter of 2018, there was growing evidence of an economic slowdown, presumably from a combination of tighter credit and escalating trade tensions with the US.

So here we are in early 2019 with a sense of déjà vu, in the wake of another credit tightening with slumping economic growth.

Will Chinese leaders use the old script and pour credit into the system yet again, despite already high levels of corporate and local government debt? If they do, will the credit again flow to heavy industry and accelerate emissions growth further, or will they somehow manage to steer it to less energy-intensive and more long-term strategically important sectors?

It is too early to proclaim any trends yet, but new loans reached an all-time high in January 2019, suggesting that Chinese leaders might indeed be pulling the old script out the drawer for a third time. It also matters where the investment flows and at least one early count shows that approvals for new infrastructure projects also spiked in January.

Continued data challenges

Now let us return to why the reported Chinese CO2 emissions growth in the communique is so much lower than our projection in the 2018 Global Carbon Budget. The real reason is not clear, but the problem is an unexplained inconsistency in the coal statistics in the communique.

Oddities and inconsistencies in Chinese coal data have been a common theme every year since 2015 (explored here, here and here). This year, the problem is that the reported 1.0% growth in coal consumption is inexplicably much lower than the growth in coal supply.

Our initial estimates used monthly data for coal supply, because similar figures for coal demand are not publicly available. This is why we estimated a much higher 4.5% growth in coal demand in 2018.

In theory, the use of coal should equal the supply of coal, defined as domestic production plus net imports plus reductions in stocks  – also called “apparent consumption”. A slight gap between these figures is normal, but more than a fraction of a percent suggests data errors or biases.

The communique reports a 4.6% growth in coal production plus imports, far above the 1% growth reported for coal consumption. This discrepancy alone explains most of the difference between our initial CO2 emissions projection (+4.7%) and the figure reported in the communique (+2.3%).

It is theoretically possible that this gap is due to a buildup of coal stocks, but inventories would have had to have grown twice as fast as they ever have in the past 20 years to absorb that difference.

Just 1% growth in coal consumption is also difficult to reconcile with electricity and industrial output data. Power generation accounts for half of all coal use in China and thermal electricity generation – 90% of which is coal-powered – grew at around 6.6% in 2018.

Steel production and a few other coal-consuming sectors also grew in 2018, so 1% growth in coal consumption seems too small to meet the reported growth in electricity generation.

There is no apparent explanation for these discrepancies. Some people have suggested that China’s statistics bureau is manipulating the data to make coal consumption growth look smoother than it actually is, although there is no direct evidence for this.

Whatever the case, the discrepancy over coal means that overall CO2 growth could be as high as around 4% – compared to 2.3% reported in the communique – even before accounting for other sources of uncertainty that we usually include in our analyses. Those factors push the uncertainty range even wider, to 0.4% to +6.7%.

The data in the communique is preliminary and the picture may change when revised statistics are published in a year’s time. Until then, it is clear that the Chinese CO2 emissions roller coaster headed uphill in 2018, but less clear how steeply.

New estimate for global CO2 emissions in 2018

Finally, a few words on our latest estimate for global emissions in 2018 in light of the new Chinese data, given the country accounts for over a quarter of global emissions.

Using monthly data for the world’s next three largest emitters the US, EU and India, as well as GDP data for all other countries, we projected last November that 2018 fossil fuel CO2 emissions globally would rise 2.7%, with an uncertainty range of +1.8% to +3.7%.

Our updated estimate is now slightly lower, at +2.0%, with a range of +1.2% to +3.3%. This is shown in the figure below, along with estimates for each of the four largest emitters.

Fossil fuel CO2 emissions in the world’s major economies 1960-2018, billions of tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2). Figures for 2018 are projections updated as of 2 March 2019, shown with their associated uncertainty range in text. Source: Global Carbon Project.

Most revisions compared to our earlier estimates are well within the expected uncertainty range for projections based on preliminary monthly data, although that for China is close to the edge.

The first full-year estimates based on annual data for 2018 will be possible in mid-June, when BP releases its Statistical Review of World Energy. Meanwhile, the following table shows how our estimates of fossil fuel CO2 emissions have changed since November.

Where are emissions going in 2019?

Looking ahead, it is already possible to make a crude initial estimate of emissions in 2019. This suggests that global CO2 emissions could rise by about 1.6% this year.

What will CO₂ emissions do in 2019?

IMF estimates GDP to grow 3.5% in 2019, & that implies:
* 1.6% CO₂ growth if CO₂/GDP improves as in the last decade,
* <0% CO₂ grow requires CO₂/GDP to have one of largest recorded declines

(figure: growth rates for GDP, CO₂, CO₂/GDP) pic.twitter.com/Y7No86ZFNz

— Glen Peters (@Peters_Glen) February 4, 2019

This would be slower than the increase in 2017 and 2018, but would nevertheless be going in the wrong direction relative to global climate goals.

This crude estimate for 2019 assumes that GDP will expand by 3.5%, as expected by the International Monetary Fund, and that the carbon intensity of the global economy will improve at the average rate seen over the past 10 years. As monthly energy data starts to become available, this estimate will be superseded with more accurate projections in the second half of the year.

The post Guest post: China’s CO2 emissions grew slower than expected in 2018 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

A misleading graph purporting to show that past changes in Greenland’s temperatures dwarf modern climate change has been circling the internet since at least 2010.

Based on an early Greenland ice core record produced back in 1997, versions of the graph have, variously, mislabeled the x-axis, excluded the modern observational temperature record and conflated a single location in Greenland with the whole world.

More recently, researchers have drilled numerous additional ice cores throughout Greenland and produced an updated estimate past Greenland temperatures.

This modern temperature reconstruction, combined with observational records over the past century, shows that current temperatures in Greenland are warmer than any period in the past 2,000 years. That said, they are likely still cooler than during the early part of the current geological epoch – the Holocene – which started around 11,000 years ago.

However, warming is expected to continue in the future as human actions continue to emit greenhouse gases, primarily from the combustion of fossil fuels.

Climate models project that if emissions continue, by 2050, Greenland temperatures will exceed anything seen since the last interglacial period, around 125,000 years ago.

Ice cores as climate ‘proxies’

Widespread thermometer measurements of temperatures only extend back to the mid-1700s. Scientists investigating how temperatures have changed prior to the invention of thermometers need to rely on a variety of climate “proxies”, which are correlated with temperature and can be used to infer, with some uncertainties, how it has changed in the past.

An ice core from Greenland is prepared for cutting at the National Ice Core Laboratory. Credit: Jim West / Alamy Stock Photo.

Climate proxies can be obtained from sources, such as tree rings, ice cores, fossil pollen, ocean sediments and corals. Ice cores are one of the best available climate proxies, providing a fairly high-resolution estimate of climate changes into the past.

Since scientists cannot directly measure temperatures from ice cores, they have to rely on measuring the oxygen isotope – 18O – which is correlated with temperature, but imperfectly so.

Odyssey of errors

A temperature reconstruction using the Greenland Ice Sheet Project 2 (“GISP2”) ice core was first published by Prof Kurt Cuffey and Dr Gary Clow in a 1997 paper published in the Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans. Prof Richard Alley of Penn State University also used the record in a 2000 paper. Neither of these papers provided a comparison of GISP2 record with current conditions, as the uncertainties in the ice core proxy reconstruction were too large and the proxy record only extended back to 1855.

The GISP2 ice core record was used in a number of papers in the late 1990s and 2000s that examined changes over the last ice age and the start of the current warm era – the Holocene – around 11,000 years ago. Around 2009, it caught the attention of Dr J Storrs Hall of the Foresight Institute, a technology-focused nonprofit group, who wrote a blog post suggesting that it disproved the idea that “human-emitted CO2 is the only thing that could account for the recent warming trend”.

That post was republished on a climate sceptic blog called Watts Up With That, which followed up with its own version of a GISP2 graph in late 2010 by Dr Don Easterbrook, an emeritus professor of geology at the Western Washington University. Easterbrook’s graph, shown below, was shared widely across the internet by climate sceptics and is still frequently seen – with many small variations – to this day in discussions on Twitter, blogs and news article comment threads.

Easterbrook’s version of the GISP2-based temperature reconstruction graph, as featured on the Watts Up With That blog.

This graph is misleading for a number of reasons.

First, the x-axis is mislabelled. In fact, it should say “Years before 1950”, rather than “Years before present (2000 AD)”. The GISP2 ice core only extends up to 1855 – 95 years before 1950. This means that none of the modern observational temperature period overlaps with the proxy reconstruction. (Easterbrook’s graph shows the uptick in the final 100 years or so of the record – shown in red – incorrectly indicating that it is the observational temperature period.)

The figure was also featured in another post on the same blog, which conflated Greenland with global temperatures. Any individual location will have significantly more variability than the globe as a whole. A single ice core is also subject to uncertainties around elevation changes and other perturbations to the ice core over time.

As Prof Alley told then-New York Times journalist Andrew Revkin back in 2010:

“The data still contain a lot of noise over short times (snowdrifts are real, among other things). An isotopic record from one site is not purely a temperature record at that site, so care is required to interpret the signal and not the noise.”

The GISP2 reconstruction is fairly old and more recent research has questioned the assumptions made in changing the relationship between temperature and 18O during the Holocene and how to best account for elevation change of the ice sheet at the GISP2 site. The GISP2 reconstruction changes the relationship between 18O and temperatures by a factor of two during the Holocene, while more recent reconstructions keep it constant. Similarly, elevation change influences 18O records. The old GISP2 reconstruction did not take elevation changes into account.

Scientists reconstructing past Greenland temperatures now use estimates from many different ice cores, which reduces the uncertainties associated with any single one and gives a more accurate picture of changes over Greenland as a whole.

Alley made this point explicitly, telling Revkin:

“So, what do we get from GISP2? Alone, not an immense amount. With the other Greenland ice cores… and compared to additional records from elsewhere, an immense amount… Using GISP2 data to argue against global warming is, well, stupid, or misguided, or misled, or something, but surely not scientifically sensible.”

Multi-core reconstructions

A more modern Greenland temperature reconstruction, based on six different ice cores, was published by Prof Bo Vinther of the Niels Bohr Institute at the University of Copenhagen and colleagues in Nature in 2009.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, Vinther suggests that this multi-core Holocene reconstruction provides a number of advantages over the old GISP2 series, using ice core 18O data corrected for past elevation change and “tuned” to fit ice core borehole temperatures at four locations.

The six ice core sites used by the reconstruction are shown in the figure below.

Location of the six ice core records used in the Vinther et al 2009 Greenland Holocene temperature reconstruction, from Figure 1a in their paper.

The temperature reconstruction produced using data from all six ice cores is shown by the blue line in the figure below, and spans the period from 9690BC to AD1970. It has a resolution of around 20 years, meaning that each data point represents the average temperature of the surrounding 20 years. So, the end of the record – 1970 – shows the average temperature between 1960 and 1980.

The ice core data cannot be extended all the way through to present because, as Alley tells Carbon Brief, the snow that falls on the ice sheet needs time to form into solid ice. He explains that “it isn’t quite enough to measure the snow as it falls…because there is a bit of post-depositional isotopic exchange and smoothing, so you’d want cores”.

Greenland Ice Sheet plain. Credit: National Geographic Image Collection / Alamy Stock Photo.

To extend this dataset up to the present day, Carbon Brief has taken observational temperature data from Berkeley Earth at the location of each of the ice cores and used a 20-year locally weighted smoothed (“LOWESS”) average of all the sites. This is a statistical approach that provides an estimate of long-term changes in the timeseries.

The black line in the figure below shows the observational record between 1880 and 2018. It is fitted to the ice core reconstruction during the period of overlap from 1880 through to 1970.

Showing instrumental temperature observations alongside climate proxy records is often challenging in practice. As Alley tells Carbon Brief: “The question of how to join palaeoclimatic data to instrumental data is one of the oldest in this field and remains challenging.”

Prof Vinther explains that showing proxy data and observations side-by-side is appropriate as long as the data both have the same “temporal resolution”. In other words, because each point in both datasets represents an average of the 20 years of surrounding data, they can be more accurately compared. Because ice cores provide relatively high resolution temperature estimates, it is easier to compare them to observed temperatures than other proxy reconstructions that may only have one value in a century or more.

Recent temperatures in Greenland are still likely below those experienced in the early Holocene. This is similar to what is found in global Holocene temperature reconstructions, such as the one published by Prof Shaun Marcott and colleagues in Science in 2013, which suggested that “current global temperatures of the past decade have not yet exceeded peak interglacial values, but are warmer than during ~75% of the Holocene temperature history”.

Recent temperatures are clearly higher than any seen in Greenland over the past two millennia. The figure below shows the ice core and observational temperature data zoomed in on the period from AD1 through to the present day.

Looking into the future

While periods during the early Holocene – 7,000-11,000 years ago – may have been warmer in Greenland than the present day, if the present rate of warming continues, the Earth should pass well beyond any temperatures experienced in Greenland during the Holocene by 2050.

To examine how future Greenland warming might compare to what has happened in the past, Carbon Brief has looked at the average of the CMIP5 climate models used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fifth assessment report. Future projections from these models are taken from the locations of the six ice cores used by Vinther and colleagues.

Two future scenarios, known as “Representative Concentration Pathways”, are used: representative concentration pathway RCP4.5, a modest mitigation scenario where global temperatures warm to nearly 3C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, and RCP8.5, a very high emissions scenario where global temperatures warm nearly 5C by 2100.

Climate models show faster warming in the Arctic than the rest of the world – a phenomenon known as arctic amplification – and similar to what has been observed over the past few decades. By 2100, these models have the area above the Greenland ice core locations warming by nearly 4C in RCP4.5 and more than 7C in RCP8.5.

The figure below shows a 20-year LOWESS smoothed average of the models from 2000 through to 2100 added on to the end of the observational temperature data. Temperatures clearly exceed any experienced in Greenland during the Holocene by 2050 and are much warmer by 2100.

Just looking at the past 2000 years – and next 100 – shows a similar rapid rise at the end of the record. The rate of warming over the next century is projected to be far faster than anything seen since the end of the last ice age.

Conclusion

Greenland ice cores provide a high-quality high-resolution estimate of past changes in temperatures, allowing more precise comparisons with observed temperature records than most other climate proxies. While current temperatures are likely still below the highs in the early Holocene around 7,000 years ago, they are clearly higher than any temperatures experienced in Greenland over the past 2,000 years.

Greenland is just one location and temperature variations seen in ice core records may not be characteristic of global temperatures. However, global proxy reconstructions have tended to show similar patterns, with current temperatures lower than the early Holocene maximum.

Unless greenhouse gas emissions cease in the near future, warming will continue and, by the middle of the 21st century, Greenland – and the world as a whole – will likely experience temperatures that are unprecedented at least since the last interglacial period 125,000 years ago.

The post Factcheck: What Greenland ice cores say about past and present climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Engineering the climate to reflect away sunlight could halve global warming and offset the risk of increases in tropical storms, new research suggests.

The study finds that an “idealised” case of “solar geoengineering” – a group of hypothetical technologies that aim to lower warming by reflecting the sun’s rays away from the Earth – would not exacerbate extremes in temperature or water availability for most world regions.

The findings stand in contrast to earlier research suggesting that solar geoengineering could, under certain circumstances, cause some regions to face amplified climate impacts.

The research marks an “important step in solar geoengineering research” by looking at climate impacts that “could directly affect society”, one scientist tells Carbon Brief.

However, the study “would have been more policy-relevant” if its modelling technique “represented solar geoengineering using stratospheric aerosols” – rather than an idealised scenario, another says.

Sundown

From removing certain clouds to sending giant mirrors to space, the proposed ideas for solar geoengineering – also known as solar radiation management (SRM) – vary widely in form.

However, they all have the same aim of reflecting incoming sunlight back into space – which could, in theory, slow global temperature rise.

This could protect the world from many of the impacts of global warming. However, it would not directly address rising CO2 levels – which are causing oceans to become more acidic and crops to become less nutritious, among other problems.

Solar Geoengingeering options. Graphic by Ros Pearce for Carbon Brief

The new study, published in Nature Climate Change, focuses on an “idealised” scenario akin to using “stratospheric aerosol injection” – an idea for reflecting sunlight by releasing aerosols into the stratosphere.

This would cool the planet in a similar way to a volcanic eruption. When a volcano erupts, it can send an ash cloud high into the atmosphere. The sulphur dioxide released in the plume combines with water to form sulfuric acid aerosols, which reflect incoming sunlight.

Some researchers have proposed that artificially introducing aerosols into the atmosphere – using a plane or a high-altitude balloon – could have a similar cooling effect.

One concern that has been raised about this idea is that reducing incoming sunlight could impact the water cycle. Specifically, research has suggested that, if solar geoengineering were used to fully offset the warming caused by a doubling of CO2 emissions, rainfall could decrease – with some regions being worse affected than others.

The new study looks at a more moderate intervention. It imagines that solar geoengineering is used to offset half of the warming caused by a doubling of CO2 emissions. In the video below, study lead author Dr Pete Irvine, a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University, tells Carbon Brief why the researchers chose to study this scenario.

(The video was shot by science editor Robert McSweeney at the 2018 American Geophysical Union (AGU) fall meeting in Washington, DC.)

Dim view

To conduct the virtual experiment, the research team used models from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (Geomip) – which is commonly used in solar geoengineering studies – and the high-resolution forecast-oriented low ocean resolution (Hiflor) model, which has been used to study tropical storms.

The researchers did not simulate aerosol release, but rather an “idealised” case of solar geoengineering, Irvine says:

“We have a case where CO2 concentrations have doubled and we turn the sun down by 1%. This is a kind of sketch of how halving warming with solar geoengineering would influence the climate.”

The researchers then investigated how this global dimming would impact annual temperature averages, yearly maximum temperature, global tropical storm intensity, yearly maximum precipitation in a five-day window (a measure of flood risk) and precipitation minus evaporation (a measure of water availability). The researchers studied changes on land and also where people live.

The team focused on precipitation-evaporation rather than rainfall alone because it gives a clearer picture of water availability, says co-author Prof David Keith, leader of the solar geoengineering programme at Harvard University. He says:

“While it seems reasonable to assume that less rain means that things are drier, in fact, what matters more for ecosystems and farmers is water availability: rainfall minus evaporation. Geoengineering reduces rainfall, but it also reduces evaporation by reducing temperatures. So, a decrease in rainfall can be associated with an increase in water availability.”

Global picture

The research finds that using solar geoengineering to halve warming would not exacerbate extremes in temperature, rainfall or water availability for the majority of world regions, when compared to present-day levels.

It finds that, under the solar geoengineering scenario, only 0.5% of the land surface would see a significant amplification of water availability extremes, while a quarter of the land surface would see fewer extremes, when compared to today.

The map below gives an idea how climate extremes could change across the world. On the map “T” represents surface air temperature and “Tx” represents maximum annual temperature. In addition, “PE” represents precipitation-evaporation, a measure of water availability, and “Px” represents maximum five-day precipitation, a measure of flood risk.

The two columns shown beneath the letters correspond to “PE” (left) and “Px” (right). In each column, blue indicates the proportion of results where solar geoengineering “moderates” (or reduces) climate extremes when compared to the present day, while red indicates the proportion of results where solar geoengineering exacerbates climate extremes. Bold colours represent a significant change and pale colours represent an insignificant change.

Global distribution of climate extreme changes (compared to present day) when solar geoengineering is used to halve global warming caused by a doubling of CO2 emissions. “T” represents surface air temperature, “Tx” represents maximum annual temperature, “PE” represents precipitation-evaporation, a measure of water availability, and “Px” represents maximum five-day precipitation, a measure of flood risk. The two columns shown beneath the letters correspond to “PE” (left) and “Px” (right). Blue indicates that solar geoengineering “moderates” (or reduces) climate extremes, while red indicates that solar geoengineering exacerbates climate extremes. Bold colours represent a significant change and pale colours represent an insignificant change. Source: Irvine et al. (2019)

The maps shows that parts of South America and southern Africa might see a significant exacerbation of water availability extremes if solar geoengineering is used to halve global warming. In their research paper, the authors say:

“In the few regions where half-solar geoengineering exacerbates climate change, it increases water availability. This stands in contrast to previous studies and commentary that highlighted concerns that solar geoengineering would lead to drought.”

The research team also find that using solar geoengineering to halve global warming would largely offset the impact of rising CO2 levels on the global intensity of hurricanes and typhoons.

The findings suggest that, compared to today, a doubling of CO2 emissions would cause the global intensity of tropical storms to increase by 17.6%. Halving warming with solar geoengineering offsets most of this, the authors say, reducing the increase to 2.4%.

Winners and losers?

The findings “challenge” the idea that “there would inevitably winners and losers” with solar geoengineering, Irvine says in the video below.

The finding that solar geoengineering would not inevitably cause there to be regional winners and losers “should not come as a surprise”, says Prof Doug MacMartin, an engineering researcher not involved in the study from Cornell University. He tells Carbon Brief:

“The paper is particularly important because [it uses] a higher resolution climate model that gives more credible projections for some important variables like precipitation extremes – whereas previous papers often only consider variables such as annual mean temperature and precipitation that don’t encompass many important climate impacts.”

The study is “fully in agreement with what we already know” about solar geoengineering, says Prof Govindasamy Bala, from the Divecha Centre for Climate Change at the Indian Institute of Science. (Bala previously published research looking at the impact of solar geoengineering on rainfall.)  He tells Carbon Brief:

“[Solar] geoengineering can markedly diminish global and regional climate change from increasing CO2 concentrations. In most regions, the impacts of climate change can be reduced by geoengineering.”

The research is an “important step in solar geoengineering research”, says Prof Ben Kravitz, an earth and atmospheric scientist at Indiana University and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, who was not involved in the study. He tells Carbon Brief:

“I am enjoying the fact that more studies in solar geoengineering are looking at extreme events, impacts like food and water security, and other aspects of climate change that could directly affect society. Studies like these will be an essential part of the knowledge that scientists can provide to decision makers in their deliberations about geoengineering.”

It is worth bearing in mind that the research presents an idealised solar geoengineering scenario, says Prof Alan Robock, a professor of environmental sciences at Rutgers University, who was also not involved in the research. He tells Carbon Brief:

“Because they mimicked stratospheric geoengineering by turning down the solar constant rather than by modeling stratospheric aerosols, they ignored a large number of potential impacts, including more diffuse radiation, heating of the stratosphere and impacts on stratospheric ozone. These latter two factors would change atmospheric circulation as well as affect the potential intensity of tropical cyclones.”

The findings “strengthen the notion that a moderate solar geoengineering application would be highly effective at ameliorating most regional climate changes”, says Dr Anthony Jones, an atmospheric scientist from the UK’s Met Office. He tells Carbon Brief:

“However, the study would have been more policy-relevant if it concentrated on a realistic global warming scenario and represented solar geoengineering using stratospheric aerosols. Nevertheless, this paper should impel policymakers to see solar geoengineering for what it is – a potentially effective method of counteracting regional climate change.”

The results are “interesting” but “do not change the fact that solar geoengineering is a highly contentious issue”, says Prof Sonia Seneviratne, a researcher of climate extremes from ETH Zurich. She tells Carbon Brief:

“Solar geoengineering does not solve the root cause of greenhouse gas induced global warming. This is a similar situation to taking morphine when you are very ill, it will mitigate the pain but it will not cure you – and it may make you addicted.”

The post Halving global warming with solar geoengineering could ‘offset tropical storm risk’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Simon Lewis est professeur en sciences de changement global à l’Université de Leeds et à l’Université College de Londres, ainsi que collaborateur à la rédaction de Carbon Brief.

En 2017, j’ai conduit une équipe de scientifiques à la publication de la toute première carte qui a mis en valeur l’existence dans la Cuvette Centrale du bassin du Congo du plus grand complexe de tourbières en zone tropicale au monde, avec une superficie de 145 500 kilomètres carrés, ce qui est plus grande que la superficie de l’Angleterre.

La tourbe est un type de sol des zones humides, constituée de matières végétales partiellement décomposées et est riche en carbone. Nous estimons qu’une réserve d’environ 30 milliards de tonnes de carbone est contenue dans les tourbières que nous avons découvertes, soit l’équivalent de trois ans d’émissions mondiales liées aux énergies fossiles.

Compte tenu du carbone renfermé dans les tourbières, leur protection est devenue une priorité mondiale. Suite à notre découverte, la République du Congo et la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) ont toutes les deux signé la Déclaration de Brazzaville, un accord qui vise à protéger et à préserver cet écosystème précieux.

Répartition des zones humides dans la Cuvette Centrale en Afrique

Bien qu’elles soient pour la plupart intactes et de plus en plus protégées par écrit, en réalité les tourbières sont menacées par l’extension du réseau routier, l’exploitation forestière et pétrolière, et le drainage des eaux afin de développer des plantations industrielles de palmier à huile. De plus, la hausse des températures pourrait inverser l’équilibre des tourbières, au point qu’elles libéreront le carbone dans l’atmosphère au lieu de le contenir.

La bonne nouvelle est que ce mois-ci nous avons commencé la deuxième phase du projet « CongoPeat », un important programme scientifique quinquennal qui a bénéficié d’un financement de 3,7 millions de livres sterling, accordé par le Conseil de recherche sur l’environnement naturel (NERC) du gouvernement britannique.

Le programme vise à acquérir une compréhension globale de cet écosystème riche en carbone en répondant à des questions clés sur son passé, son présent et son futur.

Le passé: pourquoi les tourbières se sont-elles formées?

La datation radiocarbone de la tourbe – jusqu’à cinq mètres sous la surface – a révélé que les tourbières ont commencé à se former il y a près de 10 000 ans, après le retrait de la dernière glaciation, quand l’Afrique centrale est devenue plus chaude et plus humide.

En nous basant sur cette découverte initiale, nous reconstituerons laborieusement la végétation passée de la région en prenant des carottes de tourbe et en utilisant les vieux grains de pollen piégés là-dedans.

Sous la direction du Dr Ian Lawson de l’Université de St Andrews, l’analyse du pollen nous permettra de comprendre la formation initiale des tourbières et les changements qu’elles ont subis.

Prof Susan Page et Dr Arnoud Boom de l’Université de Leicester poursuivront des analyses supplémentaires des « indicateurs », telles que la composition chimique de la cire présente sur la surface de feuilles partiellement décomposées et préservées dans la tourbe. Ces indicateurs fournissent un bilan des changements des températures et des taux de précipitation au cours du temps, ce qui nous permettra de reconstituer le climat passé de la région.

Ces recherches nous permettront de découvrir comment les changements de températures et des taux de précipitation dans le passé ont affecté l’accumulation ou l’émission du carbone dans les tourbières. Nous pourrons également comprendre dans quelle mesure les tourbières resteraient stables face aux conditions climatiques actuelles et futures.

Le présent: comment fonctionnent-elles les tourbières aujourd’hui?

Afin de mieux protéger et de bien gérer les tourbières, nous devons connaître la localisation précise de la tourbe, la quantité de carbone stockée par les tourbières et le rôle qu’elles jouent au sein de l’écosystème des forêts tropicales.

Nous pourrons cartographier la répartition de différents types de végétation en utilisant des satellites, mais comme cette méthode ne détectera pas la tourbe directement, des données sur le terrain seront essentielles.

Avec nos partenaires des deux Congo, Dr Suspense Averti Ifo de l’Université Marien N’gouabi, République du Congo, Dr Corneille Ewango de l’Université de Kisangani, République démocratique du Congo, et Dr Mark Gately de WCS Congo, nous entreprendrons une série d’expéditions à travers la région entière afin de prélever des échantillons de tourbe et d’estimer son épaisseur et sa teneur en carbone.

Sous la direction de la Dr Greta Dargie de l’Université de Leeds, l’équipe mettra des semaines à voyager en bateau et à pied, se hasardant au cœur des tourbières, tout en évitant les crocodiles nains endémiques, pour cartographier la végétation marécageuse de la tourbe, mesurer l’épaisseur de la tourbe et renvoyer des échantillons de tourbe aux laboratoires du Royaume-Uni.

Plan des trois expéditions principales que les chercheurs vont entreprendre, étiqueté 1 à 3. Sur la carte, les tourbières sont indiquées en vert, le jaune et le bleu montrent les sites où on prélèvera de nouveaux échantillons et l’orange montre les sites où on a déjà prélevé des échantillons en République du Congo. Crédit: Greta Dargie

En mettant ensemble ces informations et les données des satellites, nous pourrons ensuite produire de nouvelles cartes précises pour les tourbières.

Des données de la RDC n’ont pas figuré lors de la découverte initiale des tourbières, ce qui est d’une importance capitale parce que nous estimons qu’elle abrite deux-tiers de la superficie de tourbe et de la réserve de carbone de la zone. La nouvelle phase du projet, avec les données qui seront collectées en RDC, nous permettra de vérifier cette hypothèse et mettre à disposition les premières cartes tirées de données des tourbières de la RDC.

Les tourbières jouent un rôle important non seulement dans la capture de carbone de l’atmosphère : ces zones humides libèrent de grandes quantités du gaz à effet de serre, le méthane, du fait qu’elles sont saturées en eau.

Sous la direction de la Dr Sofie Sjögersten de l’Université de Nottingham, des données seront collectées et des analyses faites afin d’évaluer pour la première fois l’étendue des émissions sur le terrain.

Ces mesures seront complétées par des prélèvements intensifs d’un site bien étudié. Des étudiants en doctorat à l’Université Marien N’gouabi suivront les échanges de carbone entre l’atmosphère, la végétation et la tourbe au cours de deux années. Les chercheurs mesureront chaque mois plusieurs paramètres qui permettent de caractériser le fonctionnenement de cet écosystème, y compris les litières fines en chute (feuilles, brindilles, écorces) et du bois mort vers la tourbe, et leurs taux de décomposition.

Finalement, afin d’obtenir des estimations de la réserve de carbone et des émissions de gaz à effet de serre à travers la région, toutes nos mesures de terrain feront l’objet d’un accroissement d’échelle en utilisant des satellites. Pour faciliter ceci, nous obtiendrons une image détaillée de la topographie – l’aspect physique de la zone – en déployant un drone.

Sous la direction du Dr Ed Mitchard, de l’Université d’Édimbourg, cet aspect du projet établira l’importance et le rôle des tourbières dans le cycle mondial du carbone.

Le futur: les tourbières sont-elles stables?

Afin de faire des projections relatives au futur des tourbières, nous devrons utiliser des modèles. Nous utiliserons les mesures effectuées par l’équipe de recherches afin de développer une version congolaise de DigiBog, un modèle qui simule le développement des écosystèmes des tourbières.

Sous la direction du Prof Andy Baird de l’Université de Leeds, DigiBog montrera la « croissance » ou la « destruction » des tourbières selon l’entrée de données, telles que la quantité de carbone qui s’ajoute au sol provenant des matières végétales mortes et du taux de décomposition de celles-ci.

Nous pourrons utiliser le modèle à simuler le déboisement, ce qui nous permettra d’évaluer l’effet de l’exploitation forestière sur le stock de carbone présent dans la tourbe. On pourrait également creuser des canaux virtuels de drainage, afin d’estimer la quantité de carbone qui sera rejetée dans l’atmosphère si la tourbe subit un drainage pour une plantation d’huile de palmier, par exemple.

Cependant DigiBog n’est pas adapté à l’usage au sein de modèles climatiques à l’échelle mondiale. Pour les réaliser, nous devrons nous associer aux efforts mondiaux de modélisation qui sont en cours. Nous améliorerons le modèle communautaire britannique de la surface des terres mondiales, appelé JULES (Joint UK Land Environment Simulator) de façon qu’elle intègre les tourbières tropicales. Ce travail sera conduit sous la direction du Prof Richard Betts de l’Université d’Exeter et du Hadley Centre du Met Office (le service officiel de la météorologie au Royaume-Uni).

Cela nous permettra d’examiner la manière dans laquelle les tourbières congolaises répondront à d’éventuels futurs scénarios climatiques. Ainsi nous pourrons répondre à la question fondamentale: ces tourbières sont-elles un nouveau point de déséquilibre au sein du système terrestre?

Liens à la politique

L’ambition de notre projet, CongoPeat, est de mettre à disposition des décideurs et de la société civile des informations opportunes dans un format qui leur est utile. Dr Lera Miles, du Centre mondial de surveillance continue de la conservation de la nature (UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre), mènera un projet qui a pour objectif de présenter nos résultats scientifiques en langage accessible à ceux qui s’occupent de la protection et de la gestion des tourbières.

Cette étape très importante de notre projet s’effectuera avec le soutien continu d’organisations internationales telles que l’Initiative mondiale sur les tourbières, les gouvernements des deux pays, la République du Congo et la RDC, WCS Congo et les communautés vivant aux environs des tourbières, ce qui devrait garantir que notre travail laisse un héritage positif et durable.

The post Article invité: Un plan pour résoudre les mystères des vastes tourbières du Congo appeared first on Carbon Brief.

In the fifth article of a series explaining how large emitters are positioned to tackle climate change, Carbon Brief sets out India’s key policy developments, pledges and statistics…

India is the world’s third largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs), after China and the US.

Coal power plants, rice paddies and cattle are major sources of emissions, which continue to rise steeply, although per-capita emissions remain well below the global average.

India is also very vulnerable to climate change, notably due to the melting of the Himalayan glaciers and changes to the monsoon.

The country has pledged a 33-35% reduction in the “emissions intensity” of its economy by 2030, compared to 2005 levels.

It is holding a general election this year throughout April and May, with polls projecting a minority win for current prime minister, Narendra Modi.

Politics

India has the world’s second largest population, at 1.3 billion. Its economy ranks sixth globally in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), just after the UK, and is the world’s fastest growing major economy. India’s population is expected to become the world’s largest by 2025, overtaking China and peaking at 1.7 billion in 2060.

Modi first won office in May 2014. His party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was the first in 30 years to win an outright parliamentary majority. The BJP won 31% of the vote and 52% of seats; the centre-left Indian National Congress (INC) came second with 19% of votes and 8% of seats.

Modi has portrayed India as a responsible participant in international climate politics. In 2018, he told world leaders that climate change is the “greatest threat to the survival and human civilisation as we know it”.

India will begin its election on 11 April 2019, with the final ballot cast on 19 May and the results expected on 23 May. Around 900 million people are eligible to vote. The election result is hugely complex to predict. However, opinion polls in January-February 2019 generally show an expected minority or slight majority win for Modi’s party. The INC, led by Rahul Gandhi – son and grandson of two former prime ministers – is expected to come second.

Prime minister Narendra Modi with French president Emmanuel Macron at Hyderabad House, New Delhi, on 10 March 2018. Credit: Newscom / Alamy Stock Photo.

India’s constitution, adopted in 1949, says the state shall “endeavour to protect and improve the environment” and “safeguard [India’s] forests and wildlife”. Its 2006 National Environment Policy aimed to integrate environmental protection into the development process.

In 2002, India hosted the eighth formal meeting of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) in New Delhi. This meeting adopted the Delhi Ministerial Declaration, which called for developed countries to transfer the technology needed to cut emissions and adapt to climate change to developing countries. This remains a key priority for India at climate talks. The issue of how to fairly share up ambition, known as “equity”, also continues to be a strong concern for India.

Three-quarters of Indians are very concerned about global warming, according to a 2015 poll from the Pew Research Centre, the highest share of all the Asian countries surveyed. In another 2017 survey, 47% called climate change a “major threat” to their country, second only the threat of ISIS.

Around 13% of India’s population does not yet have access to electricity, while more than half still relies on traditional biomass (dung, wood, etc) for cooking. Modi has repeatedly promised to ensure all Indian homes are connected with electricity, most recently for the end of March 2019, although the quality of power access remains poor for many.

Paris pledge

India is part of four negotiating blocs at international climate talks. These are BASIC, a coalition of the four major emerging economies with Brazil, South Africa and China; the like-minded developing countries (LMDC); the G77 + China; and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN).

Its GHG emissions in 2015 stood at 3,653m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e), according to data compiled by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). Emissions increased over three-fold since 1970.

India’s per capita emissions stood at 2.7tCO2e in 2015, around a seventh of the US figure and less than half the world average of 6.5tCO2e. (See “note on infographic” at the end of this article for details on use of 2015 data).

India ratified the Paris Agreement on 2 October 2016, almost exactly a year after it submitted its climate pledge, or “nationally determined contribution” (NDC), for the Paris climate talks.

The pledge is for a 33-35% reduction in emissions associated with each unit of economic output (“emissions intensity”) by 2030, compared to 2005 levels. Carbon Brief analysis at the time found India’s emissions could increase 90% between 2014 and 2030, even if the pledge is met.

India also aims for 40% of its installed electricity capacity to be renewable or nuclear by 2030.

It further outlines plans to increase tree cover to create an additional cumulative carbon sink of 2,500-3,000MtCO2e by 2030 –  roughly on a par with its total emissions across one year.

The pledge says India’s goals represent the “utmost ambitious action in the current state of development” and criticises the “tepid and inadequate” response of developed countries to global warming. “India, even though not a part of the problem, has been an active and constructive participant in the search for solutions,” it says.

India is clear that implementation of its pledge will depend heavily on climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building support from developed countries. In total, it estimates it will need at least $2.5tn up to 2030, from both domestic and international funds.

India’s NDC is consistent with the 2C goal of the Paris Agreement, but not the 1.5C limit, according to Climate Action Tracker (CAT), an independent analysis of climate pledges produced by three research organisations. However, the top end of India’s policy range is 1.5C compatible, says CAT.

India is now on track to overachieve its Paris targets, after adopting its final National Electricity Plan (NEP) in 2018, says CAT.

The country could achieve its 40% non-fossil power capacity target more than a decade early, through the use of hydroelectricity and nuclear power, adds CAT. India’s emissions intensity in 2030 will be around 50% below 2005 levels, CAT projects, far ahead of the 33-35% target.

A “barefoot” solar engineer from Tinginaput, India, passes on her skills to other villagers teaching them how to make a solar lamp. Credit: Abbie Trayler-Smith / Panos Pictures / Department for International Development.

A less rosy assessment comes from Climate Transparency, a research and NGO partnership which aims to spark ambitious climate action. It says India’s NDC is compatible with limiting temperature rise to below 2C, but that current (2018) policies fall short of this.

The Indian government is considering long-term growth strategies for 2030-2045, which would “decouple” carbon emissions from economic growth, says CAT. India has indicated it may be willing to increase its climate pledge in 2020. However, it has not yet translated the Paris Agreement goals into domestic law.

India published its National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008, split into eight missions on diverse aspects of climate mitigation and adaptation policy. Each of the eight missions is discussed in the relevant sections, below.

India’s states are also required to produce state climate action plans. Some of these include emissions reduction commitments, e-mobility policies or solar and wind capacity quotas.

Coal

India is the world’s second largest coal consumer after China, having overtaken the US in 2015.

Moreover, Chinese coal use has plateaued, meaning India could largely determine the global trajectory for the fuel. Many analysts expect rapid growth in India to drive increases in global demand over the next few years – though this is expected to remain below a peak in 2014.

Coal has fuelled the rapid growth in Indian electricity use and its coal fleet has more than tripled in size since 2000. In 2017, coal generated 80% of India’s electricity, as shown in the chart below (black area).

As of January 2019, India has 221 gigawatts (GW) of operating coal plants. This is the world’s third largest fleet, with 11% of global capacity, according to the Global Coal Plant Tracker. Another 36GW is being built and a further 58GW is at earlier stages of development. This pipeline of new plants is rapidly drying up, however, having shrunk by more than a quarter since last year and more than five-fold since 2014.

The government currently projects there will be 238GW of coal capacity in 2027. An earlier draft NEP had no plans for coal expansion before 2022, bar the 50GW already being built. However, the final version included more than 90GW of planned coal-fired capacity, which some argue now risks becoming “stranded assets”. Abandoning plans to build new coal-fired plants could make India’s policies 1.5C compatible, says CAT.

There is ongoing debate about the extent to which new coal will actually get built in India, as well as how often existing plants will run, given falling costs for renewables and lower-than-expected growth in electricity demand. Forecasts for Indian coal demand growth have been repeatedly revised down and one recent analysis said a large proportion of the pipeline of new coal plants could be cancelled.

There is concern in India over the health impact of coal plants. One in every eight deaths in India is due to air pollution, according to a recent report in the Lancet Planetary Health, while India is home to half of the world’s 20 most polluted cities. The falling cost of solar power and batteries is also having a significant impact on the sector.

Coal being sorted by size and quality, Meghalaya, India. Credit: National Geographic Image Collection / Alamy Stock Photo.

In 2015, India set new emissions standards for air pollution from coal plants for compliance in 2017, with looser standards for older plants. However, the standards were not complied with and India’s supreme court has now extended the deadline for meeting them to 2022.

India is the second largest coal producer and importer, after China. Coal India, the national coal mining company and largest coal producer in the world, accounts for around 84% of domestic output. India has proven coal reserves of around 98bn tonnes, or 9.5% of the world total, again second only to China.

The government hopes to end imports, which come from Indonesia, South Africa and Australia. It has a target for Coal India to reach 1,000Mt of production by 2019-20, up from 650Mt in 2018-19, although timeline may be relaxed.

India says it needs to use coal to secure “reliable, adequate and affordable supply of electricity”, but that it has also taken steps to improve the efficiency of its coal plants.

In 2010, it introduced a coal “cess” (tax). This collected $12bn from 2010-2018. It is expected to bring in $1bn more in 2019 and 2020. However, subsidies for coal also remain high, at $2.3bn in 2016, largely as tax breaks to the mining sector.

Coal makes up almost half of local revenues in some states in India, meaning a move away from it would require policies to ensure a “just transition” for coal workers. There is reportedly little discussion on this in India. However, a major vocational programme launched in 2015, to boost youth employment, has renewables as a target sector.

Low-carbon energy

India is notable for its rapid expansion of renewables in recent years. In 2017, renewable investment and new capacity topped fossil fuels for first time. However, only 11.1% of India’s electricity came from renewables in 2017, including 9.5% from large hydro.

Rapidly falling solar PV prices mean coal-based power is falling out of favour with electricity distributors. However, as the penetration of renewables in the grid increases, new policies, such as smart grids, will be needed to adapt to the variable supply.

Gujarat Solar Park, in Gujarat, India, in 2013. It now has an installed capacity of 1637 MW. Credit: Ashley Cooper / Alamy Stock Photo.

Overall, subsidies to renewables in India increased from $431m in the 2014 financial year to $1.4bn in 2016, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) says. Support to coal, oil and gas was still around six times this in 2016, IISD notes.

India used its Electricity Act back in 2003 to begin promoting renewable electricity. In 2015, it set a goal to install 175GW of renewable energy capacity by 2022, consisting of 100GW solar, 60GW onshore wind,10GW bioenergy and 5GW small hydro. This could replace roughly 70GW of coal, according to a Carbon Brief guest post last year. India’s total current capacity, including fossil fuel and low-carbon plants, is around 350GW.

In June 2018, India’s power minister Raj Kumar Singh said he expects India to have built or commissioned all 175GW by March 2020. Renewables reached 72GW by September 2018.

Singh also said in 2018 that he country now hopes to reach 225GW renewables by 2022. However, this target may be due to the government giving large hydropower the status of being “renewable”. India’s most recent NEP projects that 275GW renewables will be installed by 2027.

Its 2016 revised Tariff Policy obliges power distributors and some large electricity users to buy a proportion of their energy from renewable sources. It also waives inter-state transmission charges for solar and wind energy.

India launched its “National Solar Mission” in 2010, one of the eight NAPCC missions. Its original target was 20GW solar by 2022, but this was increased in 2015 to 100GW. Rooftop solar is supposed to account for 40% of this.

India also plans 2GW of off-grid solar by 2022, including 20m solar lights in rural areas.

By August 2018, 23GW of solar had been installed or commissioned, according to India’s recently submitted biennial report to the UNFCCC. It is building many of the world’s biggest solar parks.

However, short-term financial uncertainty due to changing taxes on solar and tariff renegotiations could mean India misses the 100GW target, says consultancy firm Wood Mackenzie.

India is the fourth largest wind power globally, after China, the US and Germany. Around 34GW of onshore wind had been installed by mid-2018, triple the level seen a decade ago. India is using auctions to reach its 2022 wind target.

Wind turbines near Kanyakumari in Tamil Nadu, India. Credit: dbimages / Alamy Stock Photo.

The price of solar has fallen by almost two-thirds since 2014, while the price of onshore wind has halved, India’s biennial report says.

India also aims to install 5GW of offshore wind by 2022 and 30GW by 2030. None has yet been installed, however.

India’s renewable energy potential is around 1,100GW for commercially exploitable sources, the biennial report says. This includes 300GW wind and 750GW solar power. The country could integrate 390GW of low-cost wind and solar generation into its grid by 2030, according to the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI).

India’s climate pledge notes that around 70% of its population depends on traditional biomass energy, which is inefficient and causes high levels of indoor air pollution. India is promoting the use of biomass to generate electricity instead, which it says is cleaner and more efficient. India is targeting 10GW of such bioenergy by 2022 and had already reached 9GW in 2018.

India has around 4.5GW of small hydro (plants below 25MW), against a 5GW target for 2022. Including large hydro, capacity sat at 45GW in 2018, up from 30GW in 2005. India’s climate pledge says it will “aggressively pursue development of the country’s vast hydro potential”.

India’s government views nuclear power as a “safe, environmentally benign and economically viable” source of electricity, according to its 2015 climate pledge. It currently has 6.8GW of nuclear capacity and targets a nine-fold increase to 63GW by 2032. However, there is ongoing debate in the country on the pros and cons of nuclear energy.

India also has one of the world’s largest reserves of thorium – seen as a safer alternative to existing nuclear fuels – and has a long-term interest in experimental thorium reactors. However, substantial generation is unlikely until at least the 2050s, if at all.

Energy efficiency

India has long prided itself on its energy efficiency and emissions intensity achievements.

Its 2001 Energy Conservation Act established the Bureau of Energy Efficiency, which was tasked with reducing the energy intensity of the economy.

India says it is on track to meet its voluntary goal of cutting emissions intensity 20-25% by 2020, compared to 2005 levels. However, it also notes how little energy is used by the average Indian citizen, compared to those in other countries.

In 2010, India launched its National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency (NMEEE), another of the eight NAPCC missions. This targets an eventual 20GW in avoided electricity generating capacity and 23m tonnes of fuel savings per year.

Bricks lined up to dry at a brick manufacturing facility in Amritsar, Punjab, India. Credit: GURPREET SINGH / Alamy Stock Photo.

The market-based Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme is its main initiative. This limits the consumption of energy-intensive industries, including thermal power plants, iron and steel, and cement. Overachievers can sell their energy saving certificates to those that have fallen short.

Its first cycle led to savings of 31MtCO2e between 2012 and 2015, the government says, which is around 1% of India’s current annual emissions. The scheme has been extended several times to cover more and more sectors.

Other NMEEE schemes include support for more efficient appliances, such as ceiling fans, encouragement for financiers to engage in energy efficiency and the use of financial instruments, such as partial risk guarantees and venture capital, to support energy efficiency.

India also has a national smart grid mission, a rating system to evaluate the energy performance of buildings and another for small industries to support more environmentally friendly manufacturing.

It recently released a new action plan to cut cooling energy requirements – a significant driver of electricity demand growth – 25-40% by 2038. The plan also aims to cut refrigerant demand by 25-30% by the same year.

The government aims to replace India’s 14m conventional street lights with LEDs by 2019. It is also subsidising the rollout of LEDs in homes, with 312m distributed so far.

Transport

India currently has the world’s fifth largest car sales. These are expected to grow with rising incomes and rapid urbanisation, with strong implications for global oil demand.

The government promotes the uptake of electric vehicles (EVs), although so far India has only 260,000 – including two-wheelers and hybrids – and, overall, only 0.6% of sales are EVs. The rollout of charging stations remains low.

It also has around 1.5m electric rickshaws, although these are typically used only for short journeys.

Electric rickshaw carrying villagers at Mangalbari bustee, Chalsa in Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal, India. Credit: Biswarup Ganguly / Alamy Stock Photo.

In 2011, India set up its National Mission for Electric Mobility, which aimed to promote electric vehicle (EV) and hybrid manufacturing. In 2017, then-power minister Piyush Goyal said petrol and diesel car sales should end by 2030. But the government has since rowed back on this aim, now targeting a 30% share of sales for EVs by 2030. It also aims for all new urban buses to be fully electric by 2030.

In 2015, India launched its FAME scheme to subsidise electric and hybrid cars, mopeds, rickshaws and buses. This was recently extended with a fresh $1.4bn over three years. Of this, $1.2bn is earmarked for subsidies and $140m for charging infrastructure. Several individual states have also rolled out policy initiatives to support EVs.

India finalised its first passenger vehicle fuel efficiency standards in 2014. These entered force in 2017 and will be tightened in 2022, though even then they will be less stringent than current standards in the EU.

Its 2009 national biofuels policy had an “aspirational” target to blend 20% biofuels into the diesel and petrol mix by 2017. However, India has fallen well short of these targets, so far reaching only around 2% bioethanol and 0.1% biodiesel blend in 2018. It updated its biofuels policy in 2018, proposing a 20% blend of bioethanol and 5% of biodiesel by 2030.

India’s railway system is the fourth-largest in the world in terms of rail track length. It is second only to China in terms of rail passenger activity, with this set to grow more than any other country, tripling by 2050.

Around half of India’s conventional rail tracks are electrified, although its first high-speed line is still under construction. A third of India’s land freight is carried by rail, a high proportion by global standards, with coal by far the main commodity.

India plans to increase the share of railways in total land transport from 36% to 45%, its climate pledge says, including through development of dedicated freight corridors.

A coal train passes through a station in Jaipur, India. Credit: Sandra Foyt / Alamy Stock Photo.

Aviation only represented 1% of India’s emissions in 2014, well below the world average, but its rapid expansion means this has already likely increased. India has the world’s fastest growing domestic aviation market, with a 19% rise seen last year alone. It aims to construct around 100 new airports in the next 10-15 years and is set to become the world’s third largest market by 2020. Passenger numbers for domestic and international flights have already doubled since 2010 and could triple to 520 million by 2037.

India is a signatory to Corsia, the UN aviation emission offset scheme, although it has not signed up for the voluntary pilot phase set to begin in 2021.

Its climate pledge outlines plans to promote coastal shipping and inland water transport, due to their fuel efficiency and cost effectiveness.

Oil and gas

India relies on large amounts of oil, which made up 29% of total energy consumption in 2017. Its oil demand is rising fast and could more than double by 2040.This means it could soon overtake China as the top driver of global oil demand growth. However, its own oil production is falling.

The government has provided large consumption subsidies to both oil and gas. Between 2014 and 2016, subsidies fell by almost 75% to $6.8bn, due to reforms and falling oil prices. Further reforms are ongoing.

India has highlighted its use of subsidy cuts and petrol and diesel tax rises to address climate concerns. For example, a “Give it Up” campaign launched by the Indian government encourages more affluent citizens to voluntarily give up their subsidy for LPG cooking gas.

However, price changes in fuels such as kerosene – widely used for lighting and cooking in India – could have large impacts on those without access to electricity.

Diesel consumption is expected to rise, supported by large government spending on road-building,

Gas has never played a prominent role in India’s energy mix, making up only 6% of energy consumption in 2017. India currently imports around half its gas, largely from Qatar, the US, Australia and Russia.

However, gas consumption is rising in India, although its higher price means it struggles to compete with coal and fuel oil. The government aims to more than double the share of gas in the energy mix to 15% by 2022, citing the environmental benefits of adopting it as a “cleaner fuel”. Domestic production is low and India will likely continue to be highly reliant on imports, despite the “substantial potential” of its domestic gas and oil reserves.

A parliamentary panel recently concluded that more than half of the country’s 25GW of gas power plants had been “stranded” by a lack of domestic gas and the high price of imports. India has reportedly considered “emergency stockpiles” of gas, similar to strategic oil reserves.

Agriculture and forests

Agriculture is responsible for around 16% of India’s GHG emissions. Of this, 74% is due to methane produced from livestock – largely cows and buffalo – and rice cultivation. The remaining 26% comes from nitrous oxide emitted from fertilisers.

Workers in rice paddy fields, Kashmir, India. Credit: robertharding / Alamy Stock Photo.

Nearly two-thirds of the population rely on farming as their source of livelihood. India has 15% of the global cattle population, with around 300m cows and buffalo in 2014. It produces 19% of the world’s milk.

India will also need to substantially increase food grain production to feed its growing population, its climate pledge says. But droughts and floods are “frequent” and the sector is “already facing a high degree of climate variability,” it adds.

India’s National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA), another of its eight NAPCC missions, aims to tackle agricultural emissions and enhance food security.

The country’s many initiatives include promotion of lower methane emission rice production, crop diversification away from rice, chemical-free farming and soil health pilot projects. A policy introduced in 2015 made neem coating of urea compulsory to reduce nitrous oxide emissions.

Irrigation using highly inefficient water pumps accounts for around 70% of the energy consumption of agriculture. India has installed 200,000 solar water pumps – about 1% of the country’s total 21m, with another 2.5m planned.

India’s forest cover has increased in recent years, its climate pledge says, becoming a net CO2 sink. A recent study found India accounted for 7% of the global net increase in leaf area from 2000-2017.

Its long-term goal is to bring 33% of its area under forest cover – some 109m hectares – up from 24% in 2013 (79m hectares).

A herd of Indian cows near Mount Abu hill in Rajasthan, India. Credit: Kailash Kumar / Alamy Stock Photo.

Another goal is to absorb 2,500-3,000MtCO2 by 2030 through additional forest and tree cover. According to CAT, over half of this target could be achieved by the Green India Mission, launched in 2014, which aims to expand tree cover by 5m hectares and increase the quality of another 5m hectares of existing cover in 10 years. India’s government also offers incentives for state action to increase forest cover by linking it to funding allocations.

However, some argue India’s data exaggerates its true forest cover and masks ongoing deforestation.

Impacts and adaptation

India dedicates a large part of its 2015 climate pledge to outlining current and expected adverse impacts on the country. It says:

“Few countries in the world are as vulnerable to the effects of climate change as India is with its vast population that is dependent on the growth of its agrarian economy, its expansive coastal areas and the Himalayan region and islands.”

In its biennial report, it similarly points out it is already highly vulnerable to natural disasters, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, with these risks compounded by changing demographics and socio-economic conditions.

India’s annual mean temperature has already risen by around 1.0C since 1850.

The country could see $1.2tn of “lost GDP” in total, plus lower living standards for nearly half its population by 2050, compared to a scenario with no climate change, according to a 2018 World Bank study. The losses would be due to rising temperatures and changing monsoon rainfall patterns, the study says..

The Indus river flowing through the Ladakh range of the Himalayas.
Credit: Parvesh Jain / Alamy Stock Photo.

The Himalaya mountains, which form the most important concentration of snow outside the poles, are one particularly vulnerable part of India and the wider South Asia region. The glaciers are a critical water source for 250 million people who live in the region. A further 1.65 billion people in India and seven other countries rely on the major rivers that flow from it.

A major report released earlier this year found rising temperatures will melt at least a third of the region’s glaciers by 2100, even if average global temperature rises are limited to 1.5C.

India is also vulnerable to increases in vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue, which could both see increases due to climate change.

Heatwaves are also expected to be an issue, with 600 million people currently in locations that could become moderate or severe hotspots by 2050, according to the World Bank. India’s largely agricultural workforce was already significantly impacted by extreme heat in 2017, according to the Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change.

India could see significant sea level rise, affecting the river water systems that hundreds of millions rely on for food. Its 1,238 islands are also at risk.

The country’s disaster management act came into force in 2005. This made no explicit mention of climate change, but aimed to move from a “response and relief” approach to “prevention-mitigation and preparedness”. In 2016, India launched a disaster management plan, which integrates the principles of the Paris Agreement alongside other global disaster risk reduction frameworks.

India has dedicated one of its eight NAPCC missions to protecting the Himalayan ecosystem. Another two missions focus on water and research and development.

Its most recent National Communication report under the UNFCCC – which includes an assessment of vulnerability and adaptation – was submitted back in 2012.

Climate finance

India has long put a key emphasis on the need for climate finance and technology transfer from developed to developing countries. Its climate pledge notes:

“[O]ur efforts to avoid emissions during our development process are also tied to the availability and level of international financing and technology transfer since India still faces complex developmental challenges.”

India’s says it will cost at least $2.5tn to implement its climate pledge, around 71% of the combined required spending for all developing country pledges.

India received by far the highest level of single-country funding ($725m) approved by multilateral climate funds in absolute terms from 2013 to 2016, according to Carbon Brief analysis. The majority was from the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) for renewable projects. However, per-capita funding was relatively low, at just $0.56 per person..

A monsoon brings flooding to Kolkata, India, 7 July 2017. Credit: Dipayan Bose / Alamy Stock Photo.

On a wider level, India received on average $2.6bn per year in 2015 and 2016 in climate-related development finance, according to Carbon Brief analysis of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data.

India also has several domestic climate finance initiatives. As well as money spent through its eight national missions, its coal cess has so far collected $12bn, with proceeds used to finance clean energy, albeit not exclusively. Several adaptation programmes have also been allocated government funding.

The post The Carbon Brief Profile: India appeared first on Carbon Brief.

A new UN Environment report on the Arctic was released last week, which covered a broad range of changes to the region’s climate, environment, wildlife and epidemiology.

The accompanying press release focused on the report’s section about climate change. It warned that, “even if the Paris Agreement goals are met, Arctic winter temperatures will increase 3-5C by 2050 compared to 1986-2005 levels” and will warm 5-9C by 2080.

The report was covered by a number of news outlets, including the Guardian, Wired, Hill, CBC and others. Media coverage focused on the idea – promoted in the press release – that large amounts of Arctic warming is “locked in”, “inevitable” or “unavoidable”.

However, an investigation by Carbon Brief has found that the section of the report on climate change erroneously conflates the Paris Agreement target – which is to limit warming to “well below” 2C by the end of the century relative to pre-industrial levels – with a scenario that has much more modest emission reductions which result in around 3C of global warming.

In climate-model runs using a scenario limiting global warming to below 2C, the Arctic still warms faster than the rest of the world. But future Arctic winter warming will be around 0.5-5C by the 2080s compared to 1986-2005 levels, much lower than the 5-9C values stated in the report.

This means that much of the future warming in the Arctic will depend on our emissions over the 21st century, rather than being “locked in”, as the report claims.

Erroneous paragraph

The UN Environment report is titled, “Global linkages: A graphic look at the changing Arctic”. It provides a brief, accessible and infographic-heavy look at a number of different areas in which the Arctic has changed in recent decades and may change in the future.

The section of the report covering Arctic temperatures – which is only two pages long – does not present any new research. Rather, it summarises the findings of a number of recent, more technical studies. The future temperature projections, which were the focus of the press release and associated media coverage, are contained in a single paragraph of the report:

“Warmer temperatures in the Arctic resulted in a record low in the winter sea ice extent between 2015–2018 (Overland et al., 2018). Indeed, under a medium- or high-emission scenario, projected temperature changes for the Arctic will follow a winter warming trend at least double the rate for the northern hemisphere (AMAP 2017a). This means that even if countries manage to cut GHG emissions to the targets outlined in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, winter temperatures in the Arctic will still be 3 to 5C higher by 2050 and 5 to 9C higher by 2080, relative to 1986–2005 levels. In fact, even if we stopped all emissions overnight, winter temperatures in the Arctic will still increase by 4 to 5C compared to the late twentieth century. This increase is locked into the climate system by GHGs already emitted and ocean heat storage (AMAP 2017a).”

However, this paragraph contains a number of unclear statements and errors that undercut the message that large amounts of future Arctic warming are “locked into the climate system”.

While the first two sentences are accurate, problems begin in the third when the report argues that meeting Paris Agreement targets would still result in winter Arctic warming of 3-5C by 2050 and 5-9C by 2080, relative to 1986-2005 levels.

The reference for these numbers is the 2017 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) report. The 2017 AMAP report states:

“Over the Arctic Ocean, which is ice-free in early winter in some models and covered by thin sea ice during late winter, the warming is 3–5C by mid-century and 5–9C by late century under RCP4.5.”

The UN Environment report drops the reference to the Arctic Ocean, referring to these warming projections as ”winter temperatures in the Arctic” – a much larger area of the Earth than just the region over the Arctic Ocean. The actual warming in RCP4.5 for the full Arctic (between 60N and 90N) in the 2017 AMAP report is a bit lower: around 3.8-7.8C in the 2080s. There is another minor issue where the new report gives specific years (2050 and 2080), while the 2017 AMAP report actually uses the periods from 2050-2059 and 2080-2089.

Glossary

RCP4.5: The RCPs (Representative Concentration Pathways) are scenarios of future concentrations of greenhouse gases and other forcings. RCP4.5 is a “stabilisation scenario” where policies are put in place so atmospheric CO2 concentration levels off around the middle of the century, though temperatures do not stabilise before 2100. These policies include a shift to low-carbon energy technologies and the deployment of carbon capture and storage. In RCP4.5, atmospheric CO2 sits at 540ppm by 2100 – roughly 140ppm higher than now – equivalent to 630ppm once other forcings are included (in CO2e). By 2100, global temperatures are likely to rise by 2-3C above pre-industrial levels.

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RCP4.5: The RCPs (Representative Concentration Pathways) are scenarios of future concentrations of greenhouse gases and other forcings. RCP4.5 is a “stabilisation scenario” where policies are put in place so atmospheric CO2 concentration levels… Read More

The major problem with the paragraph comes when it associates the 2017 AMAP warming numbers – which refer to the RCP4.5 scenario – with “the targets outlined in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change”.

In the Paris Agreement, countries set a target to limit warming “well below” 2C, with an aspirational target of limiting warming below 1.5C. However, the 2017 AMAP report only considers two future emissions scenarios: a very-high-emission RCP8.5 scenario, where the world experiences more than 4C warming; and a medium-emission RCP4.5 scenario, where the world experiences around 3C warming compared to pre-industrial levels by the end of the century.

Glossary

RCP2.6: The RCPs (Representative Concentration Pathways) are scenarios of future concentrations of greenhouse gases and other forcings. RCP2.6 (also sometimes referred to as “RCP3-PD”) is a “peak and decline” scenario where stringent mitigation and carbon dioxide removal technologies mean atmospheric CO2 concentration peaks and then falls during this century. By 2100, CO2 levels increase to around 420ppm – around 20ppm above current levels – equivalent to 475ppm once other forcings are included (in CO2e). By 2100, global temperatures are likely to rise by 1.3-1.9C above pre-industrial levels.

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RCP2.6: The RCPs (Representative Concentration Pathways) are scenarios of future concentrations of greenhouse gases and other forcings. RCP2.6 (also sometimes referred to as “RCP3-PD”) is a “peak and decline” scenario where stringent mitigation… Read More

If countries were to meet the Paris Agreement target of limiting warming to “well below” 2C, global emissions would actually follow a RCP2.6 scenario (or cut emissions even more quickly to limit warming to 1.5C). While RCP2.6 still sees some additional Arctic warming, it is much smaller than the numbers contained in the report.

The figure below shows the winter warming in the Arctic from all of the CMIP5 climate models used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fifth assessment report for the RCP2.6 scenario. The black lines show the average of all the models, the dark area shows the range in which two-thirds of the models fall (the one-sigma range), and the light area shows the range covering 95% of the model runs (the two-sigma range).

RCP2.6 climate-model runs from CMIP5 for the region between 60N and 90N for the winter months (December, January and February) for the 32 different climate models providing RCP2.6 runs (with one run used per model). Model data obtained from KNMI Climate Explorer.

In a scenario where the Paris Agreement target is met, the actual winter warming projected for the Arctic is 0.8-4.5C in the 2050s and 0.5-5C in the 2080s relative to 1986–2005 levels (following the approach used in 2017 AMAP report of giving one-sigma ranges). The multi-model mean shows 2.8C warming in both the 2050s and 2080s, as falling global emissions limit further warming after the middle of the century.

The statement in the report that “even if we stopped all emissions overnight, winter temperatures in the Arctic will still increase by 4C to 5C compared to the late twentieth century” is puzzling, as it does not appear anywhere in the 2017 AMAP report that it cites.

Confusingly, the UN Environment report is claiming that cutting emissions to zero immediately would lead to more warming than occurs in climate models running the RCP2.6 scenario – a scenario which only has emissions reaching zero by around 2080. Carbon Brief reached out to a number of climate scientists, all of whom expressed puzzlement as to what might provide the basis of this claim. Carbon Brief asked UN Environment and the report’s authors for a response, but did not receive one before publication. (This article will be updated to include any response.)

According to an analysis featured in the recent IPCC special report on 1.5C, reducing all human emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols to zero immediately would result in a modest short-term bump in global temperatures of around 0.15C as Earth-cooling aerosols disappear, followed by a decline. Around 20 years after emissions went to zero, global temperatures would fall back down below today’s levels and then cool by around 0.25C by 2100. While reducing aerosols might have a larger warming impact in the Arctic than other regions, an additional long-term warming of 4C to 5C seems rather unlikely.

Not ‘locked in’

Why might the report conflate a 3C global-warming scenario (RCP4.5) with the Paris Agreement target (RCP2.6)? The actual commitments made by countries in the Paris Agreement – the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – fall well short of what would be needed to meet the Paris target. If countries only take these actions – and do not ratchet up their commitments after the Paris commitment period ends in 2030 – studies suggest that the world would be on track for a bit more than 3C warming, though how much depends largely on assumptions around emissions between 2030 and 2100.

However, even if the report meant to say “the warming implied by existing Paris commitments” rather than the “Paris targets”, the press release and subsequent media coverage are still misleading. Unless the authors are arguing that the world as a whole is already locked into 3C warming – and there are plenty of scenarios that would keep global warming below 2C, or even down to 1.5C warming – the amount of future warming that will occur in the Arctic during the 21st century will depend in large part on our future emissions.

The figure below shows the winter Arctic warming relative to 1986-2005 from the average of all the IPCC CMIP5 climate models for each future RCP emission scenario. There is a wide range of potential future warming, from as little as 2.7C in 2100 in RCP2.6 to as much as 12C in RCP8.5. Which of these future warming scenarios will occur depends largely on our greenhouse gas emissions over the rest of the 21st century.

CMIP5 Multimodel mean for each RCP scenario for the region between 60N and 90N for the winter months (December, January and February). Model data obtained from KNMI Climate Explorer.

If the world actually meets the Paris target of limiting warming below 2C, the future Arctic winter warming will be around 0.5-5C, much lower than the 5-9C values stated in the report.

There is still a wide range of possible outcomes for the region. As a result, any claim that massive amounts of future warming for the region are “locked in” is misleading.

The post Factcheck: Is 3-5C of Arctic warming now ‘locked in’? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

“The insidious thing about climate change is there’s nowhere to hide from it,” says Prof Terry Hughes, director of the Australian Research Council’s Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies at James Cook University in Townsville, a sleepy city in northern Queensland where even the winter sun beats down at 31C.

Hughes has spent the past three decades tracking changes on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. It was in 1998 that the reef faced its first “mass bleaching event”. Bleaching occurs when some kind of stress – most commonly, unusually high sea temperatures – causes coral to release the colourful algae that lives inside its tissue, leaving it a ghostly white. This algae acts as the primary source of food and, without it, coral slowly starves.

The post Interactive: Can the Great Barrier Reef survive climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Dr William F Lamb is a researcher at the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) in Berlin.

The emission reduction goals of the Paris Agreement demand rapid action at all scales and levels of governance – from individual to international – and cities are no exception. Many urban governments recognise this and are embarking on projects to improve public transport services, mandate efficient buildings, or produce energy from local renewable sources.

So what do we actually know about climate mitigation in cities? In our new paper, published in Nature Climate Change, we take stock of all the city case studies currently available in the peer-reviewed literature.

We find that knowledge on the topic is exploding, with few attempts to grapple with the vast flow of studies. We see that the vast majority of research is on larger cities, in wealthier countries, on specific topics. And we suggest that computer-assisted methods are key to tracking work on cities and learning about solutions at a large scale.

A tidal wave of studies

Cities used to be a marginal topic in climate change mitigation. This is no longer the case. Since the fifth assessment report (“AR5”) from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) first included a dedicated chapter on cities (pdf), the literature has jumped from a few dozen articles per year, to almost 3,000 in the past five years alone.

As the chart below shows, the number of urban climate mitigation case studies published in time to be included in each IPCC assessment report – from the second (“AR2”) to the sixth (“AR6”) – has risen dramatically over time.

Total number of papers published that include an urban climate mitigation case study, arranged by date of publication (according to which IPCC assessment report it is eligible for) and region on the world (see legend for colours). Credit: William Lamb

To say we are unprepared for this development is an understatement. Urban case studies are usually treated as colourful curios in major climate reports. They are placed as dedicated boxed sections that make interesting, if anecdotal reading – such as “How did London’s congestion charge reduce emissions?” and “How does Manizales manage disaster risks?”.

But treating case studies in this anecdotal way suggests we are not really learning about why cities succeed or fail in mitigating climate change. There have been no systematic attempts to map out the existing work, let alone synthesise it. We are generating hundreds of new case studies per month without even knowing what exists.

In our study, we used computer-assisted methods to quickly read and identify articles that mention climate change mitigation in cities. We built a database of studies that can be searched, compared and reviewed – and then assessed it for biases in the types of cities and topics that are commonly researched.

Large and wealthy cities get all the attention

If you think of a city, which one comes to mind? Most likely it will be a larger and more famous city that is strongly embedded in popular culture: somewhere such as New York or Paris. As it happens, these are the ones that receive most of academic attention as well.

In the figure below, we see the total number of articles written about climate mitigation in different cities, across their size categories. A small number of “megacities” (those with a population of more than ten million people) account for a large fraction of the literature, with Beijing the clear leader (369 articles), followed by Shanghai (194) and New York (161).

Number of urban climate mitigation case studies, grouped according to city size. The 12 most frequently studied cities are labelled. Population data from UN World Urbanisation Prospects (2018 revision), using agglomeration data where available. Credit: William Lamb

We also see a considerable number of studies on small, medium and large cities. But contrast this with the data on where people live: the largest proportion of the global urban population (43%) lives in small cities (with less than 300,000 inhabitants) – and yet these receive far less attention than megacities, which are actually quite small in terms of total global population (12%).

This bias is made worse by a strong regional focus in the case-study literature. The map below shows all the urban case studies plotted on a global map (grey circles) along with a summary of the types of topics the case studies from each region tend to cover (blue circles) and not cover (pink circles).

It illustrates that most of the cases we have are on cities in Europe, North America and China. In contrast, South America, Africa and other individual countries are left behind in the literature.

Map of global coverage of urban case studies (shown by grey circles). The larger the circle, the more case studies there are for that city. For each continent, the topic distribution of associated case studies is summarised, and the highest (blue circles) and lowest (pink circles) scoring topics are shown. Source: Lamb et al. (2019)

One consequence of these trends is that we know far less about dealing with climate change in cities that are rapidly growing – particularly smaller cities and those in the global south.

For example, Kisumu city in Kenya will need to avoid locking-in carbon-intensive growth – including motorways and sprawling infrastructure – if it is to be in a position to reach net-zero emissions this century. By contrast, London faces a very different task in retrofitting the already existing infrastructure of a large city for low-carbon travel. These might include, for example, developing bicycle and public transport networks, and legislating against personal car use.

A second consequence is that, perhaps, we are not learning as much as we could from pioneering cities in the global south. As Prof Harini Nagendra – a professor of sustainability at Azim Premji University in Bangalore – argues in a 2018 comment piece in Nature, the south is rich in sustainability lessons, from the impressive bus rapid transit network developed in Curitiba in Brazil, to the bottom-up governance of informal settlements.

Mapping the literature

So, how do we begin to draw out insights from 4,000 case study articles on cities? Our approach is to first map the literature, before diving into an in-depth synthesis.

Part of our mapping consists of using computer software to search and “scrape” – or harvest – articles for city names. The second part is to identify the topic content of these articles. For this we use machine learning (or “big data”) methods that essentially train a computer algorithm to read all the article abstracts, pick out the topics they have in common, and categorise them in our database.

With this information, we can start to get a handle on the existing research and identify priorities for future work. The grid below shows the number of articles we find on different topics in the 10 most-studied cities. The darker the shading in a box, the more studies found.

For example, there are dozens of articles on emissions accounting in Beijing and Shanghai. Low-carbon transportation is well-researched in London, due to its experience with the congestion charge. Yet it is poorly studied in Los Angeles, a major oversight considering the perpetual state of traffic gridlock in this city. At a regional level (shown in the previous figure), there has been very little attention on climate governance – such as policies and processes to promote mitigation – in China, compared to other regions in the world.

Grid of number of mitigation studies by topic for the 10 cities with the most publications. The dark blue shading indicates the main topic focus of case study literature within each city. Note, because our literature search included keywords only for climate mitigation, indicated studies are not comprehensive, particularly where large and relevant sectoral literatures exist but are not yet framed in terms of emissions reductions (for example, transport). Source: Lamb et al. (2019)

Armed with a map of studies, we can go beyond merely identifying gaps and towards comparing the different types of urban experiences documented in the literature.

Research on zero-carbon heating in Oslo, for example, may not be relevant for climate mitigation in the coastal city of Mombasa in Kenya, but it could be deeply useful to other cold and compact cities. In this manner, combining a map of studies with an understanding of specific urban challenges enables us to move beyond the somewhat anecdotal nature of individual cases, towards learning from actions at a large scale.

Of course, our database also allows people to quickly home in on topics and locations that might interest them – such as what happened to congestion charging in Edinburgh? What was the result of efforts in Berlin and Hamburg to bring local energy grids back into public ownership?

Looking ahead

As the literature continues to grow, researchers face increasing problems to grasp the literature that is out there, assess its relevance, and communicate its policy relevance to society. Our first step into computer-assisted methods results in a comprehensive map of case studies that are quickly categorised by topic and location.

Importantly, using machines to read and analyse thousands of articles does not replace the human effort and intuition needed to draw insights from the literature, but drastically reduces the time spent searching and staying on top of new developments. Ultimately, this is just a first step towards learning from urban experiments and delivering on climate change mitigation.

The post Guest post: What do we know about climate change mitigation in cities? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Arctic sea ice has reached its maximum extent for the year, peaking at 14.78m square kilometers (sq km) on 13 March. It is the joint seventh smallest winter maximum in the 40-year satellite record – tied with 2007.

The preliminary estimate from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) in Boulder, Colorado, suggests this year’s winter peak is the largest since 2014. But is still 860,000 sq km smaller than the 1981-2010 average.

The “most remarkable” feature of Arctic sea ice this winter has been the very low cover in the Bering Sea, the NSIDC says. Following similar lows there in 2018, this is “unprecedented in at least the satellite era”, one scientist tells Carbon Brief, and has “had significant impacts to coastal communities and marine ecosystems”.

Meanwhile, in Antarctica, sea ice has already reached its minimum extent following the summer melt season. Provisional data suggests that sea ice reached 2.47m sq km on both 28 February and 1 March, putting it seventh in the list of lowest summer minima on record.

Winter ends

As winter turns into spring in the northern hemisphere, Arctic sea ice stops growing and reaches its peak extent for the year. This marks the end of the half-year ice growth season that started with the sea ice minimum – the sixth lowest on record – in September last year.

Scientists use satellites to monitor sea ice extent, recording the size and date of the annual maximum when it peaks each year. Along with the summer minimum, it is one of the key metrics for tracking the “health” of the Arctic’s sea ice.

The winter peak extent for 2019 is estimated at 14.78m sq km, the NSIDC says. It was recorded on the 13 March – just one day out from the median winter maximum date of 12 March in the 1981-2010 average.

It sits alongside 2007 as the seventh smallest winter peak on record, says the NSIDC. The four smallest in the satellite era occurred between 2015 and 2018.

The map below shows Arctic sea ice on the day of this year’s peak. The orange line shows the average position on that day for the long-term average.

Arctic sea ice extent for 13 March 2019. The orange line shows the 1981-2010 average extent for that day. Credit: NSIDC

‘New normal’

This year’s winter peak is “quite a bit less anomalous than the last few years”, says Zack Labe, a University of California, Irvine PhD student studying sea ice. Last year’s, for example, was the second lowest on record, Labe explains:

“This is not entirely surprising, since natural variability plays a very important role in modulating year-to-year sea ice. We do not expect every year to be a new record low, although this year’s maximum is still in the top 10 lowest on record.”

The chart below – produced by Labe – shows how the Arctic sea ice winter maximum has declined since the satellite era began in the late 1970s. The red line shows how 2019 compares to the average for each decade. The chart illustrates that the 2019 peak would have been more typical of the ice extent in May during the 1980s. (Note: this chart plots an estimated winter peak for 2019 using data from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, which has not yet officially called this year’s maximum.)

Average Arctic sea ice extent over the winter peak for each decade of the satellite era (dotted lines) and for 2019 so far (red line). Individual years also shown. Chart by Zack Labe using data from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency

Unlike the last few winters, “there were no extreme Arctic warming events” transferring heat from the North Atlantic towards the Arctic, notes Labe:

“In fact, below average temperatures and northerly winds helped to extend sea ice in the Barents Sea around Svalbard. On the other hand, sea ice reached a remarkably low extent in the Bering Sea with open water even through the Bering Strait.”

That sea ice in the Barents Sea is back to near-average conditions this year is “especially interesting”, says Prof Julienne Stroeve, a professor of polar observation and modelling at University College London and senior research scientist at the NSIDC. In recent years “the ice edge was much further north”, she tells Carbon Brief. Low sea ice cover has been linked to the “Atlanticification” of this sea as it shifts from being dominated by cold, fresh Arctic waters to a warm, salty Atlantic regime.

The declining condition of winter sea ice over the past four decades has a knock-on effect in the summer too, says Dr Ron Kwok, a senior research scientist at Nasa’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology. He tells Carbon Brief:

“The replacement of large fractions of the Arctic Ocean with seasonal ice is a large factor in this behaviour [the high year-to-year variability] – the ‘new normal’ – because the seasonal ice grows faster but not enough to survive the summer.”

Bering Sea

In what the NSIDC described as a rather “ho hum” February, the most “remarkable” aspect of sea ice changes in recent weeks has been the “very low” extent in the Bering Sea after “unusual ice loss throughout the month”.

Sea ice extent in the Bering Sea typically increases until March or early April, the NSIDC says, but “this year is quite extreme” as sea ice extent decreased by around half a million square kilometres between 27 January and 3 March. This is an area of ice approximately the size of Montana, the NSIDC adds. [Montana is larger than Germany or Japan.]

The chart below shows the rapid decline in Bering Sea ice during early 2019 (green line) as well as the similar lows in ice cover during 2018-19 (blue), and the long-term average (black).

Chart showing the sharp decline in sea ice extent in the Bering Sea in 2019 (green line), the general low sea cover during 2017-18 (blue) and the long-term average (black, with grey shading showing the range). The inset map in the top left compares sea ice extent at the beginning of January 27 and at the end of March 3, 2019. Credit: W. Meier, NSIDC

Other than last year, “these conditions are unprecedented in at least the satellite era”, says Labe. The low sea ice levels in the Bering Sea “occurred due to relentless southerly winds and storms that helped to push the sea ice poleward”, he explains:

“Above average ocean temperatures in the far North Pacific may have also played a role. Air temperatures this winter were well above average on the Pacific side of the Arctic in response to these strong southerly winds through the Bering Strait.”

It is particularly unusual to have open water through the Bering Strait – the stretch of water that separates Alaska and Russia – notes Labe. “This record low sea ice has had significant impacts to coastal communities and marine ecosystems,” he adds.

Historical reconstruction of western Alaska sea ice (Bering Sea) shows February 2019’s sea ice extent was the 2nd lowest on record (after 2018) since at least 1850

Data is assembled from recent satellite data, whaler’s logs, ship records, etc. More info: https://t.co/fDS93o8ZtH pic.twitter.com/k0X01sJ6La

— Zack Labe (@ZLabe) March 19, 2019

News outlets in recent weeks have reported on how the lack of ice has disrupted hunting and fishing. It has also affected the “Iditarod” – a famous dogsled race across 1,000 miles of Alaska – where competitors have been instructed to follow the trail overland rather than cross the unstable sea ice.

Open water also leaves coastal communities exposed to the threat of flooding from storm surges. Similarly low sea ice conditions last year contributed to flooding in villages on the west coast of Alaska.

The lack of ice also has knock-on impacts for marine life. Without sea ice cover, the Bering Sea will be much warmer than usual by the summer. A “cold pool” of water in the Bering Sea typically acts as a barrier between northern and southern Bering Sea marine species. This was “considered a biological fixture until last year, when it failed to develop”, reports Arctic Today.

Antarctica

Since Antarctica’s sea ice hit its winter maximum extent on 2 October last year – the fourth lowest on record – it has been dwindling through its annual melt season.

Despite a slower-than-average decline during November, Antarctic sea ice melt accelerated in December, spurred on by “unusual atmospheric conditions and high sea surface temperatures”, according to the NSIDC. By the start of 2019, Antarctic sea ice had experienced several days of record lows for that time of year.

This dramatic decline is shown by the pink line in the chart below, which shows daily Antarctic sea ice extent for December for the six years of lowest December extents on record (different coloured lines), as well as the long-term average in grey.

Timeseries of the six lowest December extents for Antarctic sea ice. For the 40-year satellite record, the years coming closest to the 2018 extent are 1979 and 2016. (Note that the extent lines for 1979 and 1982 end on December 30 because older satellite sensors only collected data every other day.) Grey line and shading shows 1981-2010 average and range of data. Credit: W. Meier, NSIDC

The rapid ice loss in December 2018 “exposed large areas of the Southern Ocean that are typically ice-covered at this time of year”, says the NSIDC.

The maps show absolute sea ice concentration (left) and relative to the long-term average (right) for 31 December 2018. The reds in the right-hand map shows below-average concentrations of ice in the Weddell Sea, Ross Sea, and either side of the Amery ice shelf in East Antarctica.

Maps of sea ice concentration (left) and sea ice concentration relative to long-term average (right), for 31 December 2018. In the right map, blues indicate higher than average sea ice concentrations; reds indicate lower than average concentrations. Credit: Phil Reid, Australian Bureau of Meteorology, and NSIDC.

Ice melt then “slowed significantly”, explains the NSIDC, with January average sea ice dropping to the third smallest on record. By this point, ice melt was slower than average for the time of year.

The provisional estimate from NSIDC suggests that Antarctic sea ice hit its lowest extent for the year on both the 28 February and 1 March. Clocking in at 2.47m sq km, the minimum extent for 2019 is the seventh lowest on record.

Sea ice extent “has been particularly low in the central and eastern Weddell Sea and in the eastern Ross Sea”, notes the NSIDC, but “above average ice extent remains along the East Antarctic coastline and the Bellingshausen Sea”.

The post Arctic sea ice winter peak in 2019 is seventh lowest on record appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Prof Stephen Belcher is chief scientist at the UK Met Office; Dr Olivier Boucher is head of the Institut Pierre Simon Laplace (IPSL) Climate Modelling Centre; and Prof Rowan Sutton is director of climate research at the UK National Centre for Atmospheric Science (NCAS), University of Reading.

The first results from a new generation of global climate models, which are valuable tools for understanding climate change, are now becoming available from climate research centres around the world.

These new climate models make maximum use of advances in technology – such as increased supercomputing power – and feature many improvements in their treatment of Earth’s climate system. These include better representation of the weather systems that bring us wind and rain, the clouds within those weather systems, and aerosols – the myriad of small particles in the atmosphere that come from natural sources and human activities.

An unprecedented amount of information is available from the new models about the changing character of weather processes in a changing climate, which is important for understanding our exposure to climate hazards and how to make society more resilient to climate change.

Many of the new models from centres around the world have been recently finalised, with others due to be completed over the coming weeks. They will be included in the next international comparison of climate models, known as the sixth “Coupled Model Intercomparison Project” (CMIP6). This will provide the foundation of climate model information for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sixth assessment report (AR6) – which is due to be published in 2021.

From an international policy perspective, an important function of climate models is to provide evidence for estimates of the permissible global greenhouse gas emissions available to stay within a given level of global warming. This is known as a global “carbon budget” and varies in size according to the temperature goal in question and the defined likelihood of staying below these thresholds.

The climate agreement signed by governments in Paris in 2015 aims to keep global temperature rise this century to “well below” 2C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5C.

A key factor in determining carbon budgets is how sensitive the Earth’s climate system is to increases in CO2. One measure of the long-term response of the climate over hundreds of years is known as the “equilibrium climate sensitivity” (ECS), which is defined as the temperature increase when CO2 has doubled and the climate system has come into equilibrium. The higher the ECS is, the smaller the remaining carbon budget has to be to meet a particular climate target.

Early results suggest ECS values from some of the new CMIP6 climate models are higher than previous estimates, with early numbers being reported between 2.8C (pdf) and 5.8C. This compares with the previous coupled model intercomparison project (CMIP5), which reported values between 2.1C to 4.7C. The IPCC’s fifth assessment report (AR5) assessed ECS to be “likely” in the range 1.5C to 4.5C and “very unlikely” greater than 6C. (These terms are defined using the IPCC methodology.)

The chart below shows how the early estimates from the CMIP6 models (red bar) compare with the CMIP5 models (yellow) and the assessment of ECS range from AR5 (blue). It should be noted that the CMIP6 range is preliminary and could change as more modelling centres publish their results.

Assessment range for ECS from IPCC AR5 (blue bar; thick bar denotes likely range, thin bar extending from it shows values below which ECS is “extremely unlikely”, upper long dashed line shows value above which ECS is “very unlikely”), range from CMIP5 (orange bar) and preliminary estimates of ECS values from new global climate models (red bar).

The IPCC estimates its assessed range of ECS through multiple lines of evidence, including the following:

• Global climate models, which are powerful tools for understanding the effect of greenhouse gases on climate;
• Simple models constrained by observed changes in the instrumental record (since 1850);
• Using estimates of past climate going back thousands of years, which are inferred from proxy measures, such as ice cores and tree rings, combined with simple models;
• New techniques to study and quantify climate processes, such as the interactions between clouds and radiation

For AR5, simple models constrained by observed changes in the instrumental record tended to give values of ECS generally in the lower part of the likely range of 1.5 to 4.5C, whereas global climate models tended to give ECS in the upper part of the likely range.

Climate scientists will need to assess how new understanding of ECS from the various lines of evidence compares. They will all be considered by the IPCC for AR6 due in 2021.

The chart below shows an assessment of climate sensitivity estimates published since the year 2000. Each dot shows the best estimate of ECS from an individual study, while the bars show the range of possible values found by that study. The colour indicates the type of study. The dark blue bar on the right-hand end shows how the early CMIP6 estimates compare.

Updated compilation of climate sensitivity studies featured in the Carbon Brief climate sensitivity explainer, adapted from Knutti et al 2017. Bar on the far right shows the range of preliminary estimates of ECS values from the new global climate models.

The next step is for climate scientists to understand in detail why some of the new models are showing this shift in ECS – and how this fits with other lines of evidence. This includes looking at other measures of sensitivity, including “transient climate response” (TCR), which measures the rate of warming.

TCR is defined as the temperature increase at the instant that atmospheric CO2 has doubled, following an increase of 1% each year. This measure is arguably more useful for looking at changes we might expect over the current century, as it deals with shorter timescales than ECS.

The international community of scientists working on this new generation of climate models meets together for the first time next week from 25-28 March in Barcelona at the CMIP6 model analysis workshop. This has been organised under the auspices of the United Nations World Climate Research Programme (WCRP). It is an exciting opportunity for modelling centres to compare notes about the performance of their models and for the community to start thinking about the implications of this new rich seam of information for climate policy, including causes of past climate change and projections of likely future rates of change.

If it turns out that there is enough evidence to corroborate the higher ECS values from new-generation climate models then there would be important implications for carbon budgets. A higher ECS means a greater likelihood of reaching higher levels of global warming – even with deeper emissions cuts. Higher warming would allow less time to adapt and mean a greater likelihood of passing climate “tipping points” – such as thawing of permafrost, which would further accelerate warming.

The exact implications will only become clear once more analysis work is done using the latest generation climate models. In the meantime, the IPCC’s special report on 1.5C, published last year, remains the most up-to-date and robust assessment of the carbon budgets needed to meet the Paris goals.

The post Guest post: Why results from the next generation of climate models matter appeared first on Carbon Brief.

इस कड़ी के पांचवें लेख में बताने की कोशिश की गई है कि कार्बन गैस का बड़े पैमाने पर उत्सर्जन करनेवाले देश किस तरह से जलवायु परिवर्तन से निपटने की तैयारी कर रहे हैं. इस बार कार्बन ब्रीफ़ ने नज़र डाली है भारत के मुख्य नीतिगत विकास,  इससे संबंधित किए गए तमाम प्रणों और आंकड़ों पर…

चीन और अमेरिका के बाद भारत ग्रीनहाउस गैस (GHGs) का उत्सर्जन करनेवाला विश्व का तीसरा सबसे बड़ा देश है.

कोयले से चलनेवाले पावर प्लांट्स, चावल की खेती और पशु इस उत्सर्जन के सबसे बड़े कारक हैं और इसमें तेज़ी से बढ़ोत्तरी जारी है. ग़ौरतलब है कि बावजूद इसके अगर विश्व के औसत से तुलना‌‌ की जाए तो भारत का प्रति व्यक्ति उत्सर्जन औसत काफ़ी कम है.

जलवायु परिवर्तन के मामले में भारत एक बेहद संवेदनशील देश है और इसकी मुख्य वजह हिमालय के ग्लेशियर का पिघलना और‌ मॉनसून में लगातार होनेवाला बदलाव है.

उल्लेखनीय है कि भारत ने 2005 की तुलना‌ में अपनी अर्थव्यवस्था में ‘उत्सर्जन की तीव्रता’ को 30 से 35% तक कम करने का प्रण लिया है.

भारत में इस साल अप्रैल और मई महीने में आम चुनाव होनेवाले हैं और चुनाव पूर्व किए गए सर्वे के आधार परअनुमान लगाया जा रहा है कि मौजूदा प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी मामूली अंतर से एक बार फिर से प्रधानमंत्री बनने‌ सकते हैं.

राजनीति

भारत सबसे ज़्यादा आबादी वाला दुनिया का दूसरा देश है, जिसकी आबादी 1.3 बिलियन यानि 130 करोड़ है. सकल घरेलू उत्पाद (जीडीपी) के मानकों के आधार पर भारत दुनिया की छठी सबसे बड़ी अर्थव्यवस्था है और इसका नंबर यूके के बाद आता है. ग़ौरतलब है कि भारत विश्व की सबसे तेजी से आगे बढ़नेवाली अर्थव्यवस्था है. चीन को पीछे छोड़ते हुए भारत 2025 तक दुनिया का सबसे अधिक आबादी वाला देश बन जाएगा और 2060 तक इसकी आबादी 1.7 बिलियन यानि 170 करोड़ हो जाएगी.

नरेंद्र मोदी को 2014 में पहली बार भारत का प्रधानमंत्री बनने का मौका मिला. हिंदू राष्ट्रवादी कहलाई जानेवाली भारतीय जनता पार्टी (बीजेपी) को संसदीय चुनावों में पहली बार बहुमत हासिल हुआ और पिछले 30 सालों में ऐसा करनेवाली वो पहली पार्टी साबित हुई. बीजेपी ने कुल 31% वोट और 52% सीटें हासिल कीं तो वहीं आज़ादी के 72 सालों में कई बार सत्ता का स्वाद चख चुकी इंडियन नैशनल कांग्रेस (आईएनसी) को महज़ 19% वोट और 8% सीटें हासिल हुईं.

मोदी ने अंतर्राष्ट्रीय जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी राजनीति के मामले‌ में भारत को हमेशा से एक ज़िम्मेदार देश के रूप में पेश किया है. 2018 में मोदी ने दुनिया के तमाम नेताओं से कहा था कि जलवायु परिवर्तन “जैसा कि हम सभी जानते हैं, ये मानव जाति और मानव सभ्यता के बचे रहने‌ के लिए हमारे सामने खड़ी एक बड़ी चुनौती है.”

भारत में आम चुनावों की शुरुआत 11 अप्रैल, 2019 से होगी और 19 मई, 2019 को आखिरी बार वोट डाले जाएंगे जबकि चुनावी नतीजों के ऐलान की तारीख़ 23 मई है. इन चुनावों में तकरीबन 900 मिलियन यानि 90 करोड़ मतदाता वोट डाल सकेंगे. इन चुनाव के‌ नतीजों का अनुमान लगाना बेहद मुश्क़िल काम है. हालांकि जनवरी-फ़रवरी में कराए गए ओपिनियन पोल्स के मुताबिक, मोदी की पार्टी बीजेपी को बहुमत हासिल करने तक की सीटें हासिल हो जाएंगीं. अनुमान लगाया जा रहा है कि पूर्व प्रधानमंत्री राजीव गांधी के बेटे, पूर्व प्रधानमंत्री इंदिरा गांधी के पोते और पूर्व प्रधानमंत्री जवाहरलाल नेहरू के पड़पोते राहुल गांधी की पार्टी कांग्रेस इन‌ चुनावों में दूसरे नंबर पर आएगी.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with French President Emmanuel Macron at Hyderabad House, to co-chair the founding conference of the International Solar Alliance (ISA).
10 March 2018, New Delhi, India. Credit: Newscom / Alamy Stock Photo.

1949 में लागू किए गए भारतीय संविधान के‌ अनुसार, राज्य पर्यावरण की रक्षा और उसे और बेहतर बनाने की दिशा में तमाम तरह के प्रयत्न करेगा और देश के वनों व वन्यजीवों की सुरक्षा करेगा.  2006 में बनाई गई भारत की राष्ट्रीय पर्यावरण नीति में पर्यावरण की रक्षा को विकास की प्रकिया में समाहित करने‌ की बात को रेखांकित किया गया है.

2002 में, भारत ने नई दिल्ली में UNFCCC (यूनाइटेड नेशन्स फ़्रेमवर्क कंवेंशन ऑन क्लामेट चेंज) से संबंधित आठवें आधिकारिक बैठक का आयोजन और उसकी अगुवाई की थी. इस मीटिंग में दिल्ली मिनिस्ट्रियल घोषणापत्र को अपनाया गया था. इसमें विकसित देशों से टेक्नोलॉजी को‌ ट्रांसफ़र करने की अपील की गई थी, जिससे विकासशील देशों को उत्सर्जन में कमी लाने और ख़ुद को जलवायु परिवर्तन के मुताबिक ढालने में उसे मदद मिले. इस मामले में भारत अपनी महत्वाकांक्षाओं और समान‌ अवसरों को लेकर भी काफ़ी सजग और चिंतिंत रहा है.

प्यू रिसर्च सेंटर द्वारा 2015 में किए गए एक सर्वे के मुताबिक, तीन चौथाई भारतीय ग्लोबल वार्मिंग को लेकर काफ़ी चिंतित हैं. ये प्रतिशत सर्वे में शामिल किए गए सभी एशियाई देशों में सर्वाधिक है. 2017 में किए गए एक और सर्वे से ये बात सामने आई कि 47% भारतीय जलवायु परिवर्तन को अपने देश के लिए ‘बड़ा ख़तरा’ मानते हैं. इसके बाद दूसरे नंबर पर वो आतंकवादी संगठन आईएसआईएस को देश के लिए ख़तरा समझते हैं.

भारत की तकरीबन 13% आबादी तक अब भी बिजली नहीं पहुंच पाई है, जबकि देश की आधी आबादी अभी भी खाना पकाने के लिए बायोमास (गोबर, लकड़ी आदि) पर निर्भर करती है. मोदी ने बार-बार कहा है कि वो सुनिश्चित करेंगे कि सभी घरों में बिजली पहुंचे. उन्होंने कहा था कि मार्च, 2019 सभी घरों में बिजली पहुंचने‌ की संभावना है.  हालांकि अभी भी ज़्यादातर लोगों तक ज़रूरत के मुताबिक बिजली नहीं पहुंच पाती है.

पेरिस प्लेज़ (प्रण)

अंतरराष्ट्रीय जलवायु परिवर्तन से संबंधित बातचीत और समझौते को लेकर भारत का शुमार चार देशों में होता है जिसे BASIC के नाम से बुलाया जाता है. इसमें ब्राज़ील, दक्षिण अफ़्रीका और चीन जैसी उभरती आर्थिक शक्तियों; समान विचारों वाले विकासशील देशों (LMDC); G77 + चीन; और वन आवरण (रेन फॉरेस्ट) के गठबंधन वाले देशों (Cfrn) का शुमार है.

पोट्सडैम इंस्टिट्यूट फॉर क्लाइमेट इम्पैक्ट रिचर्स (PIK) द्वारा एकत्रित किए गए डाटा के मुताबिक, 2015 में भारत द्वारा की ग ई  GHG उत्सर्जन की मात्रा 3,571 मीट्रिक टन थी, जो CO2 के समान (MtCO2e) थी. 1970 के‌ मुक़ाबले उत्सर्जन की मात्रा अब तीन गुना बढ़ चुकी है.

2015 में भारत में प्रति व्यक्ति उत्सर्जन की मात्रा 2.7tCO2e थी जो अमेरिका से सात गुना कम और दुनिया के औसत 7.0tCO2e से आधी थी (इस लेख के अंत में 2015 के डाटा के इस्तेमाल पर ‘note on infographic’ देखें).

भारत ने 2 अक्तूबर, 2016 को पेरिस समझौते पर औपचारिक रूप से हस्ताक्षर किए थे. ऐसा उसने पेरिस जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी  प्रण लेने अथवा ‘राष्ट्रीय निर्धारित योगदान’ (NDC) के लिए हामी भरने के लगभग एक साल बाद किया था.

इस प्रण के मुताबिक, 2005 की तुलना‌ में 2030 तक आर्थिक आउटपुट (उत्सर्जन की तीव्रता) से संबंधित प्रति यूनिट उत्सर्जन में 33-35% तक की कमी की जाएगी. कार्बन ब्रीफ़ के आंकलन के अनुसार, 2014 से 2030 के बीच भारत की तरफ़ से किए  जानेवाले उत्सर्जन की मात्रा में 90% की बढ़ोत्तरी होगी. अगर सबकुछ प्रण के मुताबिक हुआ तो भी उत्सर्जन में इस कदर बढ़ोत्तरी देखी जा सकती है.

भारत का एक और लक्ष्य है कि 2030 तक अपने इंस्टॉल किए गए 40% बिजली क्षमता को अक्षय ऊर्जा अथवा परमाणु ऊर्जा में तब्दील करने का है.

इसके अतिरिक्त, भारत ने 2030 तक अतिरिक्त कार्बन सिंक के निर्माण के लिए वृक्ष आवरण को भी 2,500-3,000MtCO2e तक बढ़ाने का लक्ष्य रखा है. इनकी संख्या एक साल में किए जानेवाले कुल उत्सर्जन के बराबर होगी.

इस प्रण के मुताबिक, भारत का लक्ष्य मौजूदा परिस्थितियों को देखते हुए बेहद महत्वाकांक्षी होने का आभास कराता है और ग्लोबल वार्मिंग के प्रति विकसित देशों के उदासीन और उपेक्षापूर्ण रवैये की आलोचना करता है. प्रण के अनुसार, “भारत समस्या की वजह नहीं है, इसके बावजू्द भी वह सक्रिय तौर पर रचनात्मक हिस्सेदारी के जरिए समाधान ढूंढने वाला देश रहा है.“

भारत ने साफ़ कर दिया है कि उसके द्वारा लिए प्रण को लागू करना जलवायु परिवर्तन से जुड़ी आर्थिक टेक्नोलॉजी ट्रांसफ़र और विकसित देशों द्वारा क्षमता के निर्माण से संबंधित सहयोग पर निर्भर करेगी. कुल मिलाकर उसका अनुमान है कि उसे 2030 तक घरेलू और अंतर्राष्ट्रीय स्तर पर कम से कम 2.5 ट्रिलियन डॉलर की आवश्यकता पड़ेगी.

पेरिस समझौते के 2C लक्ष्य के प्रति भारत के NDC में निरंतरता रही है, मगर क्लाइमेट एक्शन ट्रैकर (CAT), तीन शोध संस्थानों द्वारा जलवायु परिवर्तन से संबंधित प्रण पर स्वतंत्र रूप से किए गए विश्लेषण से ये बात सामने आई है कि 1.5C लिमिट को लेकर भारत की ओर से निरंतरता का अभाव रहा है. हालांकि CAT का कहना है कि उच्च स्तर पर भारत की नीतियां 1.5C के अनुकूल है.

CAT के मुताबिक, अपने आखिरी राष्ट्रीय बिजली योजना यानि नैशनल इलेक्ट्री सिटी प्लान (NEP) को अपनाने के बाद भारत अब पेरिस समझौते के अपने लक्ष्य से आगे निकलने की राह पर है.

CAT का कहना है कि हाइड्रोइलेक्ट्रिसिटी और परमाणु ऊर्जा के‌ इस्तेमाल से भारत अपने 40% गैर जीवाश्म ऊर्जा क्षमता के लक्ष्य को एक दशक पहले ही हासिल कर सकता है. CAT का अनुमान है कि 2030 में भारत की उत्सर्जन तीव्रता 2005 के‌ मुक़ाबले 50% कम होगी, जो कि 33-35% के‌ लक्ष्य से कहीं आगे होगी.

A “barefoot” solar engineer from Tinginaput, India, passes on her skills to other villagers teaching them how to make a solar lamp. Credit: Abbie Trayler-Smith / Panos Pictures / Department for International Development. (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

जलवायु परिवर्तन से संबंधित महत्वाकांक्षी बदलाव की योजना रखनेवाली एक शोध और एनजीओ पार्टनरशिप क्लाइमेट‌ चेंज ने भारत से संबंधित अपने विश्लेषण में ज़्यादा ख़ुशनुमां तस्वीर नहीं उकेरी है. उसके मुताबिक भारत का NDC तापमान 2C तक सीमित रखने के लिए अनुकूल है, मगर उसकी मौजूदा (2018) योजनाएं इन उम्मीदों पर खरी नहीं उतरती हैं।

CAT के अनुसार, भारत सरकार 2030 से लेकर 2045 तक की एक लम्बी अवधि की विकास से संबंधित रणनीति पर‌ काम कर रही है, जो कार्बन उत्सर्जन और आर्थिक विकास को ‘डिकपल’ यानि अलग कर देगा. भारत ने इस बात के संकेत दिए हैं कि वह 2020 तक जलवायु परिवर्तन से संबंधित अपने प्रण में और वृद्धि करेगा. हालांकि उसने अभी तक पेरिस समझौते के लक्ष्यों को घरेलू कानून में तब्दील नहीं किया है.

भारत ने 2008 में नैशनल एक्शन प्लान ऑन क्लाइमेट चेंज (NAPCC) से संबंधित अपनी रिपोर्ट प्रकाशित की थी. इसे उत्सर्जन में कमी लाने और अनुकूल नीति से संबंधित आठ मिशन में विभाजित किया गया है. इस सभी आठ आयामों को निम्निलिखित सामायिक सेक्शन में रेखांकित किया गया है.

भारतीय राज्यों को अपनी ओर से स्टेट क्लाइमेट एक्शन प्लान भी पेश किए जाने की ज़रूरत है. इनमें उत्सर्जन में कमी लाने से संबंधित वायदे, ई-मोबिलिटी अथवा सौर व पवन ऊर्जा क्षमता कोटा का शुमार है.

कोयला

2015 में, भारत ने कोयले की खपत के मामले में अमेरिका को पीछे छोड़ दिया था और कोयले की सबसे अधिक खपत करनेवाला दुनिया का दूसरा सबसे बड़ा देश बन गया. कोयले की सबसे ज़्यादा खपत के मामले में चीन सबसे अग्रणी देश है.

चीन द्वारा कोयले का इस्तेमाल अपने चरम पर पहुंच चुका है, जिसका मतलब ये हुआ कि ईंधन के इस्तेमाल के लिहाज़ से भारत कमोबेश विश्व का अग्रणी देश साबित हो. कई जानकारों का मानना है कि भारत में तेज़ी से होनेवाले विकास का असर दुनिया पर पड़ेगा और पूरे विश्व में मांग बढ़ जाएगी. फिर भी ये 2014 की शीर्ष स्थिति से कम ही रहनेवाला है.

कोयले की वजह से भारत में बिजली के इस्तेमाल में बहुत तेज़ी आई है. 2000 से भारत के‌ कोयला उत्पादन में तीन गुना तक की वृद्धि हुई है. 2017 में भारत में 80% बिजली का उत्पादन कोयले के इस्तेमाल से हुआ. नीचे पेश किए चार्ट (काली जगहों) में इस दर्शाया गया है।

भारत में 1985 से लेकर 2017 (टेरावाट घंटे) तक बिजली उत्पादन. स्त्रोत : बीपी स्टैटिस्टिकल रीव्यू ऑफ़ वर्ल्ड एनर्जी 2018. हाईचार्ट्स के ज़रिए चार्ट का निर्माण कार्बन ब्रीफ़ ने‌ किया है.

जनवरी 2019 तक भारत के पास 221 गिगावाट्स (GW) के सुचारू कोयला प्लांट थे. ग्लोबल कोल प्लांट ट्रैकर के मुताबिक, ये दुनिया का तीसरा सबसे बड़ा कोयला फ़्लीट है जो दुनिया की क्षमता का 11% है. इसके अतिरिक्त, 36GW का निर्माण किया जा रहा है और 58GW विकास के शुरुआती चरण में है. नए प्लांट लगाने की क्षमता में तेज़ी से कमी आ रही है. पिछले साल से इसमें एक चौथाई तक‌ की कमी आई है और‌ 2014 से इसमें पांच गुना तक कमी देखी गई है.

सरकारी अनुमान के मुताबिक, 2027 तक कोयले की क्षमता बढकर 238GW हो जाएगी. इसके पहले के NEP ड्राफ़्ट‌ में 2022 तक कोयले‌ के विस्तार की कोई योजना नहीं थी. इसमें पहले से ही निर्मित किए जा रहे 50GW क्षमता वाले प्लांट का शुमार नहीं है. हालांकि‌ अंतिम मसौदे में 90GW क्षमता वाले कोयले से संबंधित बिजली उत्पादन का ज़िक्र है. इसे‌ लेकर कुछ लोगों का मानना है कि इसकी गिनती ‘स्टैंडेड ऐसेस्ट्स’ के तौर पर‌ होने का ख़तरा मंडरा रहा है. CAT का कहना है कि कोयला आधारित बिजली उत्पादन के लिए योजनाओं को ठंडे बस्ते में डालने से भारत की नीतियां 1.5C के अनुकूल हैं.

इस बात पर ज़ोरों से चर्चा जारी है कि भारत में नए कोयला प्लांट किस हद तक बन पाएंगे. नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा के गिरते दामों और बिजली की उम्मीद से कम मांग के मद्देनज़र चर्चा इस बात पर भी हो रही है कि मौजूदा प्लांट्स‌ कब तक चल पाएंगे. भारत की बढ़ती कोयले की मांग से संबंधित अनुमानों को बार बार बदला जाता रहा है और हाल ही में किए गए एक विश्लेषण में कहा गया था कि कोयले के नए प्लांट्स के अधिकत्तर प्रस्तावों को रद्द किया जा सकता है.

Coal being sorted by size and quality, Meghalaya, India. Credit: National Geographic Image Collection / Alamy Stock Photo.

भारत में कोयले के प्लांट्स से स्वास्थ्य पर पड़नेवाले विपरीत असर को लेकर चिंताएं जताई जाती रही हैं. हाल ही में लैंसेट प्लैनट हेल्थ द्वारा प्रकाशित एक रिपोर्ट के मुताबिक, भारत में होनेवाली आठ में से‌ एक मौत प्रदूषित हवा के चलते होती है. ग़ौरतलब है कि दुनिया के 20 सबसे प्रदूषित शहरों में से आधे भारत में हैं. सौर ऊर्जा और बैटरी के गिरते दामों का इस सेक्टर पर ख़ासा‌ असर देखा जा रहा है.

2015 में, भारत ने कोयला प्लांट्स से फ़ैलनेवाले वायु प्रदूषण के मद्देनज़र उत्सर्जन के ऐसे नए मानक बनाए थे, जिनपर 2017 से अमल किया जाना था. पुराने प्लांट्स के लिए बनाए मानकों में थोड़ी ढिलाई बरती गई है. बता दें कि इन मानकों पर अमल नहीं किया गया और सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने अब इन मानकों पर पूरी तरह से अमल करने के लिए 2022 तक का वक्त दिया है.

चीन के बाद भारत कोयले के निर्माण और आयात के मामले में दुनिया का दूसरा सबसे बड़ा देश है. राष्ट्रीय कोयला खनन कंपनी और दुनिया में सर्वाधिक कोयला खनन करनेवाली कंपनी कोल इंडिया घरेलू स्तर पर देश को 84% कोयला मुहैया कराती है. भारत के पास 98 बिलियन टन का कोयला रिज़र्व है, जो दुनिया के पास मौजूद कोयले का 9.5% है. इस मामले में भी चीन के बाद भारत का नंबर दूसरा आता है.

सरकार को उम्मीद है कि वो जल्द ही कोयले का आयात बंद कर देगी. भारत कोयले का आयात इंडोनेशिया, दक्षिण अफ़्रीका, ऑस्ट्रेलिया जैसे देशों से करता है। 2019-20 तक उसका लक्ष्य कोल इंडिया के माध्यम से 1,000 मीट्रिक टन कोयला उत्पादन करने का है, जो 2018-19 के निर्धारित लक्ष्य 650 मीट्रिक टन से कहीं ज़्यादा है. उम्मीद जताई जा रही है कि इस लक्ष्य को पाने‌ के लिए समय-सीमा‌ बढ़ाई जा सकती है.

भारत का कहना है कि विश्वनीय, मांग की ज़रूरत और सस्ती बिजली की आपूर्ति के लिए कोयले का इस्तेमाल करना पड़ता है, मगर उसने अब अपने कोयले के प्लांट्स को और अधिक सक्षम और दक्ष बनाने की दिशा में भी कदम उठाए हैं.

2010 में, भारत ने कोयला सेस (कर) लागू किया था, जिसके तहत 2010 से 2018 के बीच उसने 12 बिलियन डॉलर इकट्ठा किए थे. उसे उम्मीद है 2019-20 में वह एक बिलियन डॉलर की और उगाही कर लेगा. उल्लेखनीय है कि इस सेक्टर को उच्च सब्सिडी दर हासिल है, जो 2016 में कुल 2.3 बिलियन डॉलर थी. ये सब्सिडी अधिकांशतया टैक्स ब्रेक के रूप खनन सेक्टर को मुहैया कराई जाती है.

भारत के कुछ राज्यों को हासिल होनेवाले कुल राजस्व का आधा हिस्सा कोयले से प्राप्त होता है. इसका सीधा अर्थ है कि वैकल्पिक स्त्रोतों को तलाशने के लिए ऐसी नीतियां अपनानी होंगी, जो कोयला मज़दूरों के हितों में हों. रिपोर्ट के मुताबिक, भारत में इसपर कम ही चर्चा हो रही है. हालांकि 2015 में, भारत में बड़े पैमाने पर व्यावसायिक प्रशिक्षण कार्यक्रम की शुरुआत हो चुकी है, जिसके तहत युवाओं के लिए रोज़गार बढ़ाने का लक्ष्य रखा गया है. इस कार्यक्रम के तहत नवीनीकरण ऊर्जा के क्षेत्र में काफ़ी ध्यान दिया जा रहा है.

लो-कार्बन एनर्जी

नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा के क्षेत्र में भारत ने तेज़ी से उल्लेखनीय कदम उठाए हैं. 2017 में पहली बार ऐसा हुआ कि नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा संबंधी निवेश और नई क्षमता ने पारंपरिक ईंधन को पीछे छोड़ दिया. हालांकि 2017 में सिर्फ़ 11% बिजली ही नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा से प्राप्त हुई थी, जिसमें बड़े हाइड्रो से प्राप्त 9.5 % बिजली शामिल है.

सौर ऊर्जा की लगातार गिरती कीमतों से ये बात स्पष्ट हो चली है कि बिजली का वितरण करनेवाले वितरक अब कोयला आधारित बिजली के वितरण को लेकर ज़्यादा उत्साहित नहीं हैं. ग्रिड‌ में जैसे-जैसे नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा की पैठ बढ़ती जाएगी, विभिन्न तरह की आपूर्ति के लिए स्मार्ट ग्रिड को हासिल करने जैसी नीतियों को अपनाना आवश्यक हो जाएगा.

Gujarat Solar Park, in Gujarat, India, in 2013. It now has an installed capacity of 1637 MW. Credit: Ashley Cooper / Alamy Stock Photo.

इंटरनैशनल इंस्टिट्यूट ऑफ़ सस्टेनेबल डेवलेपमेंट (IISD) के मुताबिक, नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा को बढ़ावा देने ‌के लिए 2014 में 431 मिलियन डॉलर की सब्सिडी प्रदान की गई थी, जो 2016 में बढ़ाकर 1.4 बिलियन डॉलर कर गई. IISD ने बताया कि इसकी तुलना में, 20116 में ही कोयला, तेल और गैस को छह गुना‌ सरकारी समर्थन हासिल हुआ.

भारत ने नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा को बढ़ावा देने के लिए 2003 में अपने बिजली संबंधी कानून का इस्तेमाल करना शुरू किया. 2015 में भारत ने नया लक्ष्य निर्धारित करते हुए 2022 तक 175GW की नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा की स्थापना का लक्ष्य रखा, जिसमें 100GW सौर, 60GW अपटीय पवन, 10GW बायो-एनर्जी और 5GW छोटे हाइड्रो परियोजनाओं का शुमार है. कार्बन ब्रीफ़ द्वारा पिछले साल लिखे गए एक विशेष लेख के मुताबिक, इस सबसे तकरीबन 70GW कोयले को रीप्लेस किया जा सकता है. पारंपरिक ईंधन और लो-कार्बन प्लांट्स को मिलाकर भारत की मौजूदा क्षमता 350GW है.

2018 में भारत के बिजली मंत्री राज कुमार सिंह ने कहा था कि उन्हें उम्मीद है कि मार्च 2020 तक भारत 72GW क्षमता वाले सभी प्लांट्स का निर्माण कर लेगा या फिर उन्हें कमीशन कर‌ लेगा. सितंबर 2018 तक नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा की‌ क्षमता 72GW हो चुकी थी.

राजकुमार सिंह ने ये भी कहा था कि अब उनके देश को उम्मीद है कि 2022 तक उसे 225GW नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा हासिल हो जाएगी. हालांकि ये लक्ष्य बड़े हाइड्रो प्रोजेक्ट्स को ‘नवीकरणीय’ होने का दर्जा दिए जाने‌ के चलते भी हो सकता है. भारत के सबसे ताज़ा NEP का अनुमान है कि 2027 तक 275GW नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा संबंधी प्लांट्स स्थापित कर लिए जाएंगे.

2016 में बदली की गई टैरिफ़ नीति में बिजली वितरकों और बिजली इस्तेमाल करनेवाले कुछ बड़े यूज़र्स के लिड नवीकरणीय स्त्रोतों से ऊर्जा का एक हिस्सा खरीदने की व्यवस्था की गई है. इसमें सौर और पवन ऊर्जा को अंतर-राज्यीय ट्रांसमीशन पर लगनेवाले करों से मुक्त करने की भी व्यवस्था है.

भारत ने 2010 में अपने नैशनल सोलार मिशन (राष्ट्रीय सौर मिशन) को लॉन्च किया था, जो आठ NAPCC मिशन में से एक है. इसका मूल लक्ष्य 2022 तक 20GW सौर ऊर्जा प्राप्त करना था मगर 2015 में इस लक्ष्य को बढ़ाकर 100GW कर‌ दिया गया. इसमें रूफ़टॉप से हासिल होनेवाली सौर ऊर्जा का हिस्सा 40% रखा गया है.

भारत की योजना 2022 तक 2GW ऑफ़ ग्रिड सौर ऊर्जा हासिल‌ करने की है, जिसमें से ग्रामीण इलाकों में 20 मिलियन सौर संचालित लाइट्स की व्यवस्था करना शामिल है.

हाल ही में भारत द्वारा UNFCCC को सौंपी गई अपनी द्विवार्षिक रिपोर्ट के मुताबिक, अगस्त 2018 तक 23GW सौर ऊर्जा संबंधी प्लांट्स को या तो स्थापित कर दिया गया था या फिर इन्हें कमीशन कर दिया गया था. भारत दुनिया के सबसे बड़े सौर ऊर्जा संबंधी पार्क के निर्माण में संलग्न है.

हालांकि कंसल्टेंसी फ़र्म वुड मेकेंज़ी के अनुसार, सौर ऊर्जा पर बदलती टैक्स दरों से पैदा होनेवाली आर्थिक अस्थिरता और टैरिफ़ पर फिर से किए जानेवाले समझौते के चलते ये संभव है कि भारत 100GW के अपने लक्ष्य से चूक जाए.

Wind turbines near Kanyakumari in Tamil Nadu, India. Credit: dbimages / Alamy Stock Photo.

पवन से निर्मित ऊर्जा के मामले में दुनिया में भारत का स्थान चौथा है. पहला स्थान चीन, दूसरा अमेरिका और तीसरा स्थान जर्मनी का है. 2018 के मध्य तक भारत ने 34GW अपटतीय पवन ऊर्जा के निर्माण की व्यवस्था कर ली थी. भारत 2022 के लिए पवन ऊर्जा संबंधी निर्धारित किए गए अपने लक्ष्य तक पहुंचने के लिए नीलामी का सहारा ले रहा है.

भारत की द्विवार्षिक रिपोर्ट के अनुसार, 2014 में सौर ऊर्जा की कीमतें दो-तिहाई तक कम हुईं हैं जबकि अपटतीय पवन संबंधी ऊर्जा की कीमत आधी हो गई है.

भारत 2022 तक 5GW और 2030 तक 30GW अपटतीय पवन ऊर्जा संबंधी परियोजनाओं की स्थापना करना चाहता है.

द्विवार्षिक रिपोर्ट के मुताबिक, आर्थिक तौर पर फ़ायदेमंद साबित होनेवाले स्त्रोतों से जुड़े भारत के नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा की क्षमता तकरीबन 1,100GW है. इसमें 300GW पवन ऊर्जा और 750GW सौर ऊर्जा का समावेश है. क्लामेट चेंज इनिशिएटिव (CPI) के अनुसार, 2030 तक देश कम कीमत वाले 390GW पवन और सौर ऊर्जा निर्माण को अपने ऑफ़ ग्रिड में समाहित कर लेगा.

भारत के जलवायु परिवर्तन से संबंधी प्रण में कहा गया है कि भारत की 70% आबादी ऊर्जा के पारंपरिक स्त्रोतों पर निर्भर है, जो अप्रभावी होने के साथ-साथ आंतरिक तौर पर बड़े पैमाने पर वायु प्रदूषण का कारक भी है. यही वजह है कि भारत अब बिजली उत्पादन के क्षेत्र में बायोमास का इस्तेमाल कर रहा है क्योंकि उसके मुताबिक, ये ज़्यादा स्वच्छ भी है और ज़्यादा कुशल भी हैं. भारत का लक्ष्य 2022 तक 10GW बायो-ऊर्जा हासिल करने का है और उल्लेखनीय है कि 2018 तक इसमे 9GW की क्षमता हासिल कर‌ ली है.

भारत के पास तकरीबन 4.5GW के छोटे हाइडो (25MV से कम क्षमता वाले प्लांट्स) हैं, जो 2022 के 5GW के लक्ष्य से कम हैं. अगर बड़े हाइड्रो परियोजनाओं की बात की जाए, तो 2018 में भारत की क्षमता 45GW थी जबकि 2005 में ये महज़ 30GW थी. भारत द्वारा किए गए प्रण में कहा गया है कि उसका लक्ष्य देश की हाइड्रो परियोनाओं की विस्तृत संभावनाओं के विकास पर बेहद तेज़ी से काम करने का है.

2015 में लिए गए जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी प्रण के मुताबिक, भारत सरकार बिजली के स्त्रोत के रूप में परमाणु ऊर्जा को सुरक्षित, पर्यावरण के लिए अनुकूल और आर्थिक रूप से ज़्यादा सस्ता मानती है. उसकी मौजूदा क्षमता 6.8GW की है और 2032 तक वह इसमें 9 गुना की वृद्धि यानि 63GW करने का लक्ष्य रखता है. ग़ौरतलब है कि फ़िलहाल देश में परमाणु ऊर्जा से होनेवाले नफ़े और नुकसान को लेकर एक बहस छिड़ी हुई है.  

भारत के पास दुनिया का सबसे बड़ा थोरियम रिज़र्व है – जिसे मौजूदा परमाणु ईंधन के सुरक्षित विक्लप के तौर पर देखा जाता है – और लम्बी अवधि के एक्सपेरिमेंटल थोरियम रिएक्टर्स में उसकी गहरी रूचि भी है. हालांकि अगर कभी इसके उत्खनन की योजना बनाई भी जाती है, तो भी उसके लिए 2050 से पहले ऐसा करना संभव नहीं होगा.

ऊर्जा संबंधी दक्षता

भारत हमेशा से अपनी ऊर्जा संबंधी दक्षता और उत्सर्जन की तीव्रता को लेकर गर्व महसूस करता रहा है. 2001 में भारत के एनर्जी कंज़र्वेशन एक्ट (ऊर्जा संरक्षण कानून) द्वारा ब्यूरो ऑफ़ एनर्जी एफ़ीशियंसी की स्थापना की थी, जिसका मुख्य काम अर्थव्यवस्था की ऊर्जा संबंधी तीव्रता में कमी लाना है.

भारत का कहना है अपने द्वारा निर्धारित लक्ष्य के मुताबिक वह 2020 तक उत्सर्जन की तीव्रता में 20-25% तक की कमी लाकर उसे 2005 स्तर लाने की कोशिश करेगा. उसने इस बात को भी रेखांकित किया है कि किस तरह से अन्य देशों के मुक़ाबले भारतीय लोग ऊर्जा का कम इस्तेमाल करते हैं.

2010 में भारत ने नैशनल मिशन फॉर एनहान्स्ड एनर्जी एफ़ीशियंशी (NMEEE) को लॉन्च किया था, जो NAPCC के आठ मिशन का एक और एक हिस्सा है. इसका उद्देश्य उपेक्षित बिजली संसाधनों से‌ 20GW क्षमता का निर्माण करना और हर साल 23 मिट्रिक टन ईंधन बचाना है.

बाज़ार आधारित परफॉर्म, ‌अचीव और ट्रेड (PAT) स्कीम उनकी सबसे मुख्य योजनाबद्ध पहल है. इसके‌ ज़रिए अधिक मात्रा में बिजली की खपत वाले इंडस्ट्री जैसे थर्मल पावर प्लांट्स‌, लोहा व स्टील और सीमेंट इंडस्ट्री का शुमार है. इस क्षेत्र में अधिक उपलब्धि हासिल‌ करनेवाले लक्ष्य को छूने‌ में अक्षम साबित हुईं कंपनियों को अपने ऊर्जा संबंधी सर्टिफ़िकेट बेच सकते हैं.

Bricks lined up to dry at a brick manufacturing facility in Amritsar, Punjab, India. Credit: GURPREET SINGH / Alamy Stock Photo.

इसके पहले चक्र में, वह 2012 से 2015 के बीच में 31MtCO2e की बचत करने में कामयाब रहा था. सरकार का कहना है कि ये उसके द्वारा मौजूदा समय में उसके द्वारा सालाना किए जानेवाले 1% उत्सर्जन के बराबर है. इस योजना की तारीख़ों को आगे बढ़ाया गया है ताक़ि ज़्यादा से ज़्यादा सेक्टर को‌‌ इसमें शामिल किया जा सके.

अन्य NMEEE योजनाओं में अधिक कारगर अप्लायंसेस का समर्थन करना शामिल है, जिसमें सीलिंग फ़ैन्स आते हैं. इसमें ऐसे फ़ाइनांसरों को बढ़ावा देना भी शामिल है, जो उर्जा संबंधी दक्षता में संलग्न हों. इसके अलावा, ऊर्जा संबंधी दक्षता को और बढ़ावा देने के लिए पार्शियल रिस्क गारंटी और वेंचर कैपिटल जैसे उनके फ़ाइनांशियल इंस्ट्रमेंट्स का इस्तेमाल किया जाना भी शामिल है.

भारत के पास एक ख़ास तरह की रेटिंग सिस्टम – नैशनल स्मार्ट ग्रिड मिशन भी है, जो इमारतों की ऊर्जा संबंधी परफॉर्मेंस को परखता है. इसके अतिरिक्त, छोटे उद्योगों के लिए भी एक रेटिंग सिस्टम बनाई गई है, जो पर्यावरण के अनुकूल उत्पादन को बढ़ावा देता है.

इसने हाल ही में जारी किए गए एक नए एक्शन प्लान के मुताबिक, भारत का इरादा अपनी शीतल ऊर्जा ज़रूरतों (बिजली की मांग में तेज़ी लानेवाला सबसे बड़ा कारक) में 2038 तक 25-40% में कटौती करना है. इसी साल तक शीतल ऊर्जा संबंधी मांग में भी 25-30% तक की कटौती करने की भी योजना है.

सरकार का लक्ष्य 2019 तक भारत के 14 मिलियन पारंपरिक स्ट्रीट लाइट्स को एलईडी लाइट्स में बदलना है. सरकार सब्जिडी के ज़रिए भी एलईडी लाइट्स को घर–घर में पहुंचाने की कोशिशों में जुटी है और वह अब तक 312 मिलियन लाइट्स का वितरण कर चुकी है.

परिवहन प्रणाली

दुनिया में सबसे ज़्यादा कारों की बिक्री के मामले में भारत का नंबर पांचवां है. बढ़ती आमदनी और तेज़ी से हो रहे शहरीकरण के चलते इसमें और भी बढ़ोत्तरी का अनुमान लगाया जा रहा है. इससे विश्व भर में तेल की मांग बढ़ने की भी आशंका है.

सरकार इलेक्ट्रिक वेहिकल्स (EVs) को प्रमोट कर रही है, हालांकि अभी भारत में ऐसे वाहनों की संख़्या महज़ 2,60,000 है, जिसमें दो पहिया वाहनों और हायब्रीड्स का शुमार है. ग़ौरतलब है कि वाहनों की कुल बिक्री में से EVs की बिक्री महज 0.6% होती है. इनके लिए चार्जिंग स्टेशन बनाने की गति भी काफ़ी धीमी है.

भारत में 1.5 मिलियन इलेक्ट्रिक रिक्शा भी मौजूद हैं, हालांकि इनका इस्तेमाल छोटी दूरियों के सफ़र के लिए ही किया जाता है.

Electric rickshaw carrying villagers at Mangalbari bustee, Chalsa in Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal, India. Credit: Biswarup Ganguly / Alamy Stock Photo.

2011 में, भारत ने नैशनल मिशन फॉर इलेक्ट्रिक मोबिलिटी का गठन किया था, जिसका उद्देश्य इलेक्ट्रिक वेहिकल्स (EV) और हायब्रिड के निर्माण को बढ़ावा देना है. 2017 में मौजूदा बिजली मंत्री पीयूष गोयल ने कहा था कि उम्मीद है कि 2030 तक पेट्रोल और डीज़ल कारों की बिक्री समाप्त हो जाएगी. मगर फिर सरकार ने अपने इस लक्ष्य से जैसे हाथ पीछे खींच लिए और अब उसे उम्मीद है कि 2030 तक कुल बिक्री में से EVs की बिक्री 30% तक हो जाएगी. सरकार को इस बात की भी उम्मीद है कि 2030 तक सभी शहरी बसें पूरी तरह से इलेक्ट्रिक होंगी.

2015 में भारत ने अपनी FAME योजना लॉन्च की थी ताक़ि वह इलेक्ट्रिक व हायब्रिड‌ कार, मोपेड, रिक्शा और बस जैसे वाहनों को सब्सिडी दे सके. हाल ही में इसमें और बढ़ोत्तरी करते हुए भारत ने तीन साल की अवधि‌ में 1.4 बिलियन डॉलर और जोड़ने का ऐलान किया. इसमें से 1.2  बिलियन डॉलर सब्सिडी के‌ लिए हैं, तो वहीं 140 मिलियन डॉलर इंफ़्रास्ट्रक्चर की चार्ज़िंग लिए है. कई राज्यों ने भी EVs का‌ समर्थन करने के‌ लिए निजी तौर पर कुछ नीतिगत पहल किए हैं.

भारत ने‌ पैसेंजर वेहिकल ईंधन संबंधी दक्षता मानक को पहली दफ़ा 2014 में मंज़ूरी दी थी. इसे 2017 में पूरी तरह से लागू किया गया और 2022 में इससे संबंधित नियमों को और कड़ा किया जाएगा. तब भी ये नियम यूरोपियन यूनियन (EU) के मौजूदा मानकों से कम कड़े होंगे.

भारत द्वारा 2009 में बनाई गई राष्ट्रीय बायो-ईंधन नीति यानि नैशनल बायोफ़्यूल्स पॉलिसी का महत्वाकांक्षी लक्ष्य था कि वह 2017 तक 20% बायो-ईंधन को पेट्रोल और डीज़ल मिक्स में ब्लेंड कर दे. उल्लेखनीय है कि भारत अपने इन लक्ष्यों को पूरा करने में नाकाम रहा है. अभी 2018 तक वह महज 2% बायोईथानॉल और महज़ 0.1% बायोडीज़ल ब्लेंड करने में सफल रहा है. उसने अपनी बायो-ईंधन पॉलिसी को 2018 में अपग्रेड किया था. इसमें 2030 तक बायोईथानॉल का 20% ब्लेंड और बायोडीज़ल के 5% ब्लेंड का प्रस्तावित है.

रेलवे ट्रैक की लम्बाई के मामले मे भारतीय रेलवे प्रणाली दुनिया की चौथी सबसे बड़ी रेल प्रणाली है. रेलवे के ज़रिए यात्रा करनेवाले सबसे ज़्यादा मुसाफ़िरों के मामले में चीन के बाद भारत दूसरा सबसे बड़ा देश है. किसी भी अन्य देशों के मुक़ाबले इसमें सबसे ज़्यादा बढ़ोत्तरी होगी और 2015 तक इसमें तीन गुना तक वृद्धि होगी.

भारत के तकरीबन आधे पारंपरिक रेलवे ट्रैक बिजली संपन्न हैं, जबकि उसकी पहली हाई स्पीड लाइन का निर्माण अभी जारी है. ज़मीन के रास्ते ढोहे जाने वाले सामान में से एक तिहाई भार का वहन रेल द्वारा किया जाता है, जो दुनिया के मानकों से कहीं ज़्यादा है. इसमें जो चीज़ रेलवे द्वारा सबसे ज़्यादा ढोही जाती है, वह है कोयला.

भारत के जलवायु प्रण के मुताबिक, उसकी योजना ज़मीन से ढोहे जानेवाली कुल वस्तुओं‌ में रेलवे की हिस्सेदारी को बढ़ाकर 45% तक करने‌ की है, जिसमें सामान को ढोहने के लिए एक समर्पित कॉरिडोर का निर्माण शामिल है.

A coal train passes through a station in Jaipur, India. Credit: Sandra Foyt / Alamy Stock Photo.

2014 में, दु‌निया के कुल उत्सर्जन में भारतीय एविशन इंडस्ट्री का योगदान महज़ 1% था, जो कि विश्व औसत से बेहद कम था. मगर एविशन इंडस्ट्री के तेज़ी से हो रहे विस्तार के चलते इसमें वृद्धि की आशंका है. घरेलू एविशन मार्केट के विस्तार के मामले में भारत दुनिया का सबसे तेज़ी से बढ़ता बाज़ार है. महज़ पिछले साल ही इसमें 19% की बढ़ोत्तरी देखी गई. भारत का लक्ष्य अगले 10-15 सालों में 100 नए हवाई अड्डे बनाने का है. इस तरह से 2020 तक भारत विश्व का तीसरा सबसे बड़ा एविएशन मार्केट बन जाएगा. 2010 से लेकर अब तक घरेलू और अंतर्राष्ट्रीय दोनों तरह की उड़ानों में मुसाफ़िरों की संख्या दोगुनी हो गई है और 2037 तक इसके 520 मिलियन होकर तीन गुना तक बढ़ जाने का अनुमान है.

भारत UN एविएशन एमिशन ऑफ़सेट स्कीम, कोरसिया का सदस्य है, हालांकि उसने 2021 में शुरू होनेवाले वॉलंटरी पायलट फ़ैज़ के लिए अभी तक हामी नहीं भरी है.

जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी प्रण में भारत ने तटीय शिपिंग और इनलैंड वॉटर ट्रांसपोर्ट को बढ़ावा देने की योजनाओं को रेखांकित किया है. इसकी मुख्य वजह उनकी ईंधन दक्षता और तुलनात्मक तौर पर सस्ता होना है.

तेल और गैस

भारत बड़े पैमाने पर तेल पर निर्भर देश है. 2017 में उसकी कुल ऊर्जा खपत में से तेल की हिस्सेदारी 29% थी. उसकी तेल की ज़रूरतों में तेज़ी से इज़ाफ़ा हो रहा है, जिसके 2040 तक बढ़कर दोगुना हो जाने का अनुमान है. इसका मतलब ये हुआ कि भारत घरेलू स्तर पर तेल की बढ़ती मांग के मामले में चीन को भी पीछे छोड़ देगा और दुनिया में तेल की बढ़ती ज़रूरतों के मद्देनज़र भारत अव्वल साबित होगा. ग़ौरतलब है कि ख़ुद भारत की तेल उत्पादन क्षमता में गिरावट देखी जा रही है.

भारत द्वारा तेल और गैस दोनों को बड़े पैमाने पर उपभोक्ता सब्सिडी मुहैया कराई हुई है. उल्लेखनीय है कि 2014 और 2016 के बीच इस सब्सिडी में लगभग 75% तक की कमी यानि सब्सिडी में 6.58 बिलियन डॉलर की कटौती की गई. इसकी मुख्य वजहें उदारीकरण की नीतियां और तेल की गिरती कीमतें हैं. आर्थिक सुधार की प्रक्रिया अब भीट जारी है.

भारत ने जलवायु परिवर्तन के प्रति अपनी चिंताएं ज़ाहिर करने के लिए सब्सिडी में कटौती और पेट्रोल व डीज़ल पर अधिक टैक्स लगाए जाने की बातों को प्रमुख से रेखांकित किया है. उदाहरण के लिए हाल ही भारत द्वारा शुरू किए गए ‘छोड़ दो’ यानि ‘गिव इट अप’ अभियान के चलते बड़े पैमाने पर समक्ष लोगों ने स्वयंभू तरीके से अपने एलपीजी कुकिंग गैस पर मिलनेवाली सब्सिडी को छोड़ दिया था.

भारत में किरासिन तेल को बड़े पैमाने पर खाना पकाने और बिजली के उद्देश्यों से इस्तेमाल किया जाता है. ऐसे में किरासिन की कीमतों में बदलाव से बिजली से वंचित लोगों पर इसका ख़ासा असर पड़ेगा.

डीज़ल की खपत में और भी वृद्धि का अनुमान है, जिसमें सरकार द्वारा सड़क निर्माण की परियोजनाओं पर किए जाने खर्च का ख़ासा योगदान है.

भारत की ऊर्जा खपत में गैस की भूमिका ज़्यादा अहम नहीं रही है. 2017 में कुल ऊर्जा खपत के मामले में गैस की हिस्सेदारी महज़ 6% रही है. भारत अपनी आधी गैस की ज़रूरतों का आयात कतर, अमेरिका, ऑस्ट्रेलिया और रूस से करता है.

ग़ौरतलब है कि भारत में गैस की खपत में बढ़ोत्तरी हो रही है. गैस के ऊंचे दामों का मतलब है कि वो कोयला और ईंधन तेल से मुकाबला करने में फ़िलहाल सक्षम नहीं है. भारत की योजना है कि वह 2022 तक अपनी ऊर्जा खपत में गैस की हिस्सेदारी 15%. तक बढ़ा दे. इस संबंध में भारत का कहना है कि इसे स्वच्छ ईंधन के तौर पर अपनाने से कई तरह के पर्यावरणीय लाभ होंगे. तेल के मामले में भारत का घरेलू उत्पादन काफ़ी कम है और वह अपनी ज़रूरतों के लिए बड़े पैमाने पर आयात पर निर्भर रहता है. हालांकि घरेलू स्तर पर गैस और तेल के रिज़र्व के मामले में भारत की संभावनाएं काफ़ी अच्छी हैं.

हाल ही में संसदीय दल ने अपनी रिपोर्ट में कहा था कि 25GW से भी ज़्यादा गैस संबंधी पावर प्लांट घरेलू स्तर पर गैस की कमी और उसे आयात करने के ऊंचे दामों के वजह से ठप पड़े हुए हैं. स्टैटिजिक ऑयल रिज़र्व की तरह ही गैस के मामले‌ में भी भारत को ‘आपात भंडार’ के तौर पर देखा जाता है.

कृषी और वन

भारत के कुल GHG उत्सर्जन में खेती का योगदान लगभग 16% है. इसमें से 74% उत्सर्जन के लिए मवेशियों – ख़ासकर गायों और भैंसों – के इस्तेमाल से पैदा होनेवाली मिथेन और चावल‌ की खेती ज़िम्मेदार है. बाक़ी 26% उत्सर्जन की बड़ी वजह कीटनाशक से निकलनेवाली नाइट्रस ऑक्साइड गैस है.

Workers in rice paddy fields, Kashmir, India. Credit: robertharding / Alamy Stock Photo.

भारत की तकरीबन दो-तिहाई आबादी अपनी आजीविका के लिए खेती पर निर्भर है. दुनिया में कुल जानवरों की 15% आबादी भारत में है. 2014 तक भारत में गायों और भैंसों की संख्या 300 मिलियन थी. दुनिया के कुल दूध का 19% उत्पादन भारत में होता है.

भारत के जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी प्रण के‌ मुताबिक, बढ़ती आबादी के मद्देनज़र उसे अनाज़ उत्पादन में तेज़ी लानी होगी. उसके अनुसार, मगर बार-बार पड़ने वाले सूखे की मार और बाढ़ से पैदा होनेवाले हालातों से खेती पर मौसम के बदलते मिजाज़ का विपरीत असर होता है.

NAPCC के‌ आठ मिशन में एक और मिशन यानि भारत का नैशनल मिशन फॉर सस्टेनेबल अग्रीकल्चर (NMSA) का लक्ष्य खेती से पैदा होनेवाले उत्सर्जन को काबू में रखना और खाद्य सुरक्षा को बढ़ावा देना है.

भारत कई तरह की पहल करते हुए मिथेन के कम उत्सर्जन, चावल के अतिरिक्त बाक़ी कई तरह के अनाज के  उत्पादन को बढ़ावा, रसायन मुक्त खेती, स्वस्थ मिट्टी जैसे पायलट प्रोजेक्ट्स को बढ़ावा देने की शुरुआत की है. 2015 में शुरू की योजना के तहत यूरिया पर नीम की कोटिंग को अनिवार्य कर दिया गया था ताक़ि नाइट्रस ऑक्साइड का उत्सर्जन कम हो.

सिंचाई के लिए बड़े पैमाने पर इस्तेमाल किए जानेवाले अक्षम किस्म के वॉटर पम्प खेती के लिए होनेवाली कुल ऊर्जा खपत का 70% ज़िम्मेदार हैं. भारत ने अब तक 200,000 और पम्प इंस्टॉल किए हैं, जो देश के 21 मिलियन का महज़ 1% है, जबकि उसकी योजना ऐसे 2.5 मिलियन और सौर पम्प लगाने की है.

जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी भारत के प्रण के मुताबिक, हाल के सालों में उसके वन आवरण में वृद्धि हुई है, जिससे वो नेट CO2 सिंक के रूप में स्थापित होता है. हाल ही में किए गए एक अध्ययन के अनुसार, 2000  से 2017 के बीच में दुनिया में हरित क्षेत्र में हुई बढ़ोत्तरी में भारत की हिस्सेदारी 7% तक रही है.

भारत की दूरदर्शी योजना है कि उसके कुल क्षेत्रफल का 33% यानि 109 मिलियन हेक्टर हिस्सा वन आवरण के तहत आ जाए. 2013 में ये 79 मिलियन हेक्टर यानि इसकी हिस्सेदारी 24% थी.

A herd of Indian cows near Mount Abu hill in Rajasthan, India. Credit: Kailash Kumar / Alamy Stock Photo.

उसका दूसरा लक्ष्य 2030 तक अतिरिक्त वन और पेड़ों के आवरण के ज़रिए 2500-3000MtCO2 को समाहित करना है. CAT के मुताबिक, इसके आधे से अधिक लक्ष्यों को 2014 में लॉन्च किए गए ग्रीन इंडिया मिशन की मदद से हासिल किया जा सकता है. इस मिशन का मकसद वन आवरण में 5 मिलियन हेक्टर की बढ़ोत्तरी करना है और इसके अलावा अगले 10 सालों में पहले से मौजूद और 5 मिलियन हेक्टर के वन आवरण में गुणात्मक बदलाव लाना है. भारत सरकार अपने राज्यों को वन आवरण में बढ़ोत्तरी के प्रेरित करती है और उसके मुताबिक आर्थिक सहायता देती है.

हालांकि कई जानकारों का मानना है कि वन आवरण से संबंधित भारत के आंकड़े बढ़ा-चढ़ाकर पेश किए गए हैं और इन आंकड़ों को तेज़ी से हो रही वनों की कटाई के ढाल के तौर पर पेश किया जा रहा है.

प्रभाव और अनुकूल बदलाव

भारत ने 2015 के जलवायु परिवर्तन से संबंधी अपने प्रण का ज़्यादातर हिस्सा देश में मौजूदा असर और भविष्य में होनेवाले विपरीत प्रभाव को रेखांकित करने में लगाया है:

“जलवायु परिवर्तन के‌ लिहाज़ से भारत की गिनती उन चुनिंदा देशों में होती है, जिसपर इसका सबसे ज़्यादा विपरीत असर होगा, जिसकी अधिकतर आबादी कृषि आधारित अर्थव्यवस्था, विस्तृत तटीय इलाकों, हिमालयी इलाकों और द्वीपों पर निर्भर है.”

इसी तरह उसने अपनी द्विवार्षिक रिपोर्ट में इस बात की ओर‌ इंगित किया है कि बाढ़, सूखे और तूफ़ान जैसी प्राकृतिक आपदाओं के मामलों में वह बेहद संवेदनशील है. इनसे बढ़ते खतरे का असर उन इलाकों की जनसंख्या और सामाजिक-आर्थिक स्थिति पर निर्भर करता है.

1850 से लेकर अब तक भारत के सालाना तापमान में करीब 1.0C की वृद्धि हो चुकी है.

वर्ल्ड बैंक द्वारा किए गए एक अध्ययन के‌ मुताबिक, 2050 तक भारत को 1.2 ट्रिलियन डॉलर का ‘जीडीपी घाटा’ हो सकता है. इसके‌ अलावा, अगर जलवायु परिवर्तन से पहले के हालातों से तुलना करें, तो 2050 तक उसकी आधी आबादी के‌ जीवन स्तर में और गिरावट देखी जा सकती है. अध्ययन के अनुसार, इस नुकसान का कारण बढ़ता तापमान और मॉनसून में होनेवाली बारिश का बार-बार बदलता मिजाज़ होगा.

The Indus river flowing through the Ladakh range of the Himalayas.
Credit: Parvesh Jain / Alamy Stock Photo.

पोल्स की परिधि के बाहर सबसे ज़्यादा बर्फ़ीले इलाके के तौर पर जानेवाले हिमालय के पर्वत भारत और दक्षिण एशियाई इलाके के सबसे ज़्यादा बर्फ़ एकाग्रता वाले हिस्से हैं. इस क्षेत्र में रहने वाले तकरीबन 250 मिलियन लोगों के लिए यहां के ग्लेशियर पानी के मुख्य स्त्रोत हैं. इसके अलावा भारत समेत आसपास के सात अन्य देश में रहनेवाले 1.65 बिलियन लोग भी यहां से बहनेवाली नदियों से बहनेवाले पानी पर निर्भर हैं.

इस साल जारी की गई एक महत्वपूर्ण रिपोर्ट में इस बात का दावा किया गया है कि बढ़ते तापमान के चलते 2100 तक इस इलाकों के ग्लेशियर का एक तिहाई हिस्सा पिघल जाएगा. विश्व का तापमान 1.5C. तक सीमित रहा, तब भी ऐसा होने की आशंका बनी रहेगी. भारत जल से पैदा होनावाले मलेरिया और डेंगू जैसी बीमारियों के मामलों में बढ़ोत्तरी के प्रति भी काफ़ी संवेदनशील है. जलवायु परिवर्तन के चलते इन दोनों बीमारियों में ख़ासी वृद्धि देखी जा सकती है.

गर्मियों में चलनेवाली लू से भी देश की एक बड़ी आबादी को खतरा है. बता दें भारत में 600 मिलियन लोग ऐसे इलाकों को में रहते हैं जो 2050 तक बढ़ते तापमान से पैदा होनेवाली गर्म हवाओं के हिसाब से मध्यम अथवा कठोर किस्म के इलाकों में तब्दील हो जाएंगे. लांसेन्ट काउंटडाउंन ऑन हेल्थ ऐंड क्लाइमेट चेंज की एक रिपोर्ट के अनुसार, 2017 में बड़े पैमाने पर खेत-खलिहानों में काम करनेवाले मज़दूर अत्याधिक गर्मी का शिकार हुए थे.

भारत के समुद्री स्तर में बढ़ोत्तरी हो सकती है. इससे नदी जल प्रणालियों पर असर पड़ सकता है, जिससे इनपर निर्भर करोड़ों लोगों की आजीविका प्रभावित हो सकती हैं. भारत के 1,238 द्वीप भी खतरे में हैं.

देश का आपदा प्रबंधन कानून 2005 में लागू किया गया था. इसमें जलवायु परिवर्तन को ज़्यादा तवज्जो नहीं दी गई थी, मगर इसमें ‘‘रेस्पॉन्स और रिलीफ़’’ अप्रोच यानि ‘प्रतिसाद और राहत’ से आगे बढ़कर ‘‘प्रीवेंशन, मिटिगेशन और प्रीपेडनेस’’ यानि ‘निवारण, शमन और तत्परता’ का ज़िक्र किया गया है. 2016 में भारत ने आपदा प्रबंधन योजना को लागू किया, जो पेरिस समझौते और दुनिया के अन्य आपदा के खतरों में कटौती से संबंधित ढांचे के मुताबिक बनाया गया है.

भारत ने NAPCC के आठ मिशन में से एक मिशन को, हिमालय के पारिस्थितिकीय तंत्र को बचाने के लिए समर्पित किया है. इसके दो अन्य मिशन जल और शोध एवं विकास पर केंद्रित हैं.

UNFCCC के तहत जारी की गई नैशनल कम्युनिकेशन की सबसे ताज़ा‌ रिपोर्ट 2012 में सौंपी गयी थी. इसमें संवेदनशीलता का आंकलन और संबंधित बदलाव को रेखांकित किया गया था.

जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी आर्थिक सहायता

भारत काफ़ी पहले से जलवायु परिवर्तन से संबंधित आर्थिक सहायता और विकसित देशों से विकासशील देशों को टेक्नोलॉजी के ट्रांसफ़र पर ज़ोर देता आया है. उसके जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी प्रण के मुताबिक :

“विकास की प्रक्रिया के दौरान उत्सर्जन में कमी को लेकर हमारे प्रयासों का संबंध पैसों की उपलब्धता और अंतर्राष्ट्रीय स्तर पर हमें मिलनेवाली आर्थिक सहायता और टेक्नोलॉजी ट्रांसफ़र से है क्योंकि भारत में विकास की चुनौतियां अभी भी काफ़ी जटिल‌ हैं.”

भारत का कहना है कि उसे अपने जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी प्रण पर‌ अमल करने लिए 2.5 ट्रिलियन डॉलर की आवश्यकता पड़ेगी, जो सभी विकासशील देशों द्वारा मिलाकर किए जाने वाले ज़रूरी खर्च का 71% है.

कार्बन ब्रीफ़ के विश्लेषण से ये बात सामने आई कि भारत एक ऐसा देश है जिसे सिंगल कंट्री फ़ंडी (725 मिलियन) के तौर पर सबसे ज़्यादा धनराशि प्राप्त हुई, जिसे मल्टीलैटरल क्लाइमेट फ़ंड कि मान्यता के बाद समग्र शर्तों के साथ मंज़ूर किया गया था. ज़्यादातर धनराशि क्लीन टेक्नोलॉजी फ़ंड (CTF) द्वारा नवीकरणीय परियोजनाओं के‌ लिए उपलब्ध कराई गई थी. अगर इसे प्रति व्यक्ति को मिलि फ़ंडिंग के तौर पर देखा जाए, तो ये महज़ 0.60 डॉलर है, जो कि तुलनात्मक तौर पर कम है.

A monsoon brings flooding to Kolkata, India, 7 July 2017. Credit: Dipayan Bose / Alamy Stock Photo.

कार्बन ब्रीफ़ द्वारा ऑर्गनाइज़ेशन फॉर इकोनॉमिक कॉर्पोरेशन ऐंड डेवलपमेंट (OECD) के डाटा के विश्लेषण से पता चलता है कि जलवायु परिवर्तन के विकास संबंधी आर्थिक सहायता के क्षेत्र में विस्तृत रूप से भारत को 2015 और 2016 में हर साल लगभग 2.6 बिलियन डॉलर की सहायता राशि प्राप्त हुई.  

भारत ने घरेलू स्तर पर भी जलवायु परिवर्तन से संबंधी आर्थिक पहल की है. राष्ट्रीय स्तर पर अपने आठ लक्ष्यों के लिए खर्च किए जानेवाले पैसों के अलावा उसके द्वारा लगाए गए कोयला सेस से उसे अब 1.2 बिलियन डॉलर हासिल हुए हैं. पूरी तरह तो नहीं,‌ मगर इन पैसों का इस्तेमाल स्वच्छ ऊर्जा के‌ लक्ष्य को प्राप्त करने के लिए किया जा रहा है. गोद ली गई कई योजनाओं को भी सराकरी फ़ंडिंग मिल रही है.

The post द कार्बन ब्रीफ़ प्रोफ़ाइल : भारत appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Since 2000, the world has doubled its coal-fired power capacity to around 2,000 gigawatts (GW) after explosive growth in China and India. A further 236GW is being built and 336GW is planned.

More recently, 227GW has closed due to a wave of retirements across the EU and US. Combined with a rapid slowdown in the number of new plants being built, this means the number of coal units operating around the world fell for the first time in 2018, Carbon Brief analysis suggests.

Another 186GW is already set to retire by 2030 and 14 of the world’s 78 coal-powered countries plan a total phaseout.

Meanwhile, electricity generated from coal has plateaued since 2014, so the expanding fleet is running fewer hours than ever. This erodes coal’s bottom line, as does competition from gas and renewables.

The way coal’s next chapter unfolds is key to tackling climate change. All unabated coal must close within a few decades if warming is to be limited to less than 2C above pre-industrial temperatures, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

To shed light on this story, Carbon Brief has mapped the past, present and future of all the world’s coal-fired power stations. The interactive timeline map, above, shows the plants operating in each year between 2000 and 2018, as well as the location of planned new capacity.

This map and article has been fully updated since it was originally published in 2018, using the latest data from the Global Energy Monitor (formerly CoalSwarm) Global Coal Plant Tracker. It features around 10,000 retired, operating and planned coal units, totalling close to 3,000 gigawatts (GW) across 95 countries. The 2018 version of this article has been archived.

• How to read the timeline map
• Rising coal capacity
• Slowing coal growth
• Peak coal CO2 emissions
• Eroding coal economics
• Key countries and regions

How to read the timeline map

The timeline map above shows a circle for each coal plant in the world, proportional to the generating capacity in megawatts (MW). Each plant may be made up of multiple units – the individual boilers and steam turbines. The notes at the end of this article explain how the data was processed.

The graphic, below, explains how to use the map features. Select the year, region and base map – including a satellite view – using the information box on the left.

Zoom, rotate and tilt the map using the navigation tools in the top right corner and your mouse scroll wheel. Use the search box to find locations by city, region, postal or zip code. The home button will reset the map to its original state.

Coal plants on the map are colour-coded according to whether they are operating (yellow), new or expanded that year (red) and closing or shrinking the following year (white).

Drag the timeline slider from 2000 through to 2018 to see where and when coal plants are added and retired. For 2018, plants are coloured white if they are expected to close some or all of their units.

The rightmost end of the slider (“Future”) shows plants that have no known plans to retire (yellow), those currently being built (pink) and those in various stages of planning (purple).

Note that between 2010 and 2018, only 35% of planned capacity was built or started construction (958GW), whereas 1,756GW was cancelled or shelved, according to Global Energy Monitor. For example, a tender to build one new plant may attract several bids, all of which would be counted towards the “planned” total.

The map shows coal capacity, whereas electricity generation and CO2 emissions depend on a range of other factors. Most important is how often coal plants run – their load factor. Global average loads started falling in 2007 and coal power CO2 has levelled off since 2014. More on this below.

Finally, note that the map design is responsive and has fewer features on smaller mobile devices. The map uses WebGL and will not work on some older browsers. The map may also fail to load if you are using an ad-blocking browser plugin; try whitelisting the Carbon Brief website.

Rising coal capacity

Global coal capacity grew in every year between 2000 and 2018, nearly doubling from 1,066GW to 2,024GW. As far back as 1950, coal capacity has only ever risen – though this older data is less reliable. The rate of growth is slowing dramatically, however, with the 20GW net increase in 2018 the smallest in several decades.

The promise of cheap electricity to fuel economic growth has driven this expansion. Coal generates nearly 40% of the world’s electricity, close to its highest share in decades. And there are now 78 countries using coal power, up from 66 in 2000. Another 16 plan to join the club, notably Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

CO2 emissions from existing plants are enough to breach the carbon budget for 1.5 or 2C. These limits would mean no new coal plants and closing 20% of the fleet early, according to one recent study.

All unabated coal would have to close by 2040 to stay “well below” 2C, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). This would mean closing 100GW of coal capacity every year for 20 years, or roughly one coal unit every day until 2040. (Some pathways have slightly slower phaseouts.)

Yet newspaper headlines and energy projections suggest coal growth will not stop.

This bleak outlook for the climate is tempered by signs of rapid change. The pipeline of plants under construction (pink) or proposed (purple) has shrunk by three-fifths since 2015, as the chart below shows. Retirements (grey) are also accelerating, reaching a cumulative 227GW between 2010 and 2018.

As with global CO2 emissions, however, the world’s coal capacity has to peak before it can start to fall.

Slowing coal growth

The IEA says global coal investment has already peaked and is now in a “dramatic slowdown”. It says that China, which is building much of the current pipeline, has no need for new plants.

This fall in investment means coal capacity growth is slowing, as the chart below left shows. In 2011, global coal capacity increased by 82GW. This figure was 75% lower in 2018, at 20GW.

The number of plants newly under construction each year is falling even faster, down 84% since 2015, according to the latest annual status report from Global Energy Monitor, Greenpeace and the Sierra Club. Meanwhile, coal retirements are at historically unprecedented levels, with the 31GW of closures in 2018 a close third behind 2015 and 2016.

All this means that global coal power capacity could peak as soon as 2022, last year’s status report said. (A new and potentially higher cap on coal capacity in China casts doubt on this outlook, see below for more.)

Intriguingly, the number of coal units in the world could already have peaked, as the chart above right shows. In 2017, the number of units increased by just six, down from a net of 273 in 2006. In 2018, the number of units decreased by seven.

The chart shows how several countries, notably China, have been closing many hundreds of smaller, older and less efficient units, replacing them with larger and more efficient models.

Peak coal CO2 emissions

Data from the IEA shows CO2 emissions from coal power may also have peaked – or at least levelled off – even though coal capacity continues to increase. Coal CO2 emissions were unchanged between 2014 and 2017 (red line) despite coal generation rising 1.6% (yellow), as the chart below shows.

Since coal capacity continues to increase (pink), existing coal plants are running for fewer hours (purple). On average, the world’s coal plants were running around half the time in 2017, with a load factor of 54.5%. The trend is similar in the US (54%), EU (48%), China (52%) and India (61%).

Apart from running hours, a range of other factors affect the relationship between coal capacity and CO2 emissions. These include the type of coal and combustion technology each plant uses.

Plants burning low-quality lignite can emit as much as 1,200 tonnes of CO2 per gigawatt hour (GWh) of electricity generated, falling below 1,000tCO2/GWh for harder, less polluting grades from sub-bituminous through to bituminous coal. (Rarely used anthracite is hard, but has high CO2 emissions, as it contains less hydrogen than other grades.)

The combustion technology is also important, from less efficient “subcritical” units through to super- and ultra-supercritical systems, which raise efficiency by running the boiler at higher pressures.

The oldest and least efficient subcritical units might turn less than 35% of the energy in coal into electricity. Newer subcritical plants raise this towards 40% and ultra-supercritical units to 45%.

Parts of the coal industry refer to ultra-supercritical units as “high efficiency low emissions” (HELE).

However, even HELE coal plants emit around 800tCO2/GWh, according to the World Coal Association. This is roughly twice the emissions of gas-fired electricity and in the order of 50-100 higher than nuclear, wind or solar. The IEA sees little role for coal-fired power in 2C scenarios as residual emissions are too high, even when using carbon capture and storage (CCS).

Note that the chart, above, contains the latest available information from the IEA. There was another uptick in coal generation and CO2 emissions in 2018, driven by increases in China, though coal use overall remains below the 2014 peak. See below for more on coal’s status in key countries.

Eroding coal economics

Low load factors are corrosive for coal-plant economics. In general, plants are designed to run at least 80% of the time because they have relatively high fixed costs. This is also the basis of cost estimates for building new coal, whereas lower running hours raise costs per unit of electricity.

This dynamic is particularly toxic for coal-plant operators competing against the rapidly falling costs of renewables, cheap gas in the US and rising carbon prices in the EU. Constraints on coal supply are raising coal prices, further undermining any remaining cost advantage over the alternatives.

New solar is now cheaper than new coal in India.

And solar is closing the gap fast in other Asian countries, from China to Thailand to Vietnam.https://t.co/8quLDCPruy pic.twitter.com/EQuk2TZcXi

— Simon Evans (@DrSimEvans) May 24, 2018

New air pollution rules are also increasing coal-plant costs in many jurisdictions, from the EU to India to Indonesia. Operators must invest in pollution control equipment to meet higher emissions standards, or close their dirtiest plants altogether.

This combination of factors means large parts of the existing coal fleet in the EU and even in India face severe economic headwinds under prevailing market conditions, according to financial thinktank Carbon Tracker. It has found that nearly all EU plants would be loss-making by 2030, for example, considering only the revenues they earn from wholesale electricity markets.

Similarly, Bloomberg New Energy Finance founder Michael Liebreich says coal faces two “tipping points”. The first is when new renewable energy is cheaper than new coal, which has already happened in several regions. The second is when new renewables are cheaper than existing coal.

Note that coal plants may remain open in the face of unfavourable economic conditions for other reasons, for example, due to capacity market payments.

Key countries and regions

Some 78 countries use coal to generate electricity, up from 66 in 2000. Since then, 13 countries have added coal capacity for the first time and one country – Belgium – has phased it out.

Another 13 countries – responsible for 3% of current capacity – have pledged to phase out coal by 2030 as part of the “Powering Past Coal Alliance”, led by the UK and Canada. In 2019, they are set to be officially joined by Germany, home to the world’s fifth-largest coal fleet and another 3% of the global total. Meanwhile, 16 countries hope to join the coal power club in future, including Egypt, shown in the table, below.

A few key countries dominate this picture. The world’s top 10 nations for coal capacity, shown in the table below, account for 86% of the total operating today and 82% of plants in the pipeline.

China has the largest coal fleet by far and is also home to the world’s heaviest concentration of coal plants, with 97GW in a 250km radius along the Yangtze River delta around Shanghai. This is more capacity than all except three countries (China, India and the US), as the table above shows.

China

Since 2000, the most dramatic changes have taken place in China, as the slider below shows. Its coal fleet grew five-fold between 2000 and 2018 to reach 973GW, nearly half the global total.

China is the world’s largest CO2 emitter and uses half the coal consumed each year, so its future path is disproportionately important for global efforts to tackle climate change.

Industrial activity and coal use have been spurred by stimulus spending prior to President Xi’s appointment as “leader for life” in 2018. This pushed CO2 emissions growth to its fastest rate for years, even though the effects of the stimulus started to tail off through last year. There are signs of renewed stimulus spending in 2019. Yet some analysts say China’s coal use could halve by 2030.

The government is enacting a national carbon trading scheme and had announced waves of cancellations and restrictions on new coal power, in response to air pollution and climate concerns – though some shelved projects have resumed development. Overall, its pipeline of plants being built or planned has shrunk more than 70% since 2016, according to Global Energy Monitor.

It also means planned projects are unlikely to get the permits they need to get built, says Lauri Myllyvirta, energy analyst at Greenpeace East Asia. He tells Carbon Brief:

“A lot of the planned projects in China and India are effectively dead in the water. In India, they are commercially dead, no one in their right mind is going to build them…In China, economically, it makes no sense as they already have way too much capacity.”

Coal-fired capacity and generation in China has more or less peaked and will now level off, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).

Despite all this, the China Electricity Council, which represents the power sector, has proposed raising a cap on coal capacity from 1,100GW in 2020 to 1,300GW in 2030. “It is unclear how the central government will respond,” Global Energy Monitor says.

India

The second-largest increase in capacity since 2000 has been in India (see Carbon Brief’s new in-depth country profile), where the coal fleet has more than tripled to 221GW. This expansion can be seen in the slider, below.

Indian coal capacity will continue to rise, reaching 238GW in 2027, according to the government’s National Electricity Plan. Other analysts and indicators suggest this increase may be in doubt.

The rate of coal capacity growth in India has more than halved since 2016, as the chart above shows, and there are signs it is slowing ever further.

The IEA has dramatically cut its forecasts for Indian demand, due to slower than expected electricity demand growth and the falling price for renewables.

“For India, it’s a very clear case where renewables are able to deliver power at lower cost than new coal and even a lot of existing capacity,” says Myllyvirta. “From an economic perspective, it would make sense to substitute new renewables for existing coal,” according to a 2019 report from The Energy and Resources Institute in New Delhi.

In a February 2019 comment, Reuters commodities columnist Clyde Russell wrote: “The main reason coal may battle to fuel India’s future energy needs is that it’s simply becoming too expensive relative to renewable alternatives, such as wind & solar.”

Indeed, some 10GW of existing coal is “unviable” and another 30GW “stressed”, according to India’s power secretary, interviewed by Bloomberg Quint in May 2018. “India’s renewables revolution is pushing coal off the debt cliff,” writes Matthew Gray, senior analyst at Carbon Tracker.

The country has 94GW of new coal capacity under development, down 28% in the past year alone. This includes 36GW under construction, of which some 20GW is on hold – most often due to financial problems, according to Global Energy Monitor.

US

A wave of retirements has cut US coal capacity by 79GW in seven years and another 70GW is already planning to close, according to Global Energy Monitor. This would shrink the US fleet by two-fifths, from 327GW in 2000 to 191GW in future, as the slider below shows.

One wildcard is the Trump administration’s continued wish to prop up unprofitable coal plants. In 2018 it had planned what Bloomberg called “an unprecedented intervention into US energy markets” on national security grounds. It also abandoned efforts in the name of “grid resilience”.

Market conditions, on the other hand, currently favour gas-fired power plants and renewables. There are no plans for new US coal capacity. Retirements in 2018 reached 18GW, second only to 2015. In 2018, US power sector coal consumption was the lowest since 1982.

Some 74% of US coal plants have higher operating costs than the price of building new renewables nearby, according to March 2019 analysis from Energy Innovation, a thinktank.

See Carbon Brief’s earlier map of all the power plants in the US for more.

EU

The EU is also seeing a wave of coal retirements. Given member state plans to phase out coal, the bloc’s fleet is set to fall below 70GW to a third of its capacity in 2000, as the slider below shows.

Along with Canada, EU countries are leading global efforts to phase out coal. The UK, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland have all pledged a phaseout before 2030. Their coal fleets total 42GW, including several recently built plants.

Now, the world’s fifth largest national coal fleet – Germany’s 48GW – is set to be phased out, too, albeit by 2038 at the latest. After that, Poland’s 30GW is the world’s ninth largest tally.

Poland says it will not build new coal beyond what is already under construction.

Research last year suggested all EU coal plants should close by 2030, in order to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. Rising carbon prices drove a 6% reduction in EU coal generation in 2018.

Other key countries

Other Asian countries, including South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines, have collectively doubled their coal fleet since 2000, reaching 191GW in 2018.

Together, these countries are building 50GW of new plants and have another 104GW planned, though the latter figure is some 21GW lower than it was last year. Many of the projects in poorer nations are being financed or built by China, Japan and South Korea.

Campaigners see a fast-developing Asia as the key risk for coal expansion. Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief:

“China and India still matter a lot, but, megawatt for megawatt, I would put a lot more weight on other parts of Asia.”

There are mixed signs for coal in many of these countries. For example, Japan’s latest national energy plan sees a significant role for coal in 2030, whereas the Paris Agreement means it should mostly phase out coal by then, according to Climate Analytics, a scientific NGO.

Major plans for new coal capacity are opposed by communitiess, NGOs and some newspapers. More than a third of the new plants planned at the start of 2016 have been cancelled or shelved.

Vietnam has the world’s third-largest plans for new coal, totalling 42GW, of which 10GW is already being built. “Yet the government is increasingly invested in changing this trajectory,” writes Alex Perera, deputy director of energy at thinktank the World Resources Institute. He continues:

“Vietnam provides an interesting and important combination of conditions that can enable a meaningful transition to clean energy: government commitments to renewables and a private sector eager to meet increasingly stringent clean energy targets.”

Ambitious plans to expand gas power in Vietnam may replace some coal plants, Bloomberg reported in March 2019.

In Indonesia, the government continues to plan for a major coal expansion, but its coal pipeline shrank by 10GW in the past year, according to Global Energy Monitor. The state-owned utility has been criticised for “massively overestimating likely [electricity] demand growth” to justify new coal. (See Carbon Brief’s new in-depth country profile of Indonesia for more details.)

Turkey also has significant plans to expand its coal fleet (see Carbon Brief profile of Turkey’s climate and energy policy). Notably, however, less than 1GW of a total pipeline of 37GW of new coal is currently under construction.

Another country with major plans is Egypt, which has no coal plants and no domestic coal deposits. Note that none of the 13GW of planned capacity has moved beyond the earliest phases of development, with none entering the permitting process, none yet permitted and none being built.

South Africa has large coal deposits and the world’s seventh-largest coal power fleet. It is building 6GW of new coal with plans for 8GW more. The political mood is shifting since Cyril Ramaphosa’s election last year, however, and long-delayed renewable deals worth $4.7bn were signed last April.

Unusually, South African heavy industry favours renewables over continued coal growth. New coal would be much more expensive than the alternatives, separate research suggests. In March 2019, state power firm Eskom said it was looking at leaving two huge coal plants unfinished.

Methodology

Carbon Brief’s timeline map is based on the Global Coal Plant Tracker, compiled by Global Energy Monitor. The current map uses data from January 2019. This database includes all coal units of 30MW capacity or larger, covering operating and retired plants as well as those proposed since 2010. (As noted above, there are thought to be roughly 27GW of smaller coal plants.)

This covers a total of 2,024GW of capacity operating today, 236GW under construction, 337GW in planning, 237GW retired and 1,741GW that has been proposed, but then cancelled since 2010.

Carbon Brief made a number of assumptions to compile the map, explained below.

As of March 2019, 27 countries have joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance on phasing out coal power, of which 13 still have operating plants. Each of these countries is assumed to complete its phaseout by the pledged year. Germany is assumed to meet a 2038 phaseout deadline.

Coal units – the individual boilers listed in the database – are grouped together using the listed “Plant” name. However, some sites have two or more plants with subtly different names, such as “Plant-1”, “Plant-2”. These plants are grouped again in a second automated step based on their latitude. In these cases, only the first name (Plant-1) is retained for the map.

Some grouped plants have units using different combustion technologies, such as subcritical and supercritical boilers. During the data grouping step, some of these differences will have been lost. For grouped plants, the map shows the range years when units started operating.

Plants in the pipeline are a mixture of sites under construction, already permitted, pre-permit and at an early stage of planning (“announced”). Some sites host projects at different stages of this process, which would be semi-hidden on the map since their locations are the same. A random offset on the order of ±50m is applied to the location of all units in the pipeline, so as to artificially separate them on the map.

The map omits 6 units in the database lacking information on capacity, as well as 39 operating or retired units, totalling 1.7GW, that lack location data. There is 8GW of capacity marked as “mothballed”, meaning it is in a state of temporary disuse. These are included with “operating” capacity as there is no information on the timing or length of the mothballing.

There are 135 retired units (8.2GW) and 129 operating units (8.9GW) without a listed “Start Year”. The map assumes these units have been operating since 2000 onwards. Six units (0.3GW) are listed with a “Start Year” of 1960s, 1970s or similar. These are assigned to 1965, 1975 and so on.

Some 101 retired units (6.3GW) lack a “Retire Year”, most of which are in China. These plants are assigned a random retirement year between 2000 and 2018, using years weighted according to the distribution of known retirements in China and the rest of the world, respectively.

The post Mapped: The world’s coal power plants appeared first on Carbon Brief.

In the sixth article of a series on how key emitters are responding to climate change, Carbon Brief looks at Indonesia’s efforts to curb deforestation and tame polluting peatland fires.

Indonesia was the world’s fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2015. It is the 16th biggest economy and the largest in southeast Asia. Its emissions stem from deforestation and peatland megafires and, to a lesser extent, the burning of fossil fuels for energy.

The country recently overtook Australia again to become the world’s largest exporter of thermal coal. It plans to substantially increase its domestic coal-powered generation – partially in a bid to help close the “electricity gap” between its wealthy and less-connected islands.

The current government has pledged to cut emissions by 29-41% by 2030, compared to a “business as usual” scenario.

The country is holding a general election this April and polls suggest a win for current president Joko Widodo.

Politics

Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy and almost 260 million people live across its chain of islands, of which there are an estimated 17,508. It also has the world’s largest Muslim population and is highly ethnically diverse, supporting more than 300 local languages.

The country has held general elections since 1955, but only began holding presidential elections in 2004. Its current leader, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, was elected in 2014 and will face another election this April. Widodo is a member of the “left-of-centre” Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and leads a majority coalition government with the support of nine political parties.

Widodo is the first president in Indonesia to not come from an elite military or political background and remains untainted by the corruption allegations that dog other government officials. A year before he was elected, the Economist described him as “an honest man”. However, he faces criticism for doing little to advance human rights during his presidency.

His campaign for reelection is centred around promises to boost economic growth, largely through more infrastructure development, and to increase measures to tackle terrorism and corruption – with any mention of climate change so far “tragically absent”, according to the Jakarta Post, an English-language Indonesian newspaper.

Last year, Widodo boosted subsidies for diesel “amid worries that higher fuel costs [could] threaten his bid for re-election”, according to the Nikkei Asian Review, an Asia-focused financial publication. (He had previously overseen a “big-bang” removal of subsidies in 2015, according to the IEA, in a bid to reform Indonesia’s “decades-old” fuel support system.)

A poll in January by Charta Politika, an Indonesian political consultancy firm, found Widodo had an approval rating of 53.2%. His biggest rival, Prabowo Subianto – a former army general who lost to Widodo in 2014 – had an approval rating of 34.1%.

Indonesia’s president Joko Widodo (2nd R) and his rival ex-general Prabowo Subianto (L Front) talk to the media after a meeting in Jakarta, 17 October 2014. Credit: Xinhua / Alamy Stock Photo.

Research released in February by Jatam, an Indonesian NGO that monitors the mining industry, found that 86% of the $4m in donations reported by the Widodo campaign is linked to big mining and fossil-fuel companies. It also found that 70% of the $3.4m declared by the Prabowo campaign is linked to mining and fossil-fuel firms.

On 17 February 2019, both candidates took part in a televised debate on the theme of “environment, energy and infrastructure”. According to the environmental website Mongabay, both pledged to increase the cultivation of palm oil – the major driver of deforestation in the country. Neither candidate mentioned how they planned to tackle climate change.

Across the country, 41% of people describe themselves as “very concerned” about climate change, according to a poll taken in 2015. This is lower than the proportion of people concerned in neighbouring Vietnam (69%), Malaysia (44%) and the Philippines (72%), but equal to the proportion in the UK.

Paris pledge

Indonesia is part of five negotiating blocs at international climate negotiations. These include the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs); the G77 and China; the Coalition for Rainforest Nations; the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Cartagena Dialogue. (More information on each group is available in an in-depth explainer of negotiating blocs by Carbon Brief.)

The country’s annual greenhouse gas emissions were 2.4bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2015, according to data compiled by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). The figure includes emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). Indonesia’s emissions represented 4.8% of the world’s total global emissions for that year.

Its per-capita emissions were 9.2 tonnes of CO2e that year – larger than the global average (7.0 tonnes of CO2e) and the average in China (9.0 tonnes of CO2e), the UK (7.7 tonnes of CO2e) and the EU (8.1 tonnes of CO2e).

However, it is worth noting that Indonesia’s total emissions vary widely from year to year, largely as a result of variable peatland “megafires”.

The chart below, which is taken from Indonesia’s latest biennial report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), gives an idea of how the country’s peatland fires can shift overall emissions.

The chart shows emissions from peatland fires (blue), forestry and other land use (“FOLU”; green), waste (yellow), agriculture (pale green), industry (“IPPU”; red) and energy (orange). (It is worth noting that the figures shown are self-reported.)

Indonesia’s total emissions from 2000-16. Emissions from peatland fires (blue), forestry and other land use (“FOLU”; green), waste (yellow), agriculture (pale green), industry (“IPPU”; red) and energy (orange) are shown. Emissions are shown in gigagrams of CO2 equivalent (GgCO2e, millions of tonnes). It is worth noting that the figures are self-reported. Source: Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Indonesia.

Indonesia’s climate pledge (“nationally determined contribution”, or NDC) targets a 29-41% reduction in emissions by 2030, compared to “business as usual”. The upper end of this range, conditional on “support from international cooperation”, would see emissions in 2030 remain at or below recent levels.

This pledge was submitted to the UNFCCC in the lead up to the Paris climate conference. Indonesia ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016.

The country aims to decarbonise its economy “in a phased approach” – namely, through policies for “improved land use and spatial planning, energy conservation and the promotion of clean and renewable energy sources, and improved waste management”.

This pledge has been rated “highly insufficient” by Climate Action Tracker (CAT), an independent research project tracking climate policies. The rating suggests that Indonesia is not committing its “fair share” to the emissions cuts needed to limit global warming to less than 2C. If all countries had similar targets, temperatures would reach 3-4C by 2100, the analysis finds.

Indonesia’s emissions have increased at a faster rate than expected in recent years, CAT says, and, under current policies, “might even double by 2030”, when compared to 2014 levels.

Deforestation, palm oil and fire

Indonesia contains 10% of the world’s tropical rainforests and 36% of its tropical peatlands.

Tropical peatlands are wet and swampy forested environments with soil that can hold up to 20 times more carbon than other types of mineral soil. It is estimated that Indonesia’s peatlands hold around 28bn tonnes of carbon – the equivalent of nearly three years of global fossil fuel emissions.

A Bornean Orangutan feeds on aquatic plants in Tanjung Puting National Park, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. Credit: Rosanne Tackaberry / Alamy Stock Photo.

Indonesia also accounts for 53% of the world’s palm-oil cultivation, a product ubiquitous in packaged food, fuels and cosmetics. It is the country’s third most profitable export after coal and petroleum, and the industry employs an estimated 3.7 million people.

The thirst for palm oil has transformed the country’s landscape. From 2000 to 2015, Indonesia lost an average of 498,000 hectares of forest each year – making it the world’s second biggest deforester after Brazil.

Much of this past deforestation involved “slash and burn” clearing, which has played a large role in driving polluting megafires across the country’s peatlands. When fires rip across peatlands, much of their vast stores of carbon are released into the atmosphere.

The practice of draining peatlands has also heightened the risk of megafires. In order to grow palm oil and other crops, such as timber, peatlands are often drained of their natural moisture – leaving them dry and more likely to catch alight.

In 2015, the number of peatland fires spiked – causing greenhouse gas release on the same scale as Brazil’s total annual emissions. On some days, Indonesia’s fire emissions alone were higher than those from the entire US economy. (The fires in 2015 were fanned further by hot dry conditions as a result of the natural climate phenomenon El Niño.)

The smoke from the fires led to 19 deaths and caused up to half a million people to suffer from respiratory illness, the Guardian reported at the time.

A soldier tries to extinguish a peatland fire in South Sumatra, Indonesia, 12 September 2015. Credit: Xinhua / Alamy Stock Photo.

That year, changes to land-use, peatlands and forests accounted for 79% of Indonesia’s total greenhouse gas emissions.

In the wake of the deadly haze, Widodo announced a nationwide moratorium on the draining of Indonesia’s peatlands. He later set up the Peatlands Restoration Agency and tasked it with restoring 2m hectares of tropical peatlands by 2020.

From 2016 to 2017, forest loss in Indonesia fell by 60% – in part due to the moratorium, analysts say.

In September 2018, Widodo issued a presidential instruction to place a moratorium on new permits for palm plantations for three years.

However, “threats remain”, analysts say. More than a quarter of the peatlands put under protection in 2015 had already been auctioned off to palm oil and timber firms. To compensate these companies, the government is operating a “land swap” scheme, offering firms access to unprotected land. Some groups warn this could clear the way for more deforestation.

This year, the European Union tightened its rules on biofuels in an attempt to limit the use of palm oil linked to deforestation – a move that was bitterly opposed by Indonesian ministers.

A recent investigation by Unearthed uncovered evidence suggesting that Indonesian ministers had tried to pressurise European countries, including the UK, into opposing the rule change. The investigation also found that, in 2016, France scrapped a proposed tax on unsustainable supplies of palm oil after being warned it could lead to the execution of a French citizen in Indonesia.

Coal

Indonesia is the world’s fifth largest producer of coal and is home to the world’s 10th largest coal reserves, according to the latest BP Statistical Review of World Energy.

Around 80% of Indonesia’s coal is exported, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). From 2000 to 2014, Indonesia’s coal exports quadrupled, Carbon Brief analysis shows.

In 2017, Indonesia overtook Australia to become the world’s largest exporter of thermal coal, which is used for power generation, according to the IEA.

China is the primary buyer of Indonesian coal and received 31% of its exports in 2017, says the IEA. Other key customers include India, Japan and South Korea.

Coal mining has many environmental impacts in Indonesia. For example, the shipping of mined coal from Kalimantan has destroyed “hundreds of square metres” of tropical coral reefs, according to Greenpeace.

Around 58% of Indonesia’s electricity was generated by coal in 2017. This is shown on the chart below (black area).

The country ranks 10th in the world for total coal capacity (29,307 megawatts), but fifth for planned capacity (24,691MW).

However, it is worth noting that Indonesia has repeatedly scaled back its planned coal capacity. In 2015, Indonesia had plans for 45,000MW of new coal. This figure later fell to 34,000MW in 2018 and again to around 25,000MW this year, according to data from Global Energy Monitor.

In its latest report on the global coal market, the IEA identifies Indonesia as a major driver of rising demand over the next five years. It says demand for coal-fired power in the country is likely to increase as a result of “robust economic growth, a rising population and an expanding middle class”.

In 2015, Widodo unveiled an ambitious plan to develop 35,000MW of new power by 2019 – in part to address the “electrification gap” between the country’s wealthy islands, such as Bali, Java and Sumatra, and its smaller, more isolated islands. (The target was later pushed back to 2024.)

The government sees coal-fired power as a “cheap and easy” way to help meet its target, according to the Financial Times.

(However, analysis by Carbon Tracker found it could become cheaper to build new renewables than new coal between 2020 and 2022, with new renewables becoming cheaper than existing coal by 2028.)

In March 2018, officials capped the price of domestic coal for power stations for two years – a move intended to help keep electricity prices low around the time of this year’s election, analysts say.

Coal has not been a major talking point in Widodo’s campaign for reelection, according to Mongabay. However, his rival Prabowo has called for coal use to be slashed and replaced with renewables, according to the Jakarta Post.

Renewables

Just 5% of Indonesia’s electricity came from renewables in 2017 – the vast majority of this from geothermal sources. However, the government has pledged to source 23% of its power from renewables by 2025 and 31% by 2050.

Indonesia is the world’s second largest producer of geothermal power after the US.

The country has installed 1,925MW of geothermal power. However, its untapped geothermal resources are estimated to total 29,000MW – 40% of the world’s total geothermal reserves.

A Buddhist monk sits in front of the Kawah Ijen volcanic crater as sulphur gases are released, east Java, Indonesia. Credit: Malgorzata Drewniak / Alamy Stock Photo.

Indonesia is a hotspot for geothermal resources because of its volcanic activity. It sits on the Pacific Ring of Fire and is home to 139 volcanoes, according to the Global Volcanism Program.

The country aims to have 7,200MW of geothermal energy by 2025, which would make it the biggest geothermal producer in the world.

Widodo opened the country’s first wind power farm in July 2018. The Sidrap Wind Farm, the largest of its kind in southeast Asia, produces 75MW of electricity and supplies power to Sulawesi, an island east of Borneo. A second 72MW wind farm is currently under construction on the island.

Indonesia’s president, Joko Widodo, inaugurates Sidrap Wind Farm in South Sulawesi, 2 July 2018. Credit: Yermia Riezky Santiago / Alamy Stock Photo.

The country currently has just 16MW of solar power, according to statistics from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).

However, the government aims to have 6,400MW of solar and 1,800MW of wind by 2025, according to a report from IRENA.

Yet Indonesia “could feasibly exceed its current goals and deploy even more renewables”, the report says. If policies were adjusted, Indonesia could achieve its 2050 renewables target by 2030, it concludes.

The analysis notes that the potential of solar power is particularly underestimated by current government policy. With new policies and investment, solar has the potential to “provide electricity to nearly 1.1m households in remote areas that currently lack adequate access to electricity”, it says.

Climate laws

Indonesia’s legal system is based on Roman-Dutch law, custom and Islamic law.  A wide range of legislation is produced and exists in a hierarchy. This hierarchy is as follows (in order of importance): the 1945 constitution; MPR resolution; law; government regulation substituting a law; government regulation; presidential decree; regional regulation.

Much of Indonesia’s climate-related legislation is directed towards tackling emissions from the forest sector. Such laws, discussed in more detail above, include moratoriums on the draining of peatlands and the conversion of primary rainforest.

In September 2018, Widodo issued a presidential decree to place a moratorium on new permits for palm plantations for three years.

The energy sector is also subject to climate-related regulations. The government issued a regulation in 2014 which contained a pledge to source 23% of its power from renewables by 2025 and 31% by 2050 – up from 5% today.

Indonesia has targets to improve energy efficiency. Its National Master Plan for Energy Conservation (RIKEN) sets a goal of decreasing energy intensity by 1% annually until 2025.

In October 2017, the government announced a new initiative aimed at incorporating climate action into the country’s development agenda. (The country has four separate five-year development plans spanning the period 2005-2025).

The country’s National Medium Term Development Plan for 2015-19 says that a “green economy” should be at the foundation of Indonesia’s development.

This plan targets the eradication of illegal logging, fishing and mining and increased participation of local people in forest management. It also sets out aims to increase vulnerable communities’ resilience to climate change impacts.

It specifically targets emissions cuts from five “priority sectors”, including forestry and peatlands, agriculture, energy and transportation, industrial and waste.

On 25 March 2019, the government launched a report looking at how climate action can be incorporated into the country’s development plan for 2020-25.

The report finds that a “low carbon” development pathway could drive a GDP growth rate of 6% a year until 2045, higher than the rate expected under a “business-as-usual” pathway. This path could also cut emissions by 43% by 2030, when compared to “business-as-usual” – exceeding the country’s current national climate targets.

Climate finance

Indonesia has pledged to cut its emissions by 29-41% by 2030, in comparison to “business as usual” – but the top end of this pledge is conditional on “support from international cooperation”.

The pledge did not, however, specify how much aid it would need to reach the upper end of its target. A separate government document published at the time reported that meeting the country’s renewable energy target alone would cost $108bn.

Indonesia is a major emerging market economy, but its population faces steep financial inequality. A report by Oxfam in 2017 found Indonesia’s four richest men now have more wealth than 100 million of the country’s poorest people.

Analysis by Carbon Brief suggests that Indonesia is the world’s sixth largest recipient of climate finance, having received an average of $952m a year from 2015-16.

Further Carbon Brief analysis shows that, by 2016, Indonesia had been awarded $362m in investment from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Climate Investments Fund (CIF).

Notable schemes financed by the multilateral climate funds include a $150m project to develop private sector geothermal energy and $18m for a community-led project to tackle forest degradation.

Impacts and adaptation

As a highly populous nation spread across a chain of tropical islands, Indonesia is considered to be highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

Sea level rise threatens the 42 million people who live less than 10m above sea level in Indonesia. A one-metre rise in sea levels could inundate 405,000 hectares of Indonesia’s coastal land and cause low-lying islands to disappear.

The country’s capital, Jakarta – which is home to 10 million people – is acutely threatened by sea level rise and has been described as the “fastest sinking city” on Earth. The threat of sea level rise has been compounded in the city by illegal well digging, which is causing the ground to plummet.

Flooding in Jakarta, Indonesia, 10 February 2015. Credit: Dani Daniar / Alamy Stock Photo.

Increased rainfall is projected for most of Indonesia’s islands, except for its southern islands, including Java, where it is projected to decline by up to 15%.

Rainfall increases and decreases could boost the risk of flash flooding and droughts, respectively. Indonesia’s megacities are particularly vulnerable to flash flooding, which can trigger devastating landslides.

The timing of the country’s annual monsoon could also be impacted by climate change. Research suggests the risk of a 30-day delay to the monsoon could reach 40% by 2050, compared to 18% today. This could have large consequences for agricultural production.

Carbon Brief analysis finds that average temperatures on Indonesia’s islands have already risen by around 1.2-1.5C since the start of the industrial era.

Increased temperatures – in addition to changes in the natural climate phenomenon El Niño – could further raise the risk posed by forest fires. As well as accelerating climate change, fires pose a risk to Indonesia’s biodiversity. Indonesia is home to 12% of the world’s mammal species, 16% of its reptile species and 17% of its bird species.

Male Lesser Bird-of-paradise in courtship display, Papua, Indonesia. Credit: Gabbro / Alamy Stock Photo.

Indonesia launched its National Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation (RAN-API) in 2012. In the foreword of the report, Endah Murniningtyas, former deputy minister for natural resources and environmental affairs, wrote:

“As the largest archipelago nation in the world, Indonesia is one of the countries that are most vulnerable to climate change.”

The report outlines a plan to improve Indonesia’s resilience to climate change, namely by taking measures to improve energy and food security and to boost the resilience of its forest ecosystems. The report also identifies small islands, coastal regions and cities as “special areas” that most require stronger adaptation measures.

The post The Carbon Brief Profile: Indonesia appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Nearly one billion people could face “their first exposure” to a host of mosquito-borne diseases by 2080 under extreme global warming, a study finds.

Countries in Europe, including the UK, would be the most affected by the influence of extreme warming on diseases such as dengue fever, Zika and chikungunya, the research says.

Meeting the Paris Agreement’s target of limiting warming to below 2C could greatly stem the increase, the authors say. However, this would also shift the burden of disease from wealthy mid-latitude countries to the developing tropics.

The findings “point to a future world where a much larger proportion of the human population will be at risk of viruses borne by mosquitoes,” a scientist tells Carbon Brief.

Blood suckers

There are around 3,500 species of mosquito on Earth. The new study, published in PLOS Neglected Tropical Disease, focuses on two species that are particularly dangerous to humans: the yellow fever mosquito (Aedes aegypti) and the Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus).

Both mosquitoes carry viral diseases such as dengue fever, Zika, yellow fever and chikungunya – which they pass on to humans when feeding on their blood.

The insects are currently found throughout the tropics, including in central Africa, Asia and Latin America and, to a lesser extent, in the US and southern Europe.

Male yellow fever mosquito (Aedes aegypti). Credit: João Burini / Alamy Stock Photo.

The research aims to estimate how the mosquitoes’ geographic range is likely to change with varying levels of future climate change. It also estimates how the seasonality of disease risk and the overall number of people exposed could change.

To do this, the authors used modelling to simulate how the risk of disease transmission could change under four scenarios of future climate change, known as the “Representative Concentration Pathways” (RCPs). These pathways range from a scenario where the world meets the Paris target of limiting warming to “well below” 2C (“RCP2.6”), to a scenario with no climate action where future global warming could reach 5C (“RCP8.5”).

The model not only considers how warming could impact disease transmission, but also a range of mosquito traits. For example, the model considers how warming could affect the rate at which mosquitoes reproduce. (Female mosquitoes only seek human blood when they have developing eggs.)

The simulations assumed that the future world population remains at around 2015 levels, Ryan says:

“We wanted to keep a consistent denominator in our calculations. This provides almost a ‘conservative’ estimate – because it’s not including inflated numbers due to growth.”

First time risk

The results show that, under the most extreme scenario of future climate change, almost one billion people could be exposed to mosquito-borne diseases for the first time by 2080.

The chart below shows the top 10 regions where people could face a new risk from viral diseases borne by the yellow fever mosquito (left) and the Asian tiger mosquito (right).

The number of people exposed to mosquito-borne diseases for the first time by 2080 is likely to be highest in Europe, says lead author Prof Sadie Ryan, a researcher of medical geography from the University of Florida. She tells Carbon Brief:

“We will see the largest numbers of new exposures to Aedes borne disease risk in Europe, followed by East Africa. Although we do, sadly, associate tropical febrile [feverish] diseases with East Africa already – focusing largely on malaria – we really don’t associate most of Europe with them.”

Parts of the UK could face disease risk for the first time if climate change is extremely high, she says:

“Southern England will attain sufficient numbers of months of suitable temperatures under the worst-case scenario for both mosquito species. This suggests that a population of these mosquitoes could persist locally for a few months of the year, capable of transmitting viruses, setting the stage for possible introductions and outbreaks. This scenario is similar to current-day Italy, which has seen outbreaks of Chikungunya, vectored by A. albopictus mosquitoes.”

The maps below show the current geographic range of both mosquito species (top) and how these ranges are likely to change by 2050 (middle) and 2080 (bottom) under extreme warming. On the maps, colour is used to indicate the number of months in a year with disease transmission risk.

Geographic distribution of the yellow fever mosquito (A. aegypti) and the Asian tiger mosquito (A. albopictus) in present day (top) and in 2050 (middle) and 2080 (bottom) under a scenario of extreme climate change. Colour is used to indicate the number of months in a year with disease transmission risk and grey indicates absence of risk. Source: Ryan et al. (2019)

The maps show how a new risk could emerge in southern England, parts of Scandinavia and Canada as the world warms. However, the risk of disease transmission from the Asian tiger mosquito appears to shrink in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

This is because these regions could become too hot for the Asian tiger mosquito, which can tolerate temperatures up to 29.4C, the authors say. (The yellow fever mosquito can tolerate temperatures up to 34C, they add.)

Target turmoil

Though the results suggest the worst-case climate scenario would lead to the largest increase in people exposed to mosquito-borne diseases, the findings for the other scenarios are less straightforward.

The charts below show the projected net changes to the number of people exposed to disease risk from the yellow fever mosquito (left) and the Asian tiger mosquito (right) under the four future climate change scenarios. Results are shown for 2050 (top) and 2080 (bottom).

Projected net changes to the number of people exposed to disease risk from the yellow fever mosquito (left) and the Asian tiger mosquito (right) under four future climate scenarios. Results are shown for 2050 (top) and 2080 (bottom). Source: Ryan et al. (2019)

The results show that limiting warming to below 2C (RCP2.6) could nearly halve the number of people exposed to disease risk from the yellow fever mosquito by 2080.

However, the number of people exposed to disease risk from the Asian tiger mosquito appears to be largest in “middle-of-the-road” scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6.0).

This reflects the fact, under moderate warming, the Asian tiger mosquito could expand polewards, but also remain a driver of disease in the tropics. The authors say:

“Because the upper thermal limit of A. albopictus transmission is relatively low (29.4C), the largest declines in transmission potential in western Africa and southeast Asia are expected with the largest extent of warming, while less severe warming could producer broader increases and more moderate declines in transmission potential.”

Infectious

The findings show that “climate change is a looming threat to global health and that mitigation is essential”, Ryan says:

“The sheer number of people newly at risk of potential viral transmission by these two mosquito species and their pathogens is heading for nearly a half a billion in the next few decades. However, this viral risk is but one of many climate change induced vulnerabilities we face as the whole of humanity.”

The research is “important”, but does not consider all of the factors important to mosquito survival, including the availability of potential breeding sites, says Prof Andy Morse, a climate impacts researcher from the University of Liverpool. (Earlier this month, Morse and colleagues published a paper finding that climate change could bring yellow fever mosquitoes to southern England.) He tells Carbon Brief:

“Because the model is only, it seems, thermally driven, it has transmission over many months of the year in desert areas where there is a lack of breeding sites and rainfall and on the whole few, if any, humans to infect. Exclusion of regions in the world where habitat or artificial breeding sites are not available is something that should have been addressed in the analysis.”

Despite its limitations, the research paper clearly shows that climate change will lead to the increased spread of mosquito-borne diseases, he adds:

“Even with its simplifications and possible omissions, I think this is an important paper that points to a future world where a much larger proportion of the human population will be at risk of viruses borne by mosquitoes. We can act now to protect our homes and communities from this threat through more careful management of potential breeding sites.”

The post Mosquito-borne diseases could reach extra ‘one billion people’ as climate warms appeared first on Carbon Brief.

An unprecedented spell of marine heat in Shark Bay, Australia, caused bottlenose dolphin numbers to decline for the following six years, a study finds.

Dolphin population numbers fell by up to 12% following the 2011 marine heatwave, says the research. The event also led to a decline in the number of dolphin calves being born.

Previous research has shown that marine heatwaves could become up to 41 times more likely by 2100 under a very high global-warming scenario.

The findings “suggest that the ecological consequences of extreme weather events may be too sudden or disruptive for even highly adaptable animals to respond,” the authors say.

Scorching seas

As with a heatwave on land, a marine heatwave is an extended period of unusually high temperatures.

Research suggests marine heatwaves have become 34% more likely over the past century, with rising global temperatures likely playing a key role in the increase.

In 2011, Shark Bay – a world heritage area in Western Australia famous for its seagrass meadows and unique wildlife – faced an unprecedented marine heatwave. For more than two months, coastal water temperatures soared to 2-4C above average, damaging around 36% of the region’s seagrass meadows. In some regions, almost 90% of seagrasses died.

The extreme heat also killed vast numbers of fish, including commercial populations of scallops and crabs.

The new research, published in Current Biology, explores how this ecological turmoil could have affected a species near the top of the food chain: the bottlenose dolphin.

From 2007-17, researchers monitored groups of dolphins living across a 1,500km area in the bay. The scientists took photographs of each dolphin, allowing them to be identified by their markings and the shape of their fins.

These continuous observations allowed the researchers to keep track of population numbers and the number of new calves being born – both before and after the 2011 event.

Nose dive

The results show that, in the six-year period after the event, dolphin numbers fell by up to 12%, when compared to the period before.

The long-term impact of the marine heatwave on dolphin survival was “surprising”, says study lead author Sonja Wild, a PhD student at the University of Leeds. She tells Carbon Brief:

“Given the disruptive nature of extreme climatic events, negative effects are not too unsurprising. What is surprising, though, is that the negative effects were ongoing even after several years.”

The researchers hypothesise that long-term decreases in dolphin survival are a result of the “catastrophic reduction in seagrass coverage, which shows little sign of recovery”. The loss of seagrass “appears to be responsible for preventing fish stock recovery”, the authors add, reducing the food available to the dolphins.

The results also suggest the number of dolphin calves being born was “significantly higher” before the heatwave. The chart below shows the average number of calves born each year both before and after the heatwave.

Average number of dolphin calves born in Shark Bay, Australia per year before and after the 2011 marine heatwave (controlled for number of known mothers observed each field season). Grey shading shows the spread of the results and whiskers show uncertainty. Source: Wild et al. (2019)

A lack of fish prey after the heatwave could have led to “increased rates of abortion during pregnancy or increased neonatal pregnancy”, the authors say. In addition, lower food availability could have led to “suppressed ovulation or delayed sexual maturity” for some dolphins.

Sponging success

Tracking each dolphin individually also allowed the researchers to work out if some dolphins were more resilient to the impacts of the heatwave than others.

In Shark Bay, some dolphins are “spongers”. These individuals carry marine sponges on their rostrums, or beaks, when they dive for deep-sea fish. Researchers suspect that the sponges protect the animals’ beaks from sharp coral and stingray barbs, much like a glove protects a human hand.

Bottlenose dolphin swimming with marine sponge. Credit: Hubert Yann / Alamy Stock Photo.

In this analysis, around 12% of the dolphins observed were spongers, while the rest were “non-spongers”.

The researchers found that while numbers of non-spongers fell by 12% following the heatwave, numbers of spongers fell by a smaller 6%. This is further illustrated on the chart below, which shows the chances of survival (0.75-1) for spongers and non-spongers both before and after the heatwave.

Survival chances for “sponger” and “non-sponger” dolphins following the 2011 heatwave in Shark Bay, Australia. Source: Wild et al. (2019)

Spongers may have had a higher chance of survival because they are able to fish in the deep sea – meaning they may have been less affected by the reduction in fish availability near seagrasses, the authors say.

However, it is unlikely that sponging will provide dolphins with protection against climate change, Wild says:

“In a sense, these sponging dolphins just got lucky in that their foraging niche [the deep sea] wasn’t as badly affected. Therefore, we do not believe that sponge tool use protects against climatic events in general.”

(Research covered in February by Carbon Brief found global fish stocks have dropped by an average of 4% since the 1930s as a result of ocean warming.)

The long-lasting impact of the 2011 event on dolphin survival “suggests that the ecological consequences of extreme weather events may be too sudden or disruptive for even highly adaptable animals to respond,” the authors say.

Dolphins are thought to be highly adaptable because they show high levels of “behavioural plasticity” – an ability to alter their behaviour in response to changing environmental conditions, Wild says. But that adaptation is only possible “if the changes are slow enough”, she says.

The findings show “even single extreme climatic events can have long-term negative impacts on entire ecosystems”, she adds:

“This is alarming, since such extreme events are occurring more frequently with global climate change.”

The post Bottlenose dolphin numbers declined by ‘12%’ following marine heatwave appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Dr Antoni G. Lewkowicz is a professor in the department of geography, environment and geomatics at the University of Ottawa. He is president of the Canadian Permafrost Association and a former president of the International Permafrost Association.

One of the principal concerns of a warming Arctic is the thawing of carbon-rich permafrost, which could release CO2 and methane into the atmosphere and accelerate climate change.

However, the thawing of these perennially frozen soils also risks making a mark on the land surface itself, causing landslides known as “retrogressive thaw slumps”.

When I first studied retrogressive thaw slumps on Banks Island in the Canadian Arctic in the 1980s, global climate models were in their infancy and the magnitude of human-caused climate warming was still being understood.

We now have a much better idea of the scale of future warming and its amplification in the Arctic. And in our new study, published in Nature Communications, my co-author Dr Robert Way and I show how warmer summers are causing more landslides, which is having a profound impact on the Arctic landscape and ecosystem.

Landslides

A retrogressive thaw slump (RTS) is a landslide that can occur only in permafrost areas. It develops when the ice within the soil melts rapidly, leaving the soil weakened and unstable. Where this happens on a slope, the instability can result in a landslide.

We call these landslides “retrogressive” because the headscarp – the steep exposed soil face at the top of the landslide – progressively retreats upslope after the initial slumping. They are “thaw” slumps because they are caused by the thawing of ice in the permafrost. And they are “slumps” because that’s the term most commonly used for bowl-shaped landslides.

An RTS resembles a sand pit dug out of a slope, with melting ice present around its upper edge, which constantly collapses. Mud and water then collects in the bottom of the landslide “pit”, making a mud slurry that eventually flows away into rivers, lakes or the ocean. Once started, an RTS can remain active and grow in size for many years as the headscarp progressively moves upslope. The video below shows this in action.

Back in the early 1980s, the focus of my research was on understanding environmental controls on the enlargement of RTSs, which represent some of the most rapidly developing geomorphic features affecting permafrost areas.

In the field, my colleagues and I measured the rate of retreat of the headscarp – which can be up to 15 metres in a year – as well as the energy melting the ice, which comes mostly from direct sunlight, but also heat transfer from warm air. We also mapped how many RTSs were present near our camp along the southwest coast of Banks Island.

While we were investigating one tiny corner of the Canadian Arctic, in the skies overhead, satellites such as Landsat 4 and 5 silently collected images of Banks Island and the rest of the world.

In late 2016, a small part of the wealth of satellite images collected were assembled into the “Google Earth Engine Timelapse” dataset. This is a “global, zoomable video that lets you see how the Earth has changed over the past 32 years”, explains Google. It is composed of a mosaic of more than five million satellite images, providing one cloud-free image per year for each location on land from 1984-2016.

One of the benefits of using this dataset is that landscape change can be looked at on a computer screen as a timelapse movie without specialised software or hardware. You can try the Timelapse viewer below, which shows a section of the eastern coastline of Banks Island.

Observations

Around the same time, several papers were published that showed numbers of RTSs had increased on Banks Island as well as in other parts of the western Canadian Arctic. However, these studies were based on specific timeslices corresponding to the images available, so the links to climate were not entirely clear.

Shortly after the Timelapse dataset was published, I gave undergraduates at the University of Ottawa a class assignment to use it to observe and record visible changes to the landscape of Banks Island.

The observations, though not always comprehensive, were staggering. Parts of the island were changing dramatically due to RTS development.

After redoing and verifying the observations, it turned out that in 1984 when I was in the field, only 63 RTSs were active on the entire island and 10 of those were near our camp. By 2013, there were more than 4,000 on the island – a 60-fold increase. The area covered by active RTSs grew from one square kilometre (sq km) to 60 sq km in 2015 – the area of the Island of Manhattan – and was increasing by five sq km per year.

Retrogressive thaw slump in the 2014 study area on Forsheim Peninsula, Ellesmere Island, Canada. Credit: UBC Micrometeorology (CC BY 4.0).

More than 250 lakes also changed colour due to sediment being deposited into the water – resulting in some river valleys being visibly choked with sediment. These changes to the land surface and the loss of ice associated with the slumping are irreversible.

Long-term consequences

Our analyses allowed us not only to evaluate the increase in the number and area of RTSs – but also when the increases occurred.

More than 85% of these slumps became visible after four particularly warm summers: 1998, 2010, 2011 and 2012. You can see this in the chart below, which shows the number of active RTSs in the northern (purple line), central (blue) and southern (red) zones of Banks Island since 1984.

Total active retrogressive thaw slumps in northern (purple line), central (blue) and southern (red) zones of Banks Island. Inset map shows the boundaries of the three zones, the location of the three climate stations, and retrogressive thaw slumps first observed in 2012 (red dots). Source: Lewkowicz & Way (2019)

We were also able to calculate the longevity of RTSs and found that half of them remain active for 30 years or more, meaning that a single event has long-term consequences.

Our research showed that it was possible to predict the initiation rate of slumps using a combination of the weighted average of the previous and current year’s July-August air temperature. This allowed us to “hindcast” past activity in the 20th century – which was largely very low – and forecast future activity using the “RCP4.5” moderate global warming scenario.

Our model simulations suggest that more than 10,000 RTSs will be initiated per decade by 2076. You can see this in the chart below, which shows hindcasts for the 20th century and projections for the 21st. Estimates are shown as black squares with error bars showing the range of uncertainty. The red squares show the observed estimates made using the Google Timelapse images.

Modelled decadal retrogressive thaw slump initiation rates for Banks Island (1906-2015) and multimodel average projections under RCP4.5 (2016-2095). Red squares are observations based on the Timelapse data. Error bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. Source: Lewkowicz & Way (2019)

Ecological impacts

Despite the advances we have made, an important question remains regarding RTSs – what is the significance of the increase in thaw slumps for the wider environment other than terrain change?

In terms of ecological impacts, we don’t have a clear answer from our study because there is little baseline data on aquatic ecosystems on Banks Island.

Elsewhere, concentrations of RTSs have been linked to changes in river chemistry, including the release of mercury. We also know that thaw slumps export organic material that was previously frozen in the permafrost. Its subsequent breakdown by bacteria to form CO2 or methane is expected to contribute additional greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.

Aulavik National Park, northern Banks Island, Canada. Credit: All Canada Photos / Alamy Stock Photo.

It is important to underline that not all the Arctic will react like our study area, and indeed there are big spatial differences in RTS distribution even on Banks Island.

The triggering of RTS can occur only where permafrost contains large amounts of ice close to the land surface and, fortunately, this is not the case everywhere. In fact, analysis of changes from 1999-2015 in large transects in Siberia, eastern Canada and Alaska revealed only a fraction of the RTS concentrations that we observed.

However, we also know that Banks Island is not unique. The undergraduate class this past semester used Timelapse data to examine northwest Victoria Island and again found hundreds of new RTSs. Furthermore, we showed in our study that summer warmth spread farther northwards on Banks Island in the 2010-2012 period compared to 1998 – causing entirely new concentrations of RTS to develop in the same region.

We, therefore, infer that there may be colder regions in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago that will develop RTSs in the future as the climate warms.

During my working lifetime, parts of Banks Island have changed dramatically. Our projections show that my younger colleagues and students will see even more change during their careers.

We’ve added to the evidence that even areas of cold permafrost are vulnerable to climate warming, and demonstrated in particular the importance of extreme summer temperatures. Our conclusion is that this part of the Arctic will never again be the way it was just two decades ago.

The post Guest post: Arctic warming is causing a 60-fold increase in permafrost landslides appeared first on Carbon Brief.

In the seventh article of a series on how key emitters are responding to climate change, Carbon Brief looks at Australia’s complex climate politics and rising fossil fuel exports.

Climate change is a top tier political issue in Australia. Debates over climate and energy policy have triggered several of the numerous changes of prime minister in recent years.

Australia had the world’s 15th largest greenhouse gas emissions in 2015 and its citizens’ per-capita contribution is around three times the global average.

It is the world’s second largest coal exporter and recently became the top exporter of liquified natural gas (LNG). Its electricity system remains heavily reliant on coal, despite ramping up the use of gas and renewables, especially rooftop solar.

It is also highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including extreme heat, drought, bushfires and agricultural impacts.

Based on its current trajectory, Australia is off track on its international pledge to cut emissions 26-28% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels.

Opinion polls suggest the opposition Labor party will win the upcoming federal election, expected in May.

Politics

Australia’s economy ranks 13th globally in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), just after Russia and South Korea. Its population sits at 25 million – 53rd in the world – and is projected to increase to 33 million by 2050.

The country has recently witnessed political turbulence, with five changes of prime minister over the past decade. The current government has been in power since 2013 and is formed of a longtime alliance between the right-leaning Liberal and National parties (L/NP), together known as the “Coalition”.

The Liberal prime minister Scott Morrison has held office since August 2018. He was preceded by Malcolm Turnbull from 2015-2018 and Tony Abbott from 2013-2015, both Liberals. The left-leaning Labor party (ALP) was in power from 2007 to 2013 under Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard.

The country will return to the polls this year. The date is flexible, but widely expected to be in May. Opinion polls generally show a projected win for Labor, now led by Bill Shorten.

Climate change policy has a long and complex history in Australia and has been highly politicised. Some polls show it as a top issue among voters in the federal election. Tens of thousands of Australian schoolchildren recently joined the global school climate strikes.

Around 58% of Australians consider climate change a “major threat” to their country, second only to the 59% who considered ISIS a major threat, according to a 2017 poll from the Pew Research Centre. Another 2018 survey from the Australia Institute thinktank found 60% want coal-fired power to be phased out within 20 years. The same survey found 73% of people are concerned about climate change, a five-year high.

Stop the Adani Carmichael coal mine protest outside Bill Shorten’s Moonee Ponds office, 3 October 2017. Credit: Julian Meehan / (CC BY-SA 4.0).

Lobbyists and the media are also strong political players in Australia. The mining lobby spent around AUS$5m (£2.7m) last year on political campaigning, compared to AUS$183k (£99k) by environmental NGOs. Australia’s media landscape is among the most concentrated in the world. The two main newspaper firms – the more conservative News Corp and more progressive Fairfax Media – are strongly polarised politically, according to the 2018 Digital News Report, including on climate.

Australia has never hosted a meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In 1998 it signed the Kyoto Protocol, which committed developed country signatories to emission reduction targets. But Australia did not ratify this until 2007, following the election of a Labor government. It ratified the Paris Agreement on 9 November 2016.

Paris pledge

Australia’s annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions stood at 550m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2015 including land-use and forestry (LULUCF), according to data compiled by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). (See “note on infographic” at the end of this article for details of this data. Note that LULUCF emissions were negative in 2015).

Emissions excluding LULUCF have almost doubled since 1970. They peaked at 700MtCO2e in 2011 and stood at 630MtCO2e in 2016.

In August 2015, Australia submitted its climate pledge towards the Paris climate talks. This “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) came under Liberal prime minister Tony Abbott.

The pledge promised a 26-28% emissions reduction by 2030 compared to 2005 levels, including land use. This is equivalent to a 22–25% cut below 1990 levels including land use, but a 3-6% rise when land-use emissions are excluded. This sector is a net sink in Australia.

The pledge says the target is “comparable to the targets of other advanced economies” and that Australia will achieve the upper 28% of its target “should circumstances allow”. It adds:

“This effort takes account of Australia’s unique national circumstances, including a growing population and economy, role as a leading global resources provider, our current energy infrastructure, and higher than average abatement costs.”

The government’s independent advisors, the Climate Change Authority (CCA), had previously recommended a target of a 40-60% cut in emissions by 2030 compared to 2000 levels. Australia’s pledge represents only a 19-22% cut on emissions in 2000.

The main policy outlined in Australia’s climate pledge was its Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) (see more in the next section) and a scheme to source 23% of electricity from renewables by 2020.

Several post-2020 policies were under development, it said, including a plan for a 40% improvement in energy productivity – the amount of energy needed to generate each unit of GDP – between 2015 and 2030.

Australia’s per-capita emissions stood at 23tCO2e in 2015, according to PIK and World Bank data, around nine times those of India and more than three times the world average of 7tCO2e.

Australia says its pledge represents a 50-52% cut in per-capita emissions by 2030, compared to 2005 levels. The 28% by 2030 pledge would see per-capita emissions fall to 16tCO2e in 2030, from 31tCO2e in 2005, according to PIK data and UN population projections.

The pledge is rated as “insufficient” by Climate Action Tracker (CAT), an independent analysis by three research organisations. “If all government targets were within this range, warming would reach over 2C and up to 3C,” it says.

There is disagreement over whether Australia is on track to meet its climate targets.

According to CAT, a current lack of policies means it will not meet the targets within its pledge and is actually on a trajectory in line with 3-4C warming. CAT adds:

“To meet its ‘insufficient’ 2030 emissions targets, Australian emissions should decrease by an annual rate of 1.5-1.7% until 2030; instead, with current policies, they are set to increase by an annual rate of around 0.3% per year.”

Climate Transparency, a research and NGO partnership, also says Australia’s GHG trajectory and NDC target are not compatible with the Paris goals. Policy is failing to address the need for structural change, with effective policies missing in every sector, it says.

In contrast, a recent analysis from the Australian National University finds the Paris target will be met five years early, though its findings are disputed. In December 2017, a government review said Australia was “on track” to meet its target.

Scott Morrison (right), Australia’s prime minister, arrives at the G20 in Argentina in 2018. Credit: G20 Argentina Flickr.

Critics say these assessments use “creative accounting” and take credit for a large decline in deforestation that happened before the Paris Agreement was signed. Australia is also trying to carry forward credit for overachieving on its Kyoto targets, using the surplus to meet its Paris goals. The final rules on whether this should be allowed have yet to be decided.

Similar issues cloud Australia’s progress on its earlier climate pledges and goals.

As part of the 2009 Copenhagen accord, the country pledged a voluntary 5% reduction on 2000 levels by 2020, rising to a 15-25% reduction, if the world struck a strong climate deal. The CCA has said these stronger conditions have been met and recommended a 15% target, saying a 5% target is not “a credible start”. The government has stuck to the 5% pledge.

In 2010, the country pledged to reduce emissions 0.5% below 1990 levels by 2020 as part of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The 5% Copenhagen pledge was used to calculate this legally binding target, which takes the form of a cumulative emissions budget. Australia is on track to meet the target, helped by the use of “flexibility mechanisms” and carry-over from the first Kyoto commitment period.

Australia is part of the Umbrella Group informal negotiating bloc at international climate talks, which is mainly made up of rich countries from several continents. The group has often been characterised as less enthusiastic towards international climate cooperation than other developed countries.

Australia is also part of the Cartagena Dialogue, an informal discussion group of countries that say they are committed to becoming low-carbon.

It is one of the worst-performing countries both for national climate policy and for hindering progress in international negotiations, according to a recent NGO performance index. This ranked Australia 55th out of 60 countries.

Climate policy

Over  the past decade, several flagship climate policies have been announced and then adjusted or cancelled, including a scrapped economy-wide carbon tax. The current policy void means the next government could make a large difference to Australia’s emissions.

In August 2018, Malcolm Turnbull removed an emissions reduction target for the power industry from his main proposed energy policy – the national energy guarantee (NEG) – due to pressure from his party’s rightwing. This same group later ousted him as prime minister, with Scott Morrison taking the helm and dropping the NEG altogether.

Greenpeace protesters suspend a banner from Parliament House, depicting prime minister Scott Morrison, holding a piece of coal. Canberra, Australia, 10 September 2018. Credit: Sam Nerrie / Alamy Stock Photo.

The “centrepiece” of government emissions reduction efforts is now the ERF, previously called the Direct Action Plan. This uses a reverse auction to award contracts for emissions cuts. Contracts go to the cheapest bids from businesses, local councils, state governments and farmers.

There are ongoing concerns over the ERF, including its cost to the taxpayer, ability to deliver promised emissions cuts and the additionality and permanence of any reductions.

Most ERF projects are in the land sector, though funding has also gone to new fossil fuel projects considered cleaner than the activities they replace. The Clean Energy Regulator, which runs the fund, last year cancelled AUS$24m (£13m) of contracts that had failed to deliver.

The scheme will need to contribute “less of Australia’s emissions reduction task over time”, according to a 2017 review by the CCA. “[O]ther policies will need to take up the challenge of decarbonising Australia’s economy and deliver structural change”, it said, though the ERF should be “built on as part of the policy tool kit” to meet Australia’s Paris goals.

Morrison has rebranded the ERF as the “Climate Solutions Fund” and promised it an extra AUS$2bn (£1.1bn), as part of a AUS$3.5bn (£1.9bn) “Climate Solutions Package”. The pledge has been criticised for falling far short of what is needed to tackle Australia’s emissions, particularly due to the shortage of projects in the emissions-intensive power and industry sectors. Announcing the funding in February, Morrison said:

“Our government will take, and is taking, meaningful, practical, sensible, responsible action on climate change without damaging our economy or your family budget.”

In its latest budget, published earlier this month, the Morrison government said this new AUS$2bn of funding would need to last for 15 years, instead of 10 as initially proposed.

The opposition Labor party’s climate change plan would raise Australia’s emissions reduction target for 2030 from a 26-28% to a 45% cut on 2005 levels. Labor leader Bill Shorten has called climate change “a disaster”. His party would bring in a new emissions trading scheme and target “net zero pollution” by 2050.

In an effort to create cross-party consensus, Labor still supports the NEG and its emissions reduction mechanism, both dropped by the Liberals. The party would also raise the emissions reduction target.

In the event this compromise fails, Labor has outlined a AUS$15bn (£8bn) plan to cut emissions in the energy system. Of this, AUS$10bn (£5.4bn) will go to the government-owned green bank Labor established in 2012, including for a AUS$1bn (£540m) plan to begin exporting hydrogen. It recently ruled out taxpayer support for new coal power plants.

Australia’s Green party – which could hold the balance of power in the senate after the elections – has also announced a host of climate policies. These include 100% renewable electricity by 2030, bans on new fossil fuel extraction and a phaseout of coal exports by 2030, in favour of renewable exports such as “solar fuels”.

Regional climate ambition in Australia is generally far stronger than at the federal level. All states and territories, bar Western Australia, have strong renewable energy targets, net-zero emissions targets, or both. South Australia is targeting net-zero emissions by 2050.

Coal

In 2017, 61% of Australia’s electricity came from coal, as the chart below shows. However, coal power output has fallen from a peak in 2006, due to the rising use of gas and renewables. Around a third of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions come from the power sector.

As of January 2019, Australia has 24 gigawatts (GW) of operating coal plants, the world’s 11th largest fleet, according to the Global Coal Plant Tracker. It has been 10 years since a new coal power plant was commissioned and 9GW of planned capacity has been shelved or cancelled since 2010. There are currently no new coal plants in the pipeline. Nine coal power stations have been retired over the past five years in Australia, says CAT.

Much of Australia’s coal fleet is ageing, posing questions over where the country will source its electricity in future. The risk of summer blackouts – a major political issue – could grow as old coal plants become less reliable and higher temperatures increase peak demand.

The government is considering committing support for new coal power investment before the election, urged on by some factions of the ruling party. According to one assessment, Australia already has some of the world’s highest fossil fuel subsidies per capita.

Natural resources, including coal and metals such as iron ore, uranium and gold, are a major part of Australia’s economy. They account for 8% of GDP and 70% of exports.

Australia mined 500m tonnes of coal in 2017, making it the world’s fourth largest producer after China, India and the US, and just ahead of Indonesia. Mines are located mainly in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria.

Aerial view of an open-cut coal mine in Hunter Valley, New South Wales, Australia. Credit: redbrickstock.com / Alamy Stock Photo.

The Australian government expects its coal-mining activities to increase, leading to a rise in emissions in the sector. In particular, this is due to several “gassy” coal mines returning to full production after temporary declines, leading to increased fugitive methane emissions.

There has been widespread opposition to a new thermal coal mine in Queensland proposed by Indian energy giant Adani, including a series of legal challenges. Adani is now self-financing a smaller version of the project after numerous banks ruled out funding.

Last year, a New South Wales judge cited climate change impacts when ruling out another planned coal mine in the Hunter Valley.

Coal is this year set to become Australia’s most valuable export. The country only consumes a quarter of the coal it produces and is the world’s second largest exporter after Indonesia.

Coal exports were 379m tonnes in 2017-18, worth some US$64bn in earnings, and expected to grow. Japan, China and India are all significant destinations.

Renewables

Australia’s renewable capacity has increased rapidly over the past decade. By 2017, production from renewables other than hydro had more than tripled on 2007 levels, providing 10% of electricity.

Australia has one of the highest rooftop solar rates in the world: a fifth of all households have it installed, rising to a third in some states. It provides around 4% of Australia’s electricity.

Solar farms are also on the rise from an almost non-existent base five years ago. The country currently has more solar farms under construction than its total solar farm capacity. More than a million solar water heaters are installed on around an eighth of homes, while South Australia is set to build the world’s largest solar thermal plant.

Rooftop solar panels in South Australia. Credit: Andrey Moisseyev / Alamy Stock Photo.

Onshore wind capacity was 4.6GW in 2017, more than a third of which is in South Australia. This compares to 7.2GW for solar, of which 6.6GW is rooftop solar. Significantly more additions are planned for both. Australia has yet to approve its first offshore wind farm.

Australian renewable capacity had a record-breaking year in 2018. Around 10GW of new solar and wind capacity is expected to be installed during 2018 and 2019.

Hydropower provides around 5% of electricity generation, bringing the renewable total to 15%. Its output has remained relatively constant for decades, with its share in the electricity mix falling as other sources increase.

Australia’s largest hydro scheme, Snowy Hydro located in the south-east of the country, has a total capacity of 4GW, most of which was completed 45 years ago or more. A 2GW expansion, known as Snowy 2.0, was approved in December.

Gordon Dam, Southwest National Park, Tasmania. Credit: Tasmanian.Kris via Flickr.

The island state Tasmania produces around 90% of its electricity from hydro and exports to the mainland during peak demand via an interconnector. Hydro Tasmania has major plans for new pumped hydro storage and a second interconnector, as part of its “battery of the nation” scheme to double its renewable capacity to 5GW.

In 2009, Australia set a target for 20% of electricity to come from renewables by 2020, expanding an earlier renewables goal. Its scheme to achieve this requires high energy users to source a fixed proportion of electricity from renewable sources by buying certificates, with the value of the certificates decreasing each year.

A large-scale generation sub-target alone means 23.5% of generation will come from renewables in 2020, according to the government. Analysis indicates the overall 20% target has already been surpassed.

The current government has no plans to set a post-2020 target, however, despite being advised to do so by its chief scientist Alan Finkel in a 2017 review.

Around 70% of Australians back a higher renewable electricity target, according to a recent poll. Australia could reach 50% renewables in 2025 and 100% by the early 2030s if its current rate of expansion continued, analysis has found. The Labor party has promised to deliver 50% renewables by 2030, if it gets into power.

Several states have far stronger renewable targets. South Australia is on track to its goal of 75% renewable electricity by 2025 and there is public support for setting a “100% by 2030” target. Victoria and the Northern Territory are targeting 50% renewable electricity by 2030. Tasmania already regularly reaches 100% renewables generation.

In 2017, South Australia made headlines after Tesla built the world’s then-largest lithium ion battery in the state. The battery is expected to pay for itself within a few years and has been widely praised for boosting grid stability.

The battery was built after tornadoes caused statewide blackouts in 2016 by downing power lines and triggering overly-sensitive windfarm protections, which have since been modified.

Australia has never had any nuclear power due to longstanding bipartisan opposition. However, it has the world’s largest known uranium resources and is the third largest exporter of the material.

Oil and gas

Australia has widespread gas resources both on and offshore, particularly off the north-west coast. It also has high onshore unconventional gas resources.

A liquified natural gas carrier off the coast of Karratha, Western Australia. Credit: Jack Picone / Alamy Stock Photo.

It is one of the world’s largest exporters of liquefied natural gas (LNG), alongside Qatar, with seven operating LNG terminals and three more under construction. Western Australia alone accounts for 11% of global LNG capacity.

Domestic gas use has also risen in recent years. It met a quarter of the country’s energy needs in 2017, up from 16% in 1997. Some analysts say eastern states will need to start importing LNG to meet demand, even as other parts of the country increase exports.

The country aims to export 80Mt of LNG per year by 2020, up from 24Mt in 2013-14. This is expected to lead to a rise in Australia’s emissions due to electricity use in the plants that liquify LNG, as well as fugitive methane emissions during extraction.

Fugitive emissions from oil, gas and coal have risen 41% since 2005 and are expected to rise further by 2030. There are also concerns that these emissions could be underreported.

LNG production is currently the biggest driver of overall emissions growth in the country and is projected to offset all the savings achieved through Australia’s 2020 renewables target.

The current government and industry argue LNG exports cut emissions abroad by displacing coal, although the extent of this effect is disputed.

Oil use has increased by a quarter since 1997, though its proportion in the energy mix has stayed level at around a third. Australia’s oil reserves are an estimated 0.3% of the world total.

Petroleum production peaked in 2000, although exports are now increasing. Australia imports nearly all its oil and exports 75% of its own crude production. Last year, the government ordered a fuel security review after it was warned the country had only a few weeks of petrol, diesel and aviation fuel in its reserves.

Duke Energy lowering a pipeline as part of the Tasmania Natural Gas Project. Credit: Bill Bachman / Alamy Stock Photo.

Norwegian oil firm Equinor has plans for experimental oil drilling in the Great Australian Bight, a huge bay off the south coast of Australia. Critics argue the deepwater project would put pristine coastline and marine life at risk of an oil spill.

Australia’s export credit agency, Efic, has been criticised by NGOs for supporting fossil-fuel projects around the world. A bill to expand Efic’s powers is expected to pass in early April, potentially opening the door to even more fossil-fuel support.

Transport

Transport accounts for 14% of Australia’s emissions. The government expects the sector’s emissions to increase over the next decade. Unlike 80% of the global market, Australia has no mandatory fuel-efficiency standards. Previous proposals were cut down by the ruling coalition after lobbying from industry.

It also lags behind other countries in the rollout of electric vehicles (EVs). Just 2,300 were sold in 2017, according to Australia’s EV trade body, or 0.2% of total motor sales. There are small incentives for lower emissions cars.

A recent senate select committee report outlined options to increase EV uptake, including consideration of a national target. In February, the government released a one-page EV strategy that still lacks support measures, according to critics.

Labor recently proposed a national EV target of 50% new car sales by 2030, as well as fuel emissions standards for conventional vehicles.

Agriculture and forestry

Australia has large agricultural emissions, principally due to methane released from its large livestock population. The country has around 26m cows, 2.2m pigs and 65m sheep. Nitrous oxide released from fertilised soils is also a large contributor.

A herd of sheep on the Tin Horse Highway in Western Australia. Credit: Julie Mowbray / Alamy Stock Photo.

Agricultural emissions have remained relatively steady for several decades, but a 2013 government-commissioned report said this was likely to change. It projected an annual 1.2% increase up to 2050, driven by rising meat and crop exports. By 2030, emissions would have risen 10% on 2018 levels, the report said.

Australia’s land sector is a large net emissions sink, with the latest climate projections pointing to “historical lows” in recent years. On balance, 22MtCO2e was absorbed by the land sector in 2018, the report says, but this is set to shrink to 14MtCO2 in 2020 and 1MtCO2e in 2030.

The current lows are due to forest cover increases that are not expected to continue, the report says. This declining carbon sink is one of the main drivers of Australia’s emissions “growth” up to 2020.

Climate laws

Australia’s CCA is a statutory body established in 2011 to advise the government on climate targets and policy. It is modelled closely on the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC).

All its proposals need to meet certain criteria, including being economically “efficient”, equitable and consistent with Australia’s trade objectives. Former prime minister Tony Abbott tried but failed to get rid of the CCA, though he did remove its advisory role on emission targets. The body has since shrunk significantly.

In 2013, Abbot closed the Climate Commission, an independent science and public education body established by the government in 2011. However, it was resurrected as the Climate Council, a non-profit organisation, just days later.

Meanwhile, a 2007 greenhouse and energy reporting act introduced a single national framework for reporting on emissions, in part to underpin any future emissions trading scheme.

Australia’s renewable electricity target and ERF are also set in law, while a 2010 act obliges commercial buildings to disclose their energy efficiency when sold or leased.

Impacts and adaptation

Australia is experiencing higher temperatures, more frequent and intense extreme heat events, and higher fire risk and drought conditions due to climate change, says the country’s 2017 national communication to the UNFCCC. “These changes in climate are expected to continue,” it adds.

Annual mean temperatures in the country have already risen by around 1.1C since the late 1800s. They are expected to reach to 1.6-5.3C, depending on future emissions.

This year, Australia experienced its hottest summer on record, with the national average temperature around 2.1C above the long-term average, as well as multiple other heat records broken. Long-term climate trends played a role in the heatwaves, its Bureau of Meteorology says.

Drought is seen as a particularly serious issue in Australia. There are strong concerns about the Murray-Darling Basin in the southeastern interior, one of Australia’s most significant agricultural areas, which is already being affected by climate change. Rainfall patterns are changing and extreme storms, droughts and floods are becoming more frequent and intense, according to a recent paper by the region’s authority.

The report came in response to three mass fish deaths at lakes within the basin, which a scientific panel concluded were caused by drought as well as over-extraction.

A 2015 report from University of Melbourne researchers outlined how many of Australia’s major food commodities could be affected by climate change, from beef and dairy production to wheat and barley. Up to 70% of Australia’s winegrowing regions with a Mediterranean climate will be less suitable for grape growing by 2050, the report said.

Black Kite flee a bushfire in Northern Territory, Australia on 9 December 2016. Credit: Brad Leue / Alamy Stock Photo.

Climate change has also been linked to an increased risk of bushfires and length of the fire season. However, overall effects are complex since climate change can impact the various risk factors of wildfires in different ways.

There is also concern about sea-level rise, which is likely to be close to the expected global average of up to a metre by 2100. The country has already seen increased rates of extreme sea levels. Around half of Australia’s population lives within 7km of the coast.

Australia’s Great Barrier Reef is already being severely damaged by coral bleaching due to  marine heatwaves and ocean acidification. Two major bleaching events in 2016 and 2017 affected 93% and 83% of coral in the reef respectively. The government has opposed – and lobbied against – efforts to add the Great Barrier Reef to Unesco’s “in danger” list.

Coral bleaching off the coast of Townsville, Australia, November 2018. Credit: Daisy Dunne / Carbon Brief.

The country first set out its approach to adaptation in its 2007 national adaptation framework. It also has a national research facility to support management of climate risks with reports on “priority themes”. In 2015, it released a climate adaptation strategy towards climate resilience in Australia.

In 2015, Australia committed to giving at least AUS$1bn (£540m) in international climate finance to vulnerable countries over five years. This was redirected from the existing foreign aid budget and included $187m previously pledged to the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Government budget papers published this month imply Australia has ruled out contributions to GCF’s replenishment round this year.

Australia does also give significant bilateral climate funding. Overall, it was the 10th largest international climate finance donor in 2015 and 2016, according to Carbon Brief analysis. The highest transfer to a single country went to Indonesia.

The post The Carbon Brief Profile: Australia appeared first on Carbon Brief.